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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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CONTENTS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Attitude of Armenian Congress Toward USSR Reported (Jean-Claude Buhrer; LE MONDE, 25 Jul 83)	1
Lausanne Congress Ends, 'Difficulties for Unity' Cited (Jean-Claude Buhrer; LE MONDE, 26 Jul 83)	3
France Seeks UN Recognition of Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Edwy Plenel; LE MONDE, 29 Jul 83)	5

ARAB AFRICA

EGYPT

Economic Policies Based on Foreign Values Criticized (Amr Muhyi al-Din; AL-AHALI, 6 Jul 83)	8
Problems Engendered by Foreign Work Force Detailed (Isam al-Shaykh; AL-AHALI, 6 Jul 83)	14
Pollutants, Salt Water, Fishing Industry Endanger al-Manzalah Lake (A'isha Mustafa; AKHIR SA'AH, No 2533, 11 May 83)	22
Scholar Discusses Cultural Development Over Past 30 Years (Ali Shalash; AL-MAJALLAH, various dates)	30

MOROCCO

Amended Finance Law for 1983 Adopted (LE MATIN DU SAHARA, 2 Aug 83)	50
--	----

Crisis State of Housing in Nation's Capital Deplored (Maria Ben Bouchouaib; AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI, various dates)	68
SUDAN	
Critic Flays Government Oil Policy, Criticizes American Companies (Muhammad 'Ali Babakr; AL-DUSTUR, various dates)	75
Briefs Information Minister Reappointed	87
ARAB EAST/ISRAEL	
ISRAEL	
Shamir's Positions on Various Issues Examined (Refa'el Bashan; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 2 Sep 83)	88
Briefs Population Count	91
OMAN	
Deputy Prime Minister Discusses New Political Reforms, Policies (Fahd Al Sa'id Interview; 'UMAN, 5 Jul 83)	92
Government Releases Various Primary, Secondary School Statistics ('UMAN, 20 Jul 83)	99
PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS	
Impact of Syrian Control Over PLO Dissidents Discussed (Jihad al-Khazin; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 16 Jul 83)	101
SAUDI ARABIA	
West German Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia (Muhammad 'Ali Qasim; AL-DUSTUR, No 292, 27 Jun 83)	105
IRAN	
Radicals Begin Campaign Against the Hojjatieh (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	110
Hojjatieh Stand on Khomeyni Successor Viewed (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	112
Young Shah Compliments Iranians on Show of Solidarity Day (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	114

Khomeini 'On Defensive' Over Continuation of War (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	116
Mussavi Outlines 5-Year Development Plan (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	117
Oil Minister Is Attacked in Pamphleteering Campaign (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	119
Two Condemned To Death for Economic Crimes (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, No 130, 25 Aug 83)	121
Briefs	
Mullahs Told To Guide	122
PAKISTAN	
U.S. Called an Undependable Ally; Soviet System Praised (Anis Hashmi; JANG, 5 Aug 83)	123
Budgetary Policies Termed Disastrous, Political Implications Examined (ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Aug 83)	125
Briefs	
Ansari Commission Member Resigns	128
Baluch Leader Arrested	128

ATTITUDE OF ARMENIAN CONGRESS TOWARD USSR REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Jul 83 p 20

[Article by Jean-Claude Buhner: "Armenian World Congress Handles Soviet Union Carefully"]

[Text] "Our fight is not directed against the Turkish people, but rather against all the states that would like to bury our cause." That seem to be the position taken by the second Armenian world congress which met until Sunday 24 July in Lausanne. Nevertheless, the answers given to the press on Friday by the principal driving force behind the congress, Pastor James Karnusian, were not enough to lift some of the ambiguities hanging over the meeting. Whether it concerned violence or the attitude toward the Soviet Union, a kind of hesitation i not confusion, was perceptible everywhere.

Questioned about the armed struggle, Mr Karnusian was to answer: "The congress is a supporter of the Armenian struggle in all its forms, but dissociates itself from certain methods, particularly blind terrorism as was the case a few days ago at Orly." He added: "It must be noted, however, that some young people are ready to sacrifice themselves and to spill their blood for Armenia, regardless of our wishes. It will not be possible for us to influence these groups as long as the Turkish government persists in its intransigence and denies the genocide of 1915. While praising the political and diplomatic route, we really must admit that without terrorism, neither the mass media nor the governments would have talked about the Armenian cause as much as they have.

From the evasive answers given to questions about the situation of Armenians in the USSR emerges the impression of a desire to handle the Soviet Union carefully. Pastor Karnusian stated: "Our number one priority continues to be the recovery of western Armenia, occupied by Turkey." Some confusion likewise appeared when a Turkish journalist asked to whom the authorities of his country should address themselves in order to set up an eventual dialog with the Armenians. "The Armenian people have a historical official representation in Erevan and the Turkish minister of foreign affairs could make contact with his counterpart from the Soviet Republic of Armenia," was his answer at first.

A little later, the answer was corrected in these terms: "An Armenian government endowed with national representativeness exists in the USSR. But the congress aspires precisely to play that role by reinforcing its structures in order to assume representativeness of the entirety of the diaspora, and the Armenians of the Soviet Union will also find their place there."

Finally, in a resolution adopted on Friday, the congress "vigorously protested against the expulsion measures that the French government plans to take regarding some 20 persons recently questioned in Paris and against whom no charges have been filed." He appeals to "France's constant tradition of justice and liberty, so that these Armenians will not be delivered to their enemies."

9895

CSO: 4619/91

LAUSANNE CONGRESS ENDS, 'DIFFICULTIES FOR UNITY' CITED

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Jul 83 p 8

[Article by Jean-Claude Buhrer, special correspondent in Lausanne]

[Text] Lausanne--Brought to attention by its concurrence with the terrorist attacks in Brussels and at Orly and with their consequences, the second Armenian world congress, which ended Sunday, 24 July in Lausanne, will have made apparent not only its own limitations, but also the still deep divisions within the Armenian diaspora. Although more than 200 were expected to participate, the congress actually drew only some 60 persons from some 15 countries who attended as private individuals. More than half were members of France's Armenian community and the few members of the Armenian National Movement (ANM), once close to the ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], proved to be particularly active.

In the absence of the diaspora's main traditional organizations, the militant wing of Armenian nationalism clearly set the tone of the line of action drawn up in Lausanne. Thus, the participants in the congress believe that "only an all out struggle, drawing its energy from a vast national liberation movement, is likely to upset the distribution of power in favor of the Armenian people in its fight to liberate the national territory from Turkish colonialism." In another document, they remark that "the use of propaganda for armed action has changed the course of the history of the Armenian people and brought about a strengthening of national consciousness."

Without openly distancing itself from armed struggle, the Lausanne congress nonetheless recommends "a peaceful, just, and lasting settlement to the Armenian question." The allied nations which signed the treaty of Lausanne, sacrificing--60 years ago--the national interests of the Armenian people, are invited to "re-open the case in order to correct this denial of justice," while the UN, the U.S., the USSR, and the international community as a whole are also called upon to contribute their efforts. As for the Turkish government, it is asked "to carry out the courageous act" of recognizing the genocide of 1915, which would allow for dialogue to begin at last.

In a statement intended to be official, the participants in the congress expressed their will "to obtain diplomatic recognition as a national liberation organization for the Armenian world congress." They also wish to speak in the

name of the diaspora and have therefore decided to create an Armenian national council. In the meantime, a seven-member executive council has been established, chaired by Mr James Karnusian, the Swiss pastor of Armenian origin who organized the congress.

It remains to be seen how the conclusions reached at the congress, which was only relatively representative, will be received throughout the diaspora. In any case, disagreement came out, at least in Lausanne, even before the official close of the meeting. In an unscheduled press conference, representatives of the French Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause (FCDAC), close to the Dashnak party of socialist ideology, denied the congress, "private and marginal in nature, the legitimacy to call itself a national council." For them, this is a case of "usurpation that no organization before now has had the effrontery to make." The FCDAC recalled that "without abusive publicity, the three Armenian political parties signed a joint and unitary declaration in 1975, expressing their determination to pursue the primary objectives of recognition of the genocide by Turkey and restitution of the Armenian territories."

In response to these protests, Mr Ara Toranian, an ANM official, emphasized that the time had come "to build, stone by stone, an Armenian national council on democratic foundations." The ambiguity surrounding the Lausanne congress bears witness to the many obstacles which must still be surmounted in order to rally the diverse currents within the Armenian diaspora around a common, unifying program.

12413

CSO: 4619/93

FRANCE SEEKS UN RECOGNITION OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE OF 1915

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Jul 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Edwy Plenel]

[Text] Following Paris and Lisbon, Armenian terrorism continues to rage in Europe, and particularly by the minister of the interior. For why this fury against a country which, among Western nations, is now without a doubt the most sure, the most steadfast ally of the Armenian community in its battle for history?

Here, in fact, the present is dependent on the past: identity is a matter of memory, which itself is denied the Armenians by the Turkish Government, the memory of the genocide of 24 April 1915, of its succession of deportations, massacres and pillages. But it is international complicity in the ignorance of history, illustrated by the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923, when the Western allies sacrificed the rights of the Armenian people, which in large part sustains the mad and criminal successors to the lost soldiers of ASALA. Because of a relatively large degree of manipulation of this terrorism, entangled in the Near East arena, also used without a doubt toward other ends, for other causes, it would not be able to forget this starting point which is an international responsibility: the recognition by nations of a genocide, and by the same token, of persecutions practically throughout history, pursued still to this day, in Iran especially. Recognition of the past which is the legitimacy of a people.

Gaston Defferre, who knows from experience that terrorism struggles with political and diplomatic responses in parallel with repressive reprisals, has persisted on this repeatedly: who better than France has understood and assumed this requirement? On these principles, since before 10 May 1981, [France has continued] with a cautious international operation.

In 1979, speaking before the UN Commission on Human Rights, Professor Jean-Claude Soyer, delegate of France, stated: "The atrocities perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915 have been denounced in several reports dispatched by the French ambassador to Turkey at the time. (...) As for the story of the Armenian people, the facts are there, and no one has the power to modify them or cross them out."

Since the election of Mr Mitterrand, this recognition of the genocide has been reinforced. The same term is used now in official documents to denote the massacre of 1915. Numerous government responses to parliamentary questions are proof of this. [On] 13 July 1981: "The government deplores the position of the present Turkish authorities, who persist in considering the events of 1915 not as a genocide designed to exterminate the Armenian populations of East Anatolia, but as the repression of a revolt arising from the Russian army offensive." [On] 26 October 1981: "The Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were the victims of a genocide, the facts are the facts, and it is not in anyone's power either to modify them or to have them forgotten." [On] 21 April 1982: "First, France regards the Armenians who were living in the Ottoman Empire as victims of a genocide. Secondly, this position has been expressed repeatedly to the Turkish authorities."

To these public position statements has been added, since May 1981, a favorable response to the request of Armenian religious authorities that public servants, students and schoolchildren of Armenian origin be able to take leave to participate in the holidays and religious ceremonies of the community, especially 24 April, the anniversary of the genocide.

On precisely 24 April 1982, Mr Defferre, addressing the members of the Marseille Armenian community and "through them, all the Armenians of France" had to be still more explicit: "France will help you win your cause, but I ask you to understand that the French Government cannot accept the use of violence for a cause as worthy as yours." Because beyond speeches, there are also actions, more discreet, conforming to diplomatic traditions. In international entreaties, in the European Parliament and above all in the United Nations, French representatives, in fact, plead for the recognition of the genocide. An entirely mysterious matter, "paragraph 30," has for 10 solid years disturbed the Subcommittee for the Struggle Against Discriminatory Measures and the Protection of Minorities.

In 1971, in fact, the subcommittee began a "study on the issue of the prevention and repression of the crime of genocide." In 1973, the report made public contained a paragraph 30 which pointed out the "massacre of Armenians, which is considered the first genocide of the 20th century." The Turkish delegation requested suppression of it. Mysteriously, in 1979, at the time of a new presentation of the report, the said paragraph had in fact entirely disappeared. And the report was put to sleep.

Since 1981, the French expert on the subcommittee, Louis Joinet, has concerned himself with getting the whole report in hand. On 7 September 1982, he stated to the United Nations: "However old the 'faits' [facts], it is the right of all people to have the historic truth restored, particularly when it has been the victim of repressions. I regard equally that which is part of one's identity, one's cultural inheritance." Also in 1983, the UN Commission on Human Rights has adopted a new resolution requesting the designation of a new reporter so that the study on "the crime of genocide" may be led to its completion.

This should be carried out during the next session of the subcommission, from 15 August to 9 September. In short, if the United Nations persists despite the inevitable opposition of the Turkish regime, as France has done domestically in repeating that "present-day Turkey should not be considered responsible for the machinations of the Ottoman Empire government," international recognition of the Armenian genocide could occur 1 or 2 years from now. And France would be largely responsible.

12354

CSO: 4619/88

ECONOMIC POLICIES BASED ON FOREIGN VALUES CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Jul 83 p 5

[Article by Dr 'Amr Muhyi al-Din: "Economic Problem: Crisis and Solution; Order of Priorities Is Wrong Because Decision Makers Embrace U.S. Concept of Progress"]

[Text] AL-AHALI continues to present the views of Egyptian economists on alternative policies to the policies that have led Egypt to its stifling economic crisis. In this issue, Dr 'Amr Muhyi al-Din writes on the contradiction under which Egyptian society lives because of the officials' adoption of the U.S. concept of development and progress.

One of the most important issues determining the true nature of the state's social options in the area of development is the question of the production, demand and imports structure. Let us examine some commodities to find out whose needs have taken priority in production and imports. Let us begin with food. Nobody denies that the average calories available to the individual in Egypt exceed the individual's average share of calories in most developing countries. In fact, the individual's average share of some commodities, such as wheat and rice, clearly exceeds the similar share in the developing countries and in some advanced countries. But what concerns us in this respect is the make-up of these calories and the food distribution and consumption pattern concealed by this average.

In Egypt, nearly 94 percent of the calories obtained by the individual are derived from plant products whereas the share of grains and starches amounts to 70 percent. By adding legumes and carbohydrates, we find that 80 percent of the calories acquired by the individual come from the group of filling food commodities, which are cheap commodities, (whereas less than 20 percent of the calories come from canned foods and vegetable oils). These percentages indicate a low standard of nutrition. As for calories generated by meats, they do not exceed 2.3 percent of all calories. A study conducted by the International Labor Organization in 1977 on poverty in Egypt indicates that nearly 44 percent of the poor rural population suffers from a shortage of 20 percent in the calories needed to renew daily energy.

As for the distribution of food, the demand for food indicates the following, according to the 1975 family budget: The statistics indicate that nearly 69 percent of the urban families get 34 percent of all grains and starches consumed in the urban areas (these are families with an annual spending of less than 400 pounds). It is assumed that 31 percent of the urban families (with an annual spending of more than 400 pounds) get 66 percent of the grains and starches consumed in the urban areas, keeping in mind that spending on grains and starches represents the basic spending and the main percentage of the spending of the first category, contrary to the second category. As for meat, fish and poultry, the studies indicate that 60 percent of the families in urban areas consume 21 percent of the meat, fish and poultry consumed in the urban areas whereas 31 percent of the families in the urban areas consume 79 percent of the meat, fish and poultry, keeping in mind that animal protein represents a small percentage of the spending of the first category. The picture in the rural areas is not different from that in the urban areas. Nearly 67 percent of the families in the rural areas get 20 percent of the meat, fish and poultry consumed in the countryside whereas 33 percent of the rural families (with an annual spending of more than 400 pounds) get 80 percent of the meat, fish and poultry consumed in the rural areas.

Let us first examine the production indicators and the growth in demand for certain goods, as well as the import movement of such goods. Let us start with the list of essential goods, such as wheat, corn, broad beans, lentils, rice, sugar and vegetable oils. Regarding wheat, the annual average growth in demand for this commodity from 1974-81 was 6.4 percent, and the average annual increase in production in the same period was .6 percent. As for corn, the average growth rate in the demand for this commodity in the same period was 6.4 percent annually whereas the average production increase was 3.5 percent annually. As for broad beans, the average annual growth rate in the demand for this commodity was 2.3 percent whereas production declined in the period from 1974-81 at an annual rate of 1.6 percent. The growth in overall demand for rice in the same period was 1.8 percent annually whereas the average production increase was 1.5 percent annually. As for lentils, the increase in the demand for this commodity during the same period was 3.8 percent annually whereas the local production of lentils declined at a rate of 29 percent annually. As for vegetable oils, the average overall annual growth rate in demand for this commodity was 7.2 percent in the 1974-81 period whereas the annual production increase in the same period was .6 percent. The demand for sugar in the said period leaped by 11.6 percent annually whereas the annual increase in production was 2.6 percent.

What draws attention insofar as most of these commodities, excluding sugar, is concerned is that the annual average growth rate in demand in the period 1960-74 was not much different from the growth rate prevalent in the 1970's, which we have just mentioned, as in the case of wheat, for example. What is more, the annual average growth rate in the demand for sugar in the 1960's was higher than in the 1970's. The difference in the 1970's was the evident failure of local production to meet the demand--a failure that undermined self-sufficiency in most of these commodities. In

1981, the self-sufficiency rate in wheat was 24 percent, in corn 71 percent, in sugar 53 percent, in broad beans 70 percent and in lentils 5 percent. As for the sharp rise in the demand for sugar, Egyptian economists interpret this on the basis that sugar is the commodity of the poor in Egypt, representing their main source of the calories necessary to renew daily energy. The demand for this commodity rises with the rise in its price and with the fall in the real incomes of the poor.

If we examine the commodities representing an important source of calories for people with high incomes, we find that the total demand for red meats rose in the period 1974-81 nearly 6.4 percent annually whereas the growth rate in the local production of these meats was 1.8 percent annually, thus causing the self-sufficiency rate in these meats to fall to 73 percent in 1981. The average growth in meat imports totaled 44 percent annually in the period from 1970-71 to 1979. The average annual growth rate in the demand for chicken was 9.9 percent annually whereas the average annual increase in production was 2.8 percent, thus bringing the self-sufficiency rate to only 62 percent. The average annual growth rate in chicken imports was 21 percent over the same period. Meanwhile, the average annual growth rate in fish imports amounted to 30.7 percent in the period 1971-79 and the self-sufficiency rate for fish was 53 percent in 1981.

As for clothing, the annual average growth rate in the local production of cloth material was 1.8 percent in the period 1971-79 whereas the average annual growth rate in cloth material imports amounted to 13 percent in the same period.

What about manufactured goods? The average annual growth rate in the production of electric refrigerators was 14 percent in the period 1971-79 whereas the average annual growth in the importation of electric refrigerators (exceeding 14 cubic feet) was 29 percent in the same period. The average annual growth rate in [the production of] of radios was 4 percent, whereas the average annual growth rate in the importation of radios was 55 percent in the period 1971-79. The average annual growth rate in the production of television sets was 16 percent in the period 1971-79, whereas the average annual growth rate in the importation of such sets was 31 percent. We noted previously the high growth rates in the local production of cars, totaling 16.5 percent annually, whereas the importation of private cars rose from 4,000 in 1972 to 50,000 in 1980-81, an increase of 1,150 percent. We noted previously the growth in the importation of U.S.-made cars of six cylinders or more. We also noted the importation of more than 2,000 special Mercedes cars in 1980 whereas just about 1,000 such cars were imported in 1976. I do not want to note here the structure of imports without currency remittance, (so as not to agitate anybody).

What kind of a society is this we are talking about in which resources are used for the production of cars, refrigerators, television sets and other consumer goods that serve the needs of small groups? Let us examine the prices of these goods and see who among us has enough surplus, after meeting essential needs, to purchase these goods at such prices and see what

his occupation is and especially if wages are the source of his income. Who among us has the money to purchase these goods? Are they government and public sector workers? Are they people who make their income in the Arab countries? Are they people whose income has been generated in productive activities in the private sector? Or are they people with illicit income? What may also seem surprising in this situation is that even though there is a housing crisis in Egypt (the shortage, according to most estimates amounts to 1 million housing units), most of the resources are channelled toward luxury housing and above-average housing at costs that make one wonder what production activity generates such incomes that permit those engaged in them to build these units after meeting life's other needs.

What kind of a society are we talking about in which the resources are used to meet the needs of small groups at a time when more than a quarter of the population suffers from a lack of clean drinking water, when half the population suffers from a lack of sanitary sewerage, when half the population does not have electricity for lighting, when 56 percent of the population suffers from illiteracy and when the elementary schools can absorb only 60 percent of the students, the preparatory schools 50 percent and the secondary schools 42 percent (in 1976)? What is this flaw in our priorities and what is the social option that has led to this pattern of resource utilization? What kind of option is it that leads to building the international al-Salam Hospital in which private sector companies participated at a time when maternal welfare centers in the urban areas comprise just 1 center per 53,000 people, when the comprehensive examination [medical] units comprise 1 per 650,000 people, when health offices amount to 1 per 40,000 people and when hospitals for chest diseases amount to 1 per 108,000 people?

All of our priorities need to be reexamined. The prevalent investment and spending pattern reflects faulty concepts of economic and social development and of the meaning of progress and advancement. This can be explained in several aspects:

First, this flaw in our priorities is due to our adoption of a concept and criterion of progress and development derived from another culture, namely, the Western culture. This concept is that of the average individual income. This culture measures prosperity by a material yardstick, the volume of goods and services that the individual obtains. I personally see no good in this. The problem is that when we say that progress and growth consist of moving from an average individual income of \$400 to an average individual income of \$6,000, as is the case in some European countries or in the United States, then we must realize that the significance of this individual income lies not in this number of thousands of dollars. This average individual income contains a certain structure of goods and services that reflect society's preferences of choices. The average individual income covers a combination of consumer goods that reflect this society's pattern of consumption. It reflects transportation and communication services (let it be the luxury car) and it reflects the

living pattern of society's members. It reflects the specific pattern of public and private health services. The average individual income also includes rest and recreation and social and personal services. This combination of goods and services signifies and reflects the pattern and way of this society's life. Consequently, when we adopt the average individual income in Europe and the United States as a goal and (as a criterion of progress and growth), then we unwittingly adopt this combination of goods and services that reflects the concept of progress from the viewpoint of the prevalent theories concerning development. Therefore, we can demonstrate progress by offering transportation in the form of a luxury car and show progress by the acquisition of a color TV. This may lead us to the adoption of faulty political decisions, thus producing private cars, color TV sets and electric refrigerators without insuring minimal public transportation, public health service and education for the broad mass of citizens.

Second, progress in these [European and U.S.] societies began within the framework of production. The leading elite achieved its position by stressing increased production through technical and technological progress. As for satisfying consumption, this followed as a result of this productive society. There is no objection to the private car being the mode and means of transportation as long as you can really produce it. As for us, we advance in consumption before advancing in production. On the other hand, the progress in these societies is integrated and is not confined to one sector.

There is absolutely no objection to our aspiring to own a private car, a color TV and an electric refrigerator, as in France, England and the United States. But we must know that these countries that produce and consume the car and the TV set guarantee their citizens a minimum standard of education, health and so forth. In France, the individual's share of spending on education is \$273, and in the United States the per capita share is \$379; in Egypt this per capita share is \$15. Progress is an integrated whole.

Third, perhaps this faulty concept of development and progress is reflected in this strange duality in all aspects of our life where the enormous buildings constructed according to the latest architectural style stand side-by-side with the shacks in al-Turjuman and the houses in Taht al-Rub', Zaynhum and elsewhere, where the latest models of imported cars are seen side-by-side with donkey-drawn carts and barefooted pedestrians, where the latest technology in agriculture and industry coexists with production techniques that have been in use for thousands of years and where a small elite who wear the latest fashions produced by the European fashion houses, who have received their education in European and American schools, who enjoy listening to Beethoven, Bach and Mozart and like to discuss the theories of Einstein, Adam Smith, Schopenhauer and Hegel live side-by-side with the broad masses of citizens who may not know what is happening beyond their country's borders.

These problems exist because these faulty concepts live in the minds of those who make the decisions determining the pattern of the utilization of our resources. The question is: Can there be a concept of progress whereby the average individual income grows, if this is possible, while a joint policy combining commodities and service is employed reflecting a different mode of life and a different logic of happiness? Isn't the issue of the social priorities and the questions this issue raises in real need of debate?

8494

CSO: 4504/502

PROBLEMS ENGENDERED BY FOREIGN WORK FORCE DETAILED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by 'Isam al-Shaykh]

[Text] One of the wonders of the age of the open-door economic policy is that Egypt exports its workers by the millions and instead imports foreign workers.

Building and construction workers, known as the builders class, no longer comprise citizens of Upper Egypt who come from the southern part of the valley but now include foreigners who speak English, French, Korean and other languages. As for the builders from Upper Egypt, many of them are seen at Athens airport on the way to their work "beyond the borders."

Official statistics indicate that foreign workers in Egypt increased by 22.9 percent in one year, 1975-76, and that the percentage of foreign workers employed in production and construction and in operating machinery and equipment in 1980 totaled 44.6 percent of the total foreign work force.

The facts indicate that Egypt is not in dire need of this foreign work force, that a large part of this force makes no real addition to production, that there is a legislative chaos that has led to increasing their numbers and that the privileges they get are virtually restoring the era of the foreign concessions, since these workers pay no taxes and no social security. Moreover, they act arrogantly toward the Egyptian workers.

What is the story of foreign labor in Egypt?

How to set right the topsy-turvy conditions in the Egyptian labor market in the era of the open-door economic policy?

Permits and Conditions

Regarding the regulations governing the employment of foreign workers in Egypt, the director of permits for foreigners at the Ministry of Manpower says:

The granting of permits to foreign workers is governed by two fundamental conditions for the various sectors: That the foreign worker not compete with Egyptian workers engaged in a similar field and that the foreign worker licensed to work in the country fundamentally meet a shortage in a certain sphere and, second, that an Egyptian be appointed assistant to such a worker so that he can replace the foreign worker in the future, as is happening in Egyptian hotels at present.

The director of permits adds:

The percentage of foreign workers at the work sites is determined by the executive bylaws of the investment law issued by decree No 375 of 1977 by the minister of economy and foreign trade, stipulating that the foreign labor force may not exceed 25 percent of the total work force at the work site. The executive bylaws also stipulate that the Egyptian workers' wages may not be less than 65 percent of the foreign worker's wages.

The labor departments in the governorates coordinate with the foreign firms operating in Egypt and with the Egyptian workers. These departments receive the requests concerning these firms' needs for Egyptian labor, examine these requests and then determine if such needs can be met by Egyptian workers or not.

Tax Exemptions

As for taxes on foreign workers' wages, Tax Agency official said:

The sums collected by foreign experts employed by the authorities and agencies to perform services under their supervision are subject to a set tax of 10 percent, provided that these experts are not employed for more than 6 months per year, whether the employment comes in one stretch or in segments. If their employment exceeds this period, then their earnings are subject to the tax governing salaries and wages.

The latest statistics on the volume of foreign labor in Egypt show that there was an increase of 22.9 percent in 1976 compared with 1975 and 8.13 percent in 1980 compared with 1978. The places where foreign workers are basically found are CAiro and Alexandria. The figures also show that whereas the number of [foreign] workers in production was 30.5 percent the total foreign labor force, this ratio rose to 44.6 percent in 1980 (production workers include building and construction workers and workers operating equipment and machinery).

Why Foreign Workers

Eng Ahmad al-Juwayni, an ex-member of the (Egoth) Company board of directors, has defined the reasons for the importation of foreign contractors, totaling 36 foreign companies and 48 joint investment companies, along with their experts and workers to operate in Egypt; these reasons include:

Egypt's need for modern management in construction, which facilitates rapid completion and accurate execution.

The existence of new types of construction, such as prefabricated buildings, be they metal or concrete. These approaches are totally different from the conventional methods we know.

Our failure to catch up with changes that have occurred in the methods of construction and building and with the technological machinery and equipment recently introduced into this field.

The emigration of large numbers of skilled construction and building workers, especially those engaged in finishing work. This emigration has created an imbalance in this field.

This is in addition to the introduction of new raw materials unknown to the Egyptian worker, such as aluminum facades.

Foreigners Twice Egyptians

Al-Juwayni defends the much higher wages paid to the foreign worker compared with the Egyptian worker and has expressed the belief that this is due to several considerations, including: The foreign worker's experience and modern training, his adherence to schedules and his precise execution, in addition to the fact that the foreign worker's standard of living is high in his country and his wages are high in compared with those of the Egyptian. To put it candidly, the foreigner's position in Egypt is the same as the Egyptian's position in the Arab countries in all respects.

To counter the increasing number of foreign contracting firms in Egypt, Engineer al-Juwayni proposes that the various parties concerned exert concerted efforts to benefit from the modern expertise and developments in the field of construction so that within 10 years the Egyptian companies will be able to undertake with their workers and engineers all the contracts and services now being undertaken by the foreign firms and so that the Egyptian companies will be able to keep up with the progress in this field. In this way, they will be able to achieve self-sufficiency.

Where Have Egyptians Gone

Fahmi Badr, deputy chairman of the Construction Workers' General Union, says that even though the law stipulates that foreign workers may not constitute more than 25 percent of the total work force, when these firms apply to the labor bureaus for Egyptian workers, they are told that these workers are not available. This gives the companies the opportunity to increase the percentage of foreign workers as they wish. The labor bureaus are excused because there is no comprehensive survey of Egyptian workers, their abilities and their classification. This has prompted the union to seek the issuance of ministerial decree No 60 of 1980 which allows it to open the bureaus for the employment of Egyptian workers. These bureaus

conduct comprehensive worker surveys and then notify the various labor departments in the governorates so that they can meet the needs of the foreign companies instead of encouraging them to exceed [the percentage of foreign workers set by the law]. This decree also requires business owners and firms that need workers in the various fields of construction not to fill their vacant jobs or jobs that become vacant except through these departments, which coordinate with these labor bureaus.

Has the union tried to find a solution to the shortage of skilled and advanced workers?

Fahmi Badr says in reply:

The union has received a grant from the West German Construction Workers Union to set up a complete training center, with all of its equipment, instruments and curricula compatible with the latest developments, provided that the Egyptian union supplies the land and buildings necessary for the center. However, the unavailability of funds has prevented us from utilizing this grant so far.

Fahmi Badr says that training centers are the primary solution to the problem of the growth of foreign labor in Egypt. Such centers are capable of training and developing the Egyptian workers and of creating a new generation of skilled technical workers on modern scientific bases. These centers will also save the hard currency that the foreign workers collect for their wages and that can be used to achieve the state's development plans by providing inexpensive and skilled Egyptian labor, especially since some foreign firms employ conscripts from their countries to work at the projects while paying them only a conscript's salary, with the difference going to the state treasury of the countries from which these contracting companies come.

The deputy chairman of the Construction Workers General Union wonders about the position of some public sector contracting companies, which have modern technology in the field of construction and which can use this technology to train their workers, at least, but fail to do so and rely on foreign workers to operate this technological equipment. Even though the state supplies these companies with large sums of money for training, this money is not used. The existence of a shortage of skilled labor does not mean that skilled workers are not available. Rather, there is no cooperation between the authorities concerned and the union so that we can ultimately draw a true profile of the labor available in Egypt. For your information, Egypt is still the main exporter of construction workers to all of the Arab countries.

Damages and Necessities

Eng Sharif al-Nazir, an Arab contractor, defines the dimensions of the foreign labor phenomenon in Egypt, observing that there are many reasons for the presence of the foreign contracting firms and their workers and that some of these reasons are acceptable whereas others need to be reexamined.

The reasons that al-Nazir views as acceptable include the need for technical expertise, especially on major projects, to finish work in the best manner and to transfer this expertise and knowledge to the Egyptian market. These reasons also include the growing demand in the construction sector and the involuntary need for this foreign labor. Some loans granted for projects make it conditional that the loans be spent in the country of origin. Frequently, the country granting the loan makes it conditional that construction of the project concerned be carried out by a specific contractor.

Engineer al-Nazir adds that there are drawbacks, and even dangers, in employing foreign contractors and foreign labor. He believes that when the foreign firms carry out the construction by themselves and without the presence of Egyptian contracting firms with them, the fundamental condition for their presence, namely, the transfer of modern technology to Egyptians, is negated.

Moreover, the failure of these companies to follow social security and trade register laws results in the absence of a tax card. Consequently, these foreign firms pay no taxes. This makes their burdens lighter compared with the Egyptian firms that obey the law.

Eng Sharif al-Nazir underlines other negative aspects of [foreign] labor in Egypt, including:

The emergence of a class of project owners and the growth of this class as a result of the open-door policy. These owners are interested primarily in having their work carried out, regardless of the consequences, whether economically, in terms of the hard currency they pay these [foreign] firms, in terms of the Egyptian expertise or in terms of their constant employment of foreign labor--employment that will gradually lead to the creation of hidden unemployment among Egyptian workers in this sector.

The phenomenon of the foreign lender and his stipulation that the activity pertaining to his loan be entrusted to a contracting firm from his country. The reason for this condition is the absence of a law or legislation to the contrary, whereas in other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Nigeria, we find a stipulation that the construction work must be carried out only by the citizens or by combinations of national and foreign firms. It is also totally impermissible to award a construction contract to a foreign firm exclusively. It is to be noted that such contracts end up with the importation of the building and all of its contents, and this is unjustifiable in Egypt.

Controls and Limits

To curtail this phenomenon, Sharif al-Nazir has made several proposals, including one that the Engineers Union not permit foreign consulting engineering firms and foreign engineers to offer engineering consultation independently; this would serve to implement the law, prevent these firms from determining who will do the work and transfer technology to Egyptian engineers. Al-Sharif has also demanded that Egyptian contractors be

reorganized so that they can compete on an equal footing with the foreign firms, especially since there are administrative and financial shackles that impede this competition, that an Egyptian construction code be established and that all parties be required to observe this code because this will make it easier for Egyptian workers and Egyptian engineers to absorb the foreign expertise and modern technology rapidly. Al-Nazir has also proposed that strict control and followup be imposed on the firms that employ foreign labor to insure that they abide by the Egyptian laws governing taxes, insurance and the percentage set by the Egyptian labor law. Another proposal made by al-Nazir calls for unifying and coordinating the profession's training policies so that it is possible to provide the labor needs required by the profession and to dispense with foreign labor.

Salah Hijab, member of an Egyptian engineering firm's board of directors, focuses on an important point, namely, that some foreign firms represent a danger in the sense that they drain Egyptian expertise by attracting this expertise to work for them for high wages in projects conducted outside of Egypt. Such companies need to be looked at and they must be penalized because they pose a constant threat by draining Egyptian engineering expertise and luring it to work outside the country.

It is the opinion of al-Hajj Ahmad 'Abd al-Baqi, a contractor that foreign workers are not skilled or specialized, as supposed, and that they are ordinary workers. Egypt has sufficient skilled and qualified workers but the state offers them no financial support and does not set their wages on the basis of their experience, thus prompting many Egyptian workers to go abroad or to abandon the public sector, as I have done.

Commenting on the presence of 600 foreign workers at the site where he works, 'Abd al-Baqi said that this number does not reflect a true need for them, a need that is much smaller than this number.

(Harry Hatchitibs), manager of a Yugoslav contracting company, says that although Egyptian engineers need supervision and care, the Egyptian worker needs training, especially since most of the workers with high qualifications have emigrated to the Arab countries where I have worked, such as Libya, Iraq and Jordan.

'Awad Hanafi Abu al-Su'ud, a painting contractor who works with his seven sons, says:

It is a shame that we have foreign workers in Egypt because the Egyptian worker can complete in a single day what the foreign worker needs 3 days to complete. It is a shame to import painters ['ummal bayad] because "Egypt is the mother of construction."

An Egyptian female engineer working in a project being carried out by a foreign contracting firm, and who refused to reveal her name, said that the foreign workers do not respect their supervisors and do not respect the dignity of the Egyptians. If the Egyptians were paid 10 percent of

the salaries of the foreign workers and if they were given proper psychological conditions, such as recreation trips and housing close to their work sites, they would be able to replace the foreigners, even produce more and achieve greater development than the foreigners.

'Ala' 'Abbas, a university student with a [monthly] income of 115 pounds, says that he started to work so as to rely on himself and to lighten his family's burden. "I have learned at the hands of foreigners but I can shoulder the responsibility of the work by myself. I am prepared to train new students and workers in operating modern machinery if I am asked to do so and as long as I feel that I am offering Egypt something through this effort."

Mistreatment of Egyptians

Ahmad Faraj, who has a diploma from the Engineering Institute, says that he has observed from his experience with foreigners that their work is characterized by precision and completeness and that they have greater experience than we have. However, what faults them is their mistreatment of the Egyptians. The cafeteria and the restaurant are exclusively theirs.

The social and economic studies conducted on this phenomenon indicate that though the growing foreign labor force may be compatible with the interests of the work and may speed the implementation of projects of all kinds, this compatibility diminishes when viewed from the standpoint of the state's future higher interests. Some of the negative aspects of this influx of foreign labor are:

The pressure exerted on public service utilities--health, housing, education and others--and the decline in the standard of these services. What is even more serious are the changes occurring in the country's population and social structure, especially if the labor coming in in large numbers has language, culture, beliefs, customs, aspirations, interests and principles different from those of the indigenous population.

The studies add that the harm intensifies when some of these incoming workers lack the motivation to work sincerely and to observe the culture, features, personality and characteristics of the host country. The harm is intensified still further when some of these workers engage in abnormal acts that have nothing to do with the work for which they have come. Some of them may be hiding behind the ostensible work to engage in activities harmful to the country.

The main common denominator among those concerned with the phenomenon of foreign labor in Egypt is their demand that this activity be regulated. Therefore, it is necessary to:

Reorganize the regulations and laws governing the issuance of permits for foreign workers. It is unreasonable for us to import painters when Egypt is full of them.

Set clear and specific conditions to define the foreign expert instead of considering every foreigner an expert when there are Egyptians who are more capable.

Reconsider the tax laws governing these firms and their workers to make it possible to establish honest and constructive competition with Egyptian companies and also to increase the nation's hard currency revenues.

Establish a job hierarchy for the workers so that such categories as superintendent and supervisor may reappear and add their expertise to those of the workers doing the work.

Conduct a comprehensive survey of Egyptian workers employed with these foreign firms in this sector and give them further training in order to prepare them as practical training experts for the new generation of skilled workers and technicians instead of letting them emigrate.

Expand the establishment of modern technological training centers so that they can help with the development in this and other sectors.

Tighten the control and follow-up on the foreign engineering firms and their engineers to determine the degree of their implementation of Egyptian laws.

Coordinate with the authorities concerned, such as the housing, industry and manpower authorities and the labor unions, so that we can channel our capabilities along the right path and achieve self-sufficiency not only in the building and construction sector but also in other sectors as well.

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POLLUTANTS, SALT WATER, FISHING INDUSTRY ENDANGER AL-MANZALAH LAKE

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2533, 11 May 83 pp 21-25

[Investigation by 'A'isha Mustafa: "AKHIR SA'AH on Shores of Egypt's Lakes: Suicide of al-Manzalah Lake Must Be Stopped! Who Will Save Fish from Pollution and Fishermen's Nets?"]

[Text] How can we halt the continuing suicide of our lakes? How can we save our fish resources from the dangers that threaten--from fishermen's nets that catch fingerlings and from pollution?

Fish resource scientists confirm that our many lakes are among the richest in the world, filled with the best varieties of fish--lakes such as al-Manzalah, al-Burullus, Nasir, Bardawil, Qarun, Maryut, Idku and the Bitter Lakes. We also have the banks of the Nile and the Seas that surround us. Nonetheless, we are still importing frozen fish! How...why...who is responsible?

AKHIR SA'AH begins its extensive series of investigations with al-Manzalah Lake, which once covered 750,000 feddans and now has shrunk to 291,000!

How Did Al-Manzalah Lake Shrink from 750,000 Feddans to 291,000?

Our first interview was with Maj Gen Sa'd Mash'al, the official in charge of the surface of al-Manzalah Lake, who said, "The lake surface is now 291,000 feddans spread over five governorates--Port Said, al-Daqahliyah, Damietta, al-Sharqiyah and Ismailia--all working together to increase productivity, which requires that technical projects be carried out in the lake. The most important project is bringing sea water (salt water) into the lake because the lake water is fresh, fed by the Bahr al-Baqar, Hadus and Ramsis canals. This fresh water must be mixed with a specific amount of salt water so that fish from the sea such as gray mullet, danis, maigre, shrimp and crab can live in the lake.

"In 1967 al-Jamil channel was closed, depriving the lake of salt water from the sea. We are solving this problem with the most important project now underway--the channel approximately 12 km west of Port Said city which will connect the lake to the sea and allow salt water to enter the lake. The water level in the channel will be adjusted by 11 sluices with mechanical gates to regulate water intake during the water's rise and fall. We will open or close these gates according to the water level. This project is the new Ashtum al-Jamil channel,

which has cost 11.5 million pounds so far, is 75 percent completed and is expected to be finished this year. We will begin a project called "al-Makhraj," to cost approximately 2 million pounds, with the Coastal Research Institute in Alexandria conducting a study that will cost 40,000 pounds.

"The above is the most important project to develop al-Manzalah Lake and consequently to develop its fish resources and to bring salt-water fish into the lake, raise them and increase yield. Opening this channel will get rid of the traps, reeds and weeds which hinder navigation and fishing in the lake. Opening the channel will also make it easier for fish, most importantly the eel, to go from the sea to the lake."

75,000 Tons of Gray Mullet!

The head of the al-Manzalah Lake authority continued, "The Qabuti canal connects the Suez canal with al-Manzalah Lake, allowing salt water and certain types of bottom fish, such as danis and maigre, to enter the lake. The channel of the Qabuti canal needs to be dredged and deepened to allow water to pass freely. The Egyptian Dredging Company has actually begun operations, which should result in 75,000 tons [as published] to be distributed throughout the country.

"One of the most important features of this authority is that we are developing the lake as a whole, as a national facility that will be self-sufficient and will be an integrated fishery with authority over the lake in five governorates. In the past, each governorate operated its part of the lake independently, and there was friction. Let's talk about the Damietta projects, where al-Manzalah Lake has two outlets--al-Saffarah and al-Ratam--which need to be dredged so that sea water can reach the lake. The governor of Damietta will negotiate with the Egyptian Dredging Company to do the work, which has already been authorized. This will mean that salt water and fish stock will enter the lake at Damietta, increasing productivity. The fourth project is in al-Saffarah canal itself, where there is a land bridge at 'Izbah al-Burj with culverts connecting to the coastal road at Port Said. We will remove the culverts and build a free-standing bridge to allow light to penetrate, since fish, fingerlings in particular, will not move in the dark; the strong pressure and current also make it difficult for them to move. The solution is to build a bridge with spaces to allow light to pass; authorization exists and the job will be done. Hatcheries will also be set up at Jamsah, al-Sharqiyah and Sa al-Hajar to provide fingerlings for local fisheries and for the lake. However, the best natural source of stock are the estuaries between the sea and the lake."

More Than 1 Million Pounds

Maj Gen Mash'al continued, "We shall also bring back a system that was used when the border forces were in Port Said. We will designate a specific area in al-Jamil where fishing is prohibited during certain times of the year to allow fish such as the gray mullet to grow in number and size. It has been proven scientifically that this is very productive, and we have contacted the water surface authority to prohibit fishing in this area. The best way to promote growth is to prohibit the catching of fingerlings--this can increase the number of fish fivefold. Unfortunately, the fishermen are always anxious to make a living, catching fingerlings and selling them for poultry feed. This is the job of the marine areas police.

However, there is a weak spot--there are too few policemen and soldiers to control al-Manzalah Lake, which covers approximately 300,000 feddans. We have asked the Minister of Interior to increase the number of marine areas police to take care of the lake. The officer who could come and control the lake would actually be worth more than 1 million pounds. There are no more than five officers, each responsible for thousands of feddans."

Production from the Lake and Al-Jamil

Our second meeting was with Sayyid Sirhan, governor of Port Said, home of the largest development project for al-Manzalah, who said, "Concern for the lake is nothing new, but goes back decades. Before the 1967 war, al-Manzalah's production was great enough to provide for Port Said and the surrounding governorates, as well as for export. The channels were affected by the wars, with channels destroyed and sand bars, islands and dams cropping up. There were also many fishing violations, such as the use of traps in the lake and depletion of the fingerlings from the shores of the lake.

"As a result, the size of the water surface shrank, and the salt content increased in certain areas where channels such as Bahr al-Baqar and Hadus emerge. The lake's production dropped, requiring prompt action. The al-Manzalah Lake administrative board was formed to be in charge of technical operations, take care of the water pouring in from the sea and tributaries and restore the lake to its former healthy condition and output. We are also getting rid of the rocks, sand bars and dams, eliminating fishing violations and augmenting the marine areas authority's forces on the lake, preserving the peace and properly enforcing fishing regulations, thereby protecting the fingerlings in the nets and maintaining productivity. The old al-Jamil channel has been dredged and a new al-Jamil channel is being built west of Port Said, which will be completed at the end of this year. This is a big boost for the lake and will restore its good condition little by little. Al-Qayuti outlet one of the major arteries of al-Manzalah, has also been cleared. The outlets at al-Ratam and al-Saffarah are being looked at, and a bridge has been built along Shata al-Bariyah road between Port Said and Damietta. Al-Baghdadi outlet is under this bridge and is important to the continued flow of water between the sea and the lake. The marine areas police are also waging an extensive campaign to control fishing violations and deter lawbreakers. The Ministry of Interior has reinforced the police with the necessary equipment and personnel. The surface of the lake plays a very important role and must receive more attention so that we can restore the lake's productivity. Through the administrative board, agreement is now being reached with the National Research Center to conduct a study on pollution around al-Manzalah Lake and its shores, including Bahr al-Baqar. Such a study would take almost a year to determine locations of pollution and ways to eliminate them. This is one of the goals of preserving our fish resources. At the recent board meeting the idea was raised of protecting fingerlings by preventing them from being fished carelessly and transplanting them in special fisheries. This would do great damage and would destroy the lake's fish resources, for maintaining stock is very important for development of the lake.

Largest Gray Mullet Hatchery in the Country

Port Said Governor Sayyid Sirhan resumed: "There is also a project to establish a gray mullet hatchery in the al-Jamil area, which we hope will go into operation because it would be very important for the production of fingerlings for the fisheries in Port Said and throughout the country. The gray mullet is one of the best fish and is found primarily in al-Bardawil, al-Burullus and one other lake. The important thing is that giving attention to stock, water surfaces and fishing regulations will result in a very large yield for food, and hard currency as well. The abundance of fish will mean a drop in prices, making fish a popular food and serious competition for red and white meat. We must not be concerned only with raising meat, but must give attention to our fish resources, which give the same food value at lower prices. God has given us coasts and lakes filled with the best types of fish and we should act, enforce regulations and protect these resources from being destroyed or squandered.

"The shrinkage of some parts of the lake undoubtedly constitutes a danger. The administrative board strongly agreed regarding the shrinkage and on preserving the area left, especially since the new channel will recreate the lake. Past neglect has created sand bars and pasture land used by some for farming and raising livestock. All this will cease, and we may be able to eliminate law-breakers.

"Another new project is a 600-feddan fishery started by the Ministry of Agriculture south of Port Said, which by the end of the year will yield around 150 tons per season, a figure that will increase each year. Fish cultivation is proven to be one of the most productive projects, hence officials' interest in it. The governorate is also concerned about the navigable lake east of the Port Fu'ad tributary because its productivity has been affected by the tributary. However, it did begin to produce last year and this year on a small scale, and its productivity will increase. The lake produces excellent varieties of gray mullet and danis, and gives a high yield in both variety and quantity.

Damietta Triangle

In Damietta governorate we met with engineer 'Isam Radi, governor of Damietta, to discuss development of al-Manzalah Lake in this governorate. He said, "The al-Manzalah Lake authority is composed of five governorates, with the governor of al-Daqahliyah in charge. We have a very small part of the lake--30,000 feddans. This part is being developed and is suitable for fisheries. We have set up a farm on 1,000 feddans. However, the most important part of developing the lake is to have channels, or links, between the Mediterranean Sea and the lake so that stock can come into the lake. Al-Ratam and al-Saffarah canals must be dredged. Three hundred thousand pounds was earmarked for this, and the job given to the fishery company, which did not complete the work. The governorate will dredge both canals with dredgers from Port Said that were imported for the Damietta channel and are now working on Ashtum al-Jamil in Port Said. We will do the same thing for the triangle in Damietta, and the project will be named al-Hajj 'Ay, or al-Halaqi. With this, we can develop the triangle, which is in our jurisdiction. Because of the building of the

Port Said road at Ashtum al-Baghdadi, the link between the triangle and the lake was filled in. The triangle and the lake feed each other, so the fish were affected, as was the salinity of the triangle. This problem will cease when the bridge at Ashtum al-Jamil is built and water will flow from the triangle to the lake and vice versa.

Abundant Fish in Egypt's Lakes...Why Do We Import Frozen Fish?

The part of the lake in Damietta governorate which lies outside the triangle is small and is connected only with al-Daqahliyah. Damietta is concerned with developing the triangle and using the fish. The Ministry of Reconstruction provided a consultant center to do an exhaustive study of the triangle, to include proposals for developing every aspect of al-Manzalah Lake--agriculture, fishing and raising livestock. Three areas were designated suitable for raising fish--the Damietta triangle, an area south of Port Said and an area in Ismailia. The part of the lake that could be drained was also designated. Most of this area is in al-Sharqiyah and Port Said. The part in Damietta is the triangle--2,000 feddans would be the core of a company to develop livestock resources; Fariskur agricultural, 4,000 feddans; the model farm 1,750 feddans; 250 feddans for a farm; al-Ratam and al-Shaykh Dargham farms, which have a production capacity of 1,500 tons of the best varieties of gray mullet, [tubar], trigla and danis; and the stock complex at Jamsah.

Changing Fisherman Difficult

Engineer 'Isam Radi continued, "We sought Japan's help, and they provided us with a development study on the fishing fleet at 'Izbah al-Burj. However, the study was not extensive enough, since I have half the country's fleet at 'Izbah al-Burj. Then we turned to the Netherlands and Yugoslavia, but have not received their studies yet. I'm waiting for the results, but I want to say something important, which is that changing the fisherman and the lawbreaker is difficult. They don't accept modern ways quickly, even though many residents of Damietta work on the Cypriot and Greek fleets. Clearly, the village mentality is in control here although they are diligent, economical people. I wish every Egyptian could be from Damietta, even though I am not, because they know where to put their money. The farms set up now are individual, not collective, but cooperation is better than working alone. I hope the government farm becomes a starting point to spread the collective idea. If it succeeds, we will create a fish research center in 'Izban al-Burj. This is being studied in Yugoslavia and the Netherlands and assistance and loans are being given. As for the channel serving our water resources, we are waiting for a dredger to reopen the 'Izbah al-Burj channel for the fleet so that it can accommodate larger, long-haul boats. I will also use the dredger to dredge al-Saffarah and al-Ratam canals.

"The question of draining is governed by a formula depending on whether the area's fish production is large or small. The Canadian project said that there are areas unsuited to a fishing economy that would produce more if converted to agriculture. I will use the area for the public good--if its production of fish is greater, I will convert it to a fishery. One problem that faces all of us in al-Manzalah Lake is the drainage from Bahr al-Baqar. This must be dealt with because it destroys fingerlings and causes illness among the fishermen.

Fifty Percent of Drainage Goes into Lake!

In a launch belonging to the marine areas authority in the middle of 314,000 feddans of turbulent water, islands, bars, traps and pits, we met with Lt Col Hasan al-'Ajami, head of the marine areas police at Damietta. Our conversation was interrupted at times by the appearance of bars and grasses. He said, "The lake has big problems--problems for the fishermen and problems caused by them. The lake is big and requires many men to guard it and enforce the law, even though this law should be amended. The People's Assembly should act quickly to pass a new law consistent with the modern age--not a law passed approximately 33 years ago [as published]. The 1960 law forbids catching fingerlings, but loopholes are used by dishonest fishermen and others to supply local fisheries in very devious ways; they are threatening all the lake's resources.

"To stop this, hatcheries for fingerlings must be provided. Another problem is that 50 percent of the drainage water pours into al-Manzalah Lake. Every village has a drainage pipe that pollutes the lake, kills fingerlings and infects the fishermen with many diseases, such as bilharzia. Most of the fishermen have had their spleens and parts of their livers removed. The immense area of the lake and the scarcity of marine areas police help fishermen and law-breakers continue to violate fishing regulations. The marine areas police destroy the traps, pits, enclosures and pasture land, then a day or two later they are rebuilt. All fishing is prohibited and illegal. The new Ashtum al-Jamil channel will be a natural remedy for all of these fishing violations, eliminating the traps and fields which the lawbreaking fishermen use for fishing and raising livestock in the middle of the lake. If we try to stop them, they run away inside the lake. All these violations hinder navigation and fishing and kill the fingerlings, which fishermen catch improperly in tightly-woven nets and sell as poultry feed. I believe that there is a solution we can find benefit from--why not use these bars and islands for tourism? Why not build small restaurants to offer seafood and cold drinks, and launches and boats could bring tourists to spend a pleasant day on this spot of natural beauty.

"More activity, people and life would help cut down on those who break the law in this peaceful expanse. Al-Manzalah Lake needs social betterment before economic, since there are 30 to 50 feddans completely isolated from outside life--there are no schools, no development, no medical treatment. I say again--there must be more marine areas police to control the lake, which is used by many fishermen who reap its bounty without paying the state its due. I don't mean the small, ordinary fisherman who only catches a little, always suffers from diseases and is easily brought under the law.

After Projects, Production Will Be 90,000 Tons

Engineer Fakri Hasanayn, director of the recreation department and fish resource officail in Port Said said, "Al-Manzalah Lake is one of the largest lakes in the north, with 45 percent of the lakes' production. From the 1940's to the 1980's, it covered 750,000 feddans, but after draining and housing projects, it dropped to 314,000 feddans yielding 21,000 tons per annum of the gray mullet family, [tubar], danis and bolti. This was also due to the [Israeli] aggression, closing of the channels and illegal fishing. When the lake's ecosystem was

exhausted, particularly because of Bahr al-Baqar, Hadus and Ramsis, fresh water increased and salinity decreased, with the resultant decline in salt-water fish and increase in Nile fish. Diseases such as bilharzia spread among the fishermen, weeds grew, fish began to disappear from the lake and there was no one to enforce fishing law number 144 of 1960.

"The first serious conference on fish resources was held in 1978, with all concerned parties and the governorates surrounding the lake invited. The conference was a success, most importantly because it united those concerned. After the Ashtum channel and the canals to the lake were dredged and salt water and fish poured into the lake, the old al-Jamil channel could not handle the load, so we asked for the new al-Jamil channel, which will be completed this year. Breakwaters will be erected to protect the channel from erosion. The second project is dredging the Qabuti canal, which is approximately 3 km long and links the Suez and al-Manzalah Lake, in order to increase the lake's productivity and the number of salt-water fish and to make it easier for fishermen to leave and come back to their villages.

"One important project to promote the fishing industry is the fingerling collection center and manmade hatchery for gray mullet at Ashtum al-Jamil, one of the Middle East's largest projects. The project will cover 23 feddans under an American grant of approximately \$27 million. The governorate has set aside the land, compensated the owners and reserved fresh water for the project. The authority still has to complete a project that will provide a year-round supply of fingerlings for al-Manzalah Lake, local and state fish farms, research centers and land-locked lakes such as Qarun, which will affect fish output throughout Egypt.

"The state has begun to promote fish farms as an important factor in providing fish protein, since 1 feddan used for fish production gives three times the yield of 1 feddan used for agriculture. Fish farms are one of the most important projects in Egypt designed to lessen the animal protein problem. In Port Said alone, there are more than 600 feddans used primarily for local farms set up illegally which used to provide fish for the governorate, especially during droughts. Now most of the fish is smuggled outside the governorate.

Fingerlings Mean Development

Engineer Fakri Hasanayn continued, "One of the major problems is fingerlings. This must be dealt with by scientific circles and those concerned with fish resources. It is the primary element in developing this lake and our lakes in general. Although catching fingerlings is illegal, every fisherman on al-Manzalah Lake catches gray mullet and [tubar] fingerlings. The solution is to provide authorized government centers where fingerlings can be collected. The state spends millions of pounds, 140 million so far, to develop the lake, and fishermen destroy the fingerlings, the major factor in development.

"A big mistake was made when the central administration gave some fishermen, fish farms and some of its scientific agencies permission to catch fingerlings in the outlets, channels and locks. This was in 1960, but now that there are centers for fingerlings, this policy is destroying the lake. The old fishing

law is unsatisfactory. We must have the new law quickly. The fingerlings are being stolen despite round-the-clock efforts by the marine areas police and all agencies concerned. We have only one officer in Port Said, and he doesn't have the means or equipment to operate in several areas at once. Careless fishing destroys millions of fish and deprives the lake of its output. If the development plan succeeds, the marine areas police carry out their duties and we have the new law, the 21,000 tons per annum will become 90,000 tons."

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SCHOLAR DISCUSSES CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OVER PAST 30 YEARS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 25 Jun-1 Jul, 2-8, 9-15 Jul 83

/Article by 'Ali Shalash: "The Cultural Experience in Egypt over 3 Decades"/

/No 176, 25 Jun-1 Jul 83 pp 58, 59, 61, 62/

/Text/ This study, which AL-MAJALLAH is publishing in three instalments, is a personal examination of three political eras in Egypt, written by Dr 'Ali Shalash, a longstanding eyewitness, as he puts it. In it, he tries to shed light on the political authorities' effect on the cultural atmosphere in Egypt over the three decades. Here is the first instalment of this study.

The following study does not aspire to present a comprehensive historic record supported by figures and evidence; rather, it aspires to present a sort of personal experience with the subject of the study, or the experience of a longstanding eyewitness, if one may use the expression, who lived through three decades under three presidents, 'Abd-al-Nasir, al-Sadat and Mubarak, successively.

Since the time frame of the study extends over more than a quarter century and deals with three different political periods, it would perhaps be most feasible for us to break them down into three instalments, based on these three eras.

Before we proceed to the first section (the first instalment) of the study, it would be fitting if we explained the meaning of the word "culture" here. This word is one of the most distorted and fluctuating of modern expressions in its significance and meaning. Culture, as we know, is a new term in our language; although it was used in the past, as the lexicons state, in the sense of sagacity, innate intelligence, refinement and education, its modern meaning, in language and practice, has come to indicate the science, knowledge and arts that require knowledge and sagacity, provide refinement for the people who exercise them, and provide them with greater ability to understand what goes on around them. However, modern scholars tend to enlarge upon the meaning of the term, so that it means a group of material and spiritual achievements of a people, a group of patterns of thinking and acting common to that people, a given people's way of thinking and acting, or the results of human activity on two levels--the material (machinery, equipment and discoveries) and the spiritual (values, morality, intellectual acvitivity knowledge, arts and letters). None of these meanings, and many besides them,

deviate in the end from a single objective, which is refinement and progress. Nevertheless, they all revolve in a broad context of the meaning of "culture." However, it is the narrow context of this meaning which concerns us here, and that is the manifestations of the expression of culture, most importantly literature and the arts.

In this framework, it is not important that we follow up on the disputes of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists (students of man), epistemologists and so forth on the definition of the meaning of culture and settle on a comprehensive, restrictive definition, as the logicians say. Rather, the important thing is that we ourselves settle on a definition here. Nonetheless, in spite of that, although we have settled on the narrow definition of culture, we will have access to the broad definition whenever need so requires.

Previous Ambitions

'Abd-al-Nasir made his appearance after a stage of transition after the 1936 treaty with the British which was distinguished by violent struggle, domestic and nationwide, on various fronts to achieve a new identity for the country. Therefore the way was paved for 'Abd-al-Nasir to put on his gloves and play his part in the Egyptian and Arab arenas both, and also to direct the resources and aspirations of the postwar generation toward the attainment of what the leaders of the previous generations had failed to achieve. Because he had not grown up in a vacuum, he responded to many of these aspirations, which the young and old generations had helped express. The motive force of events and the dynamic of changes in the Arab area, foremost among them the appearance of Israel and its success in breaking the momentum of Arab official leadership in '948, were a factor in the intensification of these aspirations, one of the most important of which was interest in culture and education, after their manifestations had deteriorated in the period of World War Two and after.

One of these aspirations was to reform the state of education and introduce modern sciences into al-Azhar following its development; Taha Husayn had called for this in 1938. This was an appeal to which many thinkers and literary figures, headed by al-'Aqqad and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, had contributed for years. Another of these aspirations was the need to issue a law protecting the rights of authors, looking after literature and literary figures, and establishing a federation for them which would protect their interests from manipulation, which Taha Husayn himself had called for in 1943; the establishment of a ministry of publication and translation that Muhammad Mandur called for in 1943; the establishment of a translation house along the lines of what the Caliph al-Ma'mun had called for the following year, in order to keep the Arabs abreast of what the best minds in the world were producing; and the need to organize conferences for Arab literary figures which Salah al-Munajjid, Darin Khashabah, Sayyid Qutb, 'Adnan al-Khatib and others had called for the same year, so that those figures could get to know one another and discuss the problems of Arab literature, in order to achieve the literary unity that brought their forefathers together in the ancient past, not to speak of the interest in letters and arts, and their advancement, which others besides those people had called for.

A Ministry of Culture

All these aspirations, appeals and so forth met with a clear response from 'Abd-al-Nasir from the time he appeared on the scene of events. Thus, for the first time in the history of Egypt, 'Abd-al-Nasir established a ministry for culture, in 1958. When it appeared, he gave it the name "culture and national guidance." During his era, men who had an obvious connection with cultural activity succeeded one another in it. He himself, as it was stated, was enthusiastic about this ministry and its mission. Before that, he had established the Higher Council for Letters, Arts and Social Sciences, whose numerous committees were active in translation, research, publication, the holding of contests for literary persons and the awarding of government prizes. During the fifties and sixties, many cultural institutions which the country had not been familiar with emerged in succession, especially in the areas of literature, the stage, films and publishing. In 1959, the Ministry of Culture established an academy of arts which included institutes specializing in the stage, the screen, music and ballet, and it established the agency of "mass culture," which managed to supply many cultural services to towns and villages in all areas of the country. In fact, the Ministry of Higher Education established a vital cultural project to translate the sourceworks of the human heritage in all areas of learning, under the title "The Thousand Books." Supervising the project was the translation committee of the Council of Letters and Arts under the chairmanship of Taha Husayn.

Toward the end of the fifties, numerous study groups were sent out to study arts and human and applied sciences. When they returned, the members of these groups helped create a comprehensive cultural resurgence during the sixties. In the Arab context, meetings took place among many cultural figures. In 1956, the conferences of Arab literary figures and periodic festivals of Arabic poetry started in Baludan, Syria, then in Cairo, and after that they alternated among the various Arab capitals. Cairo was chosen as the headquarters for the secretariat general of these conferences. This process was followed by a broad opening up to Asia and Africa, which, in the words of the Indonesian president, Soekarno, experienced a new birth at Bandoeng in 1954. One effect of the developments in the context of culture, was that Cairo hosted the permanent office of writers of Asia and Africa and witnessed some of their conferences.

Signs of a Resurgence

It was natural, in such a situation, that this cultural resurgence should include the media. Although the media had become wholly involved in expressing the political outlines of the Nasirist regime, in the first place, they did not sever their links with culture and its manifestations, especially literature, the arts and the sciences. The daily papers were careful to devote entire pages to culture. The radio service established a special cultural broadcast after the Suez War of 1956. This daily broadcast of about 3 hours, which was called the "second program," succeeded in building a special channel for intellectuals over the air. The Ministry of Culture also established a large number of general and specialized cultural magazines, of which the most important were AL-MAJALLAH, NAHDAT YFRIQIYA, AL-FIKR AL-MU'ASTR, AL-SHI'R, AL-QISSAH, AL-MASRAH, AL-SINAMA, AL-KUTTAB AL-'ARABI

and AL-FUNUN AL-SHA'BIYAH, above and beyond the other cultural magazines which belonged to the press establishments, such as AL-HIYAL, AL-KATIB AND AL-TALI'AH. In fact, when Cairo failed in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir to provide a literary magazine which would bring the writers of the Arab nation together as had the magazine AL-RISALAH, which al-Zayyat issued (1933-1953), and Beirut undertook to provide such a magazine when Suhayl Idris issued the magazine AL-ADAB in the wake of the suspension of AL-RISALAH, most of the writers in AL-ADAB, up to the end of the sixties, were nonetheless from Egypt! Individuals did, in any case, also have the right to issue literary magazines, as was the case with Amin al-Khuli's magazine AL-ADAB (1956-1968) and Sa'd Wahbah's magazine AL-SHAHR (1958-1961).

Among the most important features of this cultural resurgence were three:

1. The stage.
2. The screen.
3. Translation and publication.

The stage was active in the sixties as it never had been before. Numerous new theaters were established in Cairo and other towns. Talented new persons in playwriting, led by Ni'man 'Ashur, appeared in the fifties. Many members of study groups returned from Europe and spread about an artistic climate of acting and directing which was without precedent. At the head of these were Sa'd Ardash, Karam Mutawa', Kamal 'Id, Ahmad 'Abd-al-Halim and Najib Surur, at whose hands the resurgence of the stage in the sixties was implanted. This resurgence gained the strength to attract many writers in other innovative fields. Yusuf Idris, Sa'd Wahbah, Lutfi al-Khuli, Alfred Faraj, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and Mikha'il Ruman, who had come from the field of the story and the novel, Rashad Rushdi, who had come from the field of criticism, and Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur, who had come from the field of poetry, came into this arena. Numerous dramatic troupes competed with one another in Cairo and Alexandria to present original and translated plays, so that going to the theater became one of the regular rituals of the middle class. The original plays ranged from social criticism to political condemnation, until they started to draw the attention of the political authorities in the mid-sixties, especially after the showing of al-Sharqawi's play "The Young Mihran," which stirred up much unpublished debate on democracy and freedom in 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime and the mistakes of the war in Yemen!

The screen, to which the public sector and government supervision came in 1961, provided many new movies by Salah Abu Sayf, Kamal al-Shaykh, Yusuf Shahin, 'Atif Salim and Shadi 'Abd-al-Salam, who all shone throughout the sixties. In spite of the immersion of the public sector and the Film Organization in the production of low-grade movies called B Films, conversely there was broad interest in good historic movies ("Saladdin the Conqueror" and "Oh Islam!") and movies prepared from well known novels and short stories by well known writers such as Najib Mahfuz, Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus and Yusuf Idris. These were so numerous and widely circulated that they made up for the second rate movies, not just through their advanced technical level but also by the seriousness with which they dealt with modern social issues.

Regarding translation and publication, the organizations of the Ministry of Culture alone presented hundreds of books which are considered sourceworks of the ancient Arab and international human legacy, not to mention books by modern Arab literary figures. The prices of these books dropped under competition to a point which the people of the present generation might not believe. Numerous cultural magazines came out in succession, month after month, shedding light on many new writers who had come out from under the aegis of the new regime or had matured in its framework, from Ni'man 'Ashur, Yusuf Idris, Sa'd Wahbah, Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur and Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mu'ti Hijazi to 'Ali Salim, Muhammad Abu Sanah, Faruq Shushah and others. Indeed, some of the older writers, foremost among them Najib Mahfuz, Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus, Louis 'Awad, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, Yusuf al-Siba'i, Rashad Rushdi, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim 'Abdallah and 'Abd-al-Qadir Qatt, achieved stability and solidity, and wrote their best output in this very era. If al-'Aqqad and Taha Husayn did not shine in that period, Tawfiq al-Hakim shone more in the sixties than he had before, and wrote his most important stage works in that time, starting with "The Bewildered Sultan" and "You Going up the Tree-Climber" to "The Anxiety Bank" and "The Destiny of a Cockroach."

What Did Socialism Do?

However, the picture of this cultural resurgence in the sixties cannot in reality be made complete unless one talks about the political aspects by which it was intended that culture should be colored. Culture, however, does not benefit from coloration. In 1961, 'Abd-al-Nasir proclaimed the "National Action Charter" to the people; it came out in a little brochure and was given the name "the charter." He also proclaimed what was called the "socialist transformation" in the country, and changed the name of the National Union to the Socialist Union. The word "socialism" began to be widespread, whereas it once had been the property of the intellectual class and its mere use would expose persons who used it to the charge of communism and to detention and imprisonment. In the charter, 'Abd-al-Nasir talked about national culture and defined the working forces of the people as five, one of which was the intellectuals. All the platforms and agencies of the government started to discuss "socialism" and explain the charter, which soon became part of the study curriculum, and also came to have "memorizers," who would memorize it by heart and present paragraphs and expressions from it on every occasion, large and small.

However, the charter was not traced with a strong popular organization which could convert its stipulations into simple practical reality through good examples and sacrifices by effective leaders. Although it continued to control the official and unofficial opinions that were declared to the people until 'Abd-al-Nasir's final days, it did not manage to provide culture with a socialist coloration, just as its memorizers and proselytizers did not succeed in convincing ordinary citizens to change their view of matters along socialist lines.

I can remember a small incident I witnessed one day in the mid-sixties which nonetheless was of great significance regarding the ordinary citizens grasp of socialism. I got on the trolley and was compelled to stand, because of the crowds that morning. It so happened that I was standing next to an ordinary construction worker carrying a trowel in one hand and gripping the metal pole that was in the

middle of the area set aside for passengers to stand in with the other. With the congestion and the swaying of the vehicle, it appeared that the trowel, soiled with plaster and mud, had accidentally grazed the clothes of a standee who had an elegant appearance. The elegant person shouted at the worker, suddenly,

"Can't you be careful? My trousers got dirty because of your trowel!"

Most calmly, in an accent from Upper Egypt, the worker replied,

"This is socialism! If you don't like it, get off and take a taxi."

Some of the standees laughed, others smiled, and the worker remained fixed in place, like a statue, while the elegant person whose trousers had been soiled did not comment, but contented himself with an expression of disgust on his face and got off at the next stop. The worker looked right and left, then said, "There is strength only through God! I got on the trolley and no one had any doubts about me or the trowel! What have I done? Should I get down and take a taxi?"

The significance of this event is that socialism reached the ordinary citizen only through words that had no meaning, or words which distorted its meaning, and could be interjected into any context without justification!

Lest talk about socialism take our time and divert us from the subject, from the object of independent study, I can summarize the statement in a specific question:

Why did Nasirist socialism fail to impart its coloration to culture?

The answer, also in brief, is that culture basically is a process of digestion or slow fermentation and that such digestion more than anything else requires freedom--the freedom to choose and discuss matters, and freedom of style. In spite of the constant talk, in the charter, by the people who interpreted it, and by the person who set it forth himself, about freedom and democracy as the two wings of socialism, freedom remained a mere slogan or sign on an abandoned street, not to mention the absence of good examples, and the dominance of what Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, after the 1967 defeat, called the "men of culture," who drove the "men of experience" off the stage. In addition, no real or profound effects in values or in behavior were reflected on culture during 'Abd-al-Nasir's era by socialism. The reason for that was that socialism surprised people, after they had been prepared for it through consciousness or organization, and it was the product of decrees, not real needs for which its proponents will die.

Freedom Also

Mention of the word freedom leads us to talk of another aspect which unfortunately had a negative effect on culture. At a time when 'Abd-al-Nasir, his aspirations and his popularity, and culture were growing, an ugly side of the government was growing on the other hand, and that was the police side. Gradually, 'Abd-al-Nasir himself, like culture, became a prisoner of this ugly side, which is widespread in countries of the Third World. Starting roughly in the mid-sixties, the police side of the government started to loom over all levels and alleyways of culture,

on the pretext of protecting the regime and insuring the people against its enemies. Concentration camps opened to receive the Moslem Brothers in 1965, and the people who were in charge of publishing, or the "gatekeepers," as they are called by communications scholars, started to hold writers to task in the context of meanings of words. Gradually, also, symbolism and political nihilism began to be widespread, not just in the books of young people but also in the books of older people, as happened with Tawfiq al-Hakim in his dramatic narrative, or "docudrama" as he called it, "The Anxiety Bank," which he wrote, as he mentioned in his book "The Return of Consciousness," to warn 'Abd-al-Nasir of the anxiety and fragmentation that had afflicted Egyptian society before the 1967 war, lest he embark on a new adventure! It became a mission of critics to decode the symbols of literary works in the form of poems, short stories and plays and to set out for the readers, for example, the real nature of the person of the locomotive engineer in Tawfiq al-Hakim's short play "The Train," and whether that person embodied 'Abd-al-Nasir or not!

The End

The encroachment of this ugly police face on cultural life was a warning of the approach of the end of the resurgence which this life had witnessed, and the prosperity that had embraced it.

In June 1967, there occurred the grievous rift in the identity of the whole nation, which neither 'Abd-al-Nasir nor anyone else up to now has been able to heal. Gradually, all previous cultural activities started to regress, and the phenomenon of obscurity and symbolic literature, indeed secret literature, which was not fit for publication by the standards of the police, began. Recrimination and mockery started. This all afflicted the prosperity of culture and gave it a stab in the heart; all culture became wrapped in a garment of grief, pessimism, and perhaps despair. Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur expressed that in his play "Layla wa al-Majnun," which came out in the wake of the defeat, by stating, in the words of "the professor":

"In these times, it is not proper

"For us to write, or reflect,

"Or sing, or even exist."

Indeed, the "happy person" who represents the voice of the poet in the same play cries out to his colleagues:

"People of our town,

"This is what I say:

"Blow up or die."

On 28 September 1970 the curtain came down over a whole era, an era which began with an almost unparalleled enthusiasm for cultural innovation and activity and

ended with despondency and tragedy, as if 'Abd-al-Nasir had been a hero in Greek tragedy, in which the hero descends into error by the contrivance of fate, then goes down the ladder of life to confront his inevitable destiny!

'Abd-al-Nasir's era remains one of true cultural resurgence, but one which found no one to support it until the end and protect it from the excesses of dictatorship and police control.

/No 177, 2-8 Jul 83 pp 61-64

/Text/ When Anwar al-Sadat assumed office in the wake of 'Abd-al-Nasir's death, he announced on more than one occasion, for a period of at least a year, that he would proceed along 'Abd-al-Nasir's road and complete his journey. Thus, he guaranteed the support of the broad base of the people, especially the intellectuals, which 'Abd-al-Nasir had formed around himself in Egypt and other countries of the Arab nation. However, time quickly proved that this declaration on al-Sadat's part was only a natural tactic aimed at consolidating his position. He also quickly clashed with the Nasirists, in May 1971, a few months after he took power, and declared what he called the "corrective revolution," or the "May revolution," a movement by which he intended to get rid of the Nasirists who were making preparations to get rid of al-Sadat himself.

The Difference in Course

Just as 'Abd-al-Nasir's era was full of slogans, even after his defeat, when the people discovered the bitter truth, al-Sadat's era started with slogans as well, such as "the sovereignty of the law," "the government of science and faith," "the government of institutions," "no voice is louder than that of the struggle," and "the village society." However, al-Sadat, it appears, decided, from the beginning, to be different from 'Abd-al-Nasir, to pursue a road which was not the same as his, and to create a special course for himself, although he had declared, at the beginning of his term, that there were no differences between himself and 'Abd-al-Nasir except in method. He started to release the political prisoners whose number, at 'Abd-al-Nasir's death, had come to more than a thousand, (aside from the political prisoners who had been gradually released). He did devote himself after that to completing 'Abd-al-Nasir's course with respect to one point, which was to complete the preparations for a decisive battle for vengeance with Israel, whose forces had been sitting on the bank of the canal since 5 June 1967, but except for that, he gradually distanced himself from 'Abd-al-Nasir's course. He decided to establish a new democracy based on three platforms (which developed and became three parties), rather than the democracy of a single party. After the war of October 1973, he then declared the liberalization policy, which was a blow to the very heart of Nasirist socialism and finished off all that was left of it. He then, until his assassination, entered into bitter struggles with the growing opposition forces and the rampant problems of food and supplies, not to mention the problem of the occupation of Sinai, which the war with Israel had not resolved, but which had forced him, at his hour of despair, to travel to Israel!

It was clear at the beginning that al-Sadat was in an unenviable position. Coincidence, through the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir, drove him to power, which apparently

was not one of his dreams, and, from the seat of power which he reached, dragging his tail, if it is permissible to turn the old line of verse around, al-Sadat started to qualify himself for the difficult task that awaited him.

What, however, does all this have to do with culture?

Al-Sadat Was a Romantic

The experience of culture in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era taught us an important lesson, which can be summarized in the fact that culture in our country is beholden to the ruler, if one may use that expression. It shines and prospers, from the standpoint of instruments and channels at least, if the ruler is interested in it, and it deteriorates and dies if he turns away from it. This is what happened in the era of al-Sadat, who was not concerned with culture, as it seems, not because of the prior circumstances that surrounded his era and caused him to turn toward politics, but because of his personal disposition which he revealed in a conversation he held with Rashad Rushdi, which the latter published in the magazine AL-JADD in the mid-seventies, that no one paid attention to at the time. In that conversation, Rashad asked al-Sadat about his opinion on such well known literary and artistic schools as classicism, romanticism and realism and which of them he favored. Al-Sadat replied that he favored romanticism and that he himself was a romantic. Romanticism, as is well known, is an adjective given in literature to literary figures in whom emotion, imagination, the love of nature, feeling of grief and solitude, and expression of the self and temperament prevail.

Al-Sadat was truthful in giving himself this description, and he reaffirmed this later in many indirect ways when he recorded his life in his book "The Search for Identity." Nonetheless, it is well known that romanticism has created many source-works of poetry in particular in world literature, not just Arab literature. If al-Sadat had started his life as a poet in this manner, that would have been normal, but he wanted to be a politician. That is the problem: romanticism does not in any way go with politics. As he was a romantic politician, most of his conduct became an expression of subjective positions, especially in our era, in which politics has developed and become a science with objective rules and an objective precise process of calculation which does not give great weight to emotion or the imagination.

Cultural Deterioration

It is not, of course, necessary that a romantic be a literary person or a poet; he could be a politician, as was the case with al-Sadat. It is not necessary, either, that a romantic who is not a literary person or a poet be a devotee of culture or be concerned with it. However, it is undoubtedly necessary that a political romantic be concerned with culture, especially if he is a ruler. Al-Sadat's era was characterized by cultural deterioration, a fact which was confirmed by his cultural advisor, Dr Rashad Rushdi, who, a few weeks before his death, wrote an article which AL-AHRAM published in January 1983, in which he gave the verdict that the past 10 years were ones of deterioration from the standpoint of culture, compared to the prosperity the sixties had experienced.

Was al-Sadat himself the cause of this cultural deterioration, or did other elements enter into it?

In answering this question, one must point out, first of all, that the opposition al-Sadat faced from the time he took power came basically from among the intellectuals, that these intellectuals succeeded in provoking al-Sadat throughout his regime, and that he, in compensation, was always belittling them and referring them to in his conversations and speeches as "communists" or as "effendis".

In another area, the case of the sale of the Pyramid Heights to foreign companies in the early part of al-Sadat's term provoked the intellectuals, in particular, to the point where the cabinet of the time withdrew its decree. However, the opposition intellectuals considered the case to be an act of defamation of the country's cultural heritage.

With the passage of time and increasing attacks from intellectuals who had emigrated, al-Sadat thought of eliminating the Ministry of Culture in the last years of his regime; again the intellectuals rose up in arms. Al-Sadat held insistently to his position, while modifying the form, and gave the minister of culture (Mansur Hasan) the title "minister of state for culture." Al-Sadat's choice of the last two ministers of culture in his term were a total violation of the tradition which had been followed previously, which was that the minister of culture would be someone directly from the ministry, or a cultural figure of some substance. One of the two ministers had been a businessman before he assumed the ministry, the other had been a young lawyer, and neither of them was well known in the environment of culture and the intellectuals.

There is another position regarding al-Sadat: it has been bruited about that he proceeded to request relics from the Cairo Museum and give them to foreign politicians and leaders who were his guests of hosts. I was reminded of that by what I saw once in the Metropolitan Museum in New York. I discovered that a source card had been written under more than one relic in the Egyptian wing of the museum, and that that source was a single one--the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Sa'id (in whose era the Suez Canal was excavated). As to how the governor dealt with antiquities, the cards related that he would give a certain piece to such-and-such a person (a foreigner), and that such and such a person bequeathed it to his son or daughter, and so on, until it came to the museum! Though we let that happen in the case of Muhammad Sa'id, who gave the Frenchman DeLesseps the concession to build the Suez Canal at a time when justice and accountability were unknown, how can we allow it today?

If to those indices, which are based on these situations, we add the economic crisis which Egypt suffered in the era of al-Sadat, and the slogans that could engender, such as "bread before culture," and if we also add the growing emigration of intellectuals after 1973, could these factors combined suffice to create cultural deterioration in the channels and agencies of culture? The answer is yes, but what are the symptoms of this deterioration?

The Drain of Intellectuals

During 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime, a substantial number of Egyptians, all of them educated intellectuals, drifted away from the country, either because life had become a strain on them in Egypt or because they were searching for adventure or were expressing their disagreement with the regime or 'Abd-al-Nasir. Most of the former were young people. Most of the latter were the pillars of the previous regime. However, al-Sadat's era registered a record number of Egyptians of all types and objectives who drifted away from the country, especially after the 1973 war. One of the most prominent features of this great drain, if one may use the expression, was the departure of a substantial number of intellectuals working in the areas of culture, the media and education.

Mahmud Abu-al-Fath and 'Ali Amin came back to Egypt in the era of al-Sadat, but conversely many writers, journalists, and university professors left it. In the first group, which included artists as well, we can find Ahmad 'Abbas Salih, Ahmad 'Abd-al-Bu'ti Hijazi, Alfred Faraj, George al-Bahjuri, Ahmad Baha'-al-Din, Mahmud Amin al-'Alim, Mahmud al-Sa'dani, Sa'd Ardash, Karam Mutawi', Ahmad 'Abd-al-Halim, Safinaz Kazim, Najib al-Kilani, Muhammad 'Afifi Matar, Muhsin al-Khayyat and Muhammad Abu-al-Ma'ati Abu al-Naja. In the final group (university professors) we can find 'Abd-al-Rahman Badawi, Muhammad Isma'il al-Muwafi, Shawqi al-Sukkari, 'Ali al-Ra'l and 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Qutt.

These, and other leftists or "communists," were not the only ones, as the media in the al-Sadat era ceaselessly worked to describe them, and when the authorities brought some of their names to the socialist public prosecutor to investigate their defamation of Egypt abroad. People who followed the writings of those and others abroad, in the Arab countries and in Europe, must have noticed that they attacked al-Sadat personally, or his regime, but did not "defame" Egypt, as the media said they did, and that those who preoccupied themselves with criticizing al-Sadat's policies did not produce intellectual or literary work of much value.

One of these people, the poet 'Abd-al-Mu'ti Hijazi, described his trip to Paris with his shattered dreams of Arab revolution and Arab unity, which had been realized to some degree in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir, and stated, in a beautiful short poem:

"I, revolution, and Arabic

"Are looking for work in the streets of Paris.

"We are looking for a room.

"We are hanging around in the April sun.

"A time has passed and a time is coming!

"I told the Arab revolution:

"You, yourself, have to go back.

"As for me,

"Let me die under this warm drizzle."

It was clear to everyone, throughout al-Sadat's era, as was the case in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, that the intellectuals were a popular force that was not liked by the regime, unless they cooperated with it, on the conditions the regime imposed. The people we mentioned did not think about the conditions of 'Abd-al-Nasir's time, because they believed in the goals he had declared. When the situation and the era changed, it was not easy for them to accept the condition of submission which some political regimes in the Third World set out when they deal with intellectuals. Therefore, they were content with this voluntary exile, that is, with drifting abroad; it was a solution which was not easy in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, since the alternative was prison!

The Struggle with the Authorities and Bread

While the writers and artists are the vanguard of intellectuals, tantamount to the heavy or productive industry in the culture of any nation, al-Sadat kept them busy during his regime with two things, the struggle with his regime and the search for bread, or finding a living. That means that they were diverted from the basic concerns which normally preoccupy writers and artists, namely production and expression.

The writers' and artists' preoccupation with al-Sadat and his regime did not start until early 1973, when they became aware that the freedom, sovereignty of the law, democracy and other things that al-Sadat had been calling for had turned into empty slogans. The authorities arrested large numbers of students at that time. More than 100 writers and artists got together and signed a statement protesting the abuse of freedom. Heading the signatories was Tawfiq al-Hakim. The signatories also belonged to opposed political tendencies, as did Lutfi al-Khuli and Tharwat Abazah. The statement got to al-Sadat and vexed him greatly; he issued orders terminating and transferring 111 writers and journalists. Had Tawfiq al-Hakim not hastened, under urging from Yusuf al-Siba'i, to apologize to al-Sadat and settle the matter, the situation would have worsened. This situation repeated itself more than once. The last of these occasions was the September 1981 blow. Writers and artists, even those who had supported al-Sadat openly, found themselves in a state of no security, struggling between what existed and what ought to exist. At the same time, most of them proceeded to express this struggle in articles, either positively, as did Yusuf Idris when he wrote about the problem of sanitation in Cairo, or negatively, as Tawfiq al-Hakim did when he cast doubt about Egypt's Arabhood, or Najib Mahfuz, when he blessed the famous "September blow" in his writings.

The reason why the writers and artists were preoccupied with the search for bread was complex in reality. In the wake of the application of the liberalization policy, following the 1973 war, prices rose in a provocative fashion, and they were accompanied by a parasitic accumulation of capital, which increased with the years until it constituted a sort of explosion of wealth, as happened with Rashad 'Uthman, 'Isamat al-Sadat, Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy and dozens of others who had not yet "become notorious." At the same time, this was accompanied by many bottlenecks in supply commodities, not to mention the fact that the fixed incomes of the class of government employees, including writers and artists, could not keep up with the rise in prices. In another area, the channels and agencies of culture

shrivelled increasingly, especially in the sectors of publication, the stage and films, which we will pause to contemplate in a while, whereas these channels grew and flourished in the Arab oil countries especially. That meant that the demand for Egyptian writers and artists who found compensation and scope to feel economic security in these channels and agencies increased, and the result was a tremendous amount of works and books which did not disturb anyone or wake anyone up, as well as a large amount of wasted effort and energy!

In Cairo, more than at any other time in the past, the middlemen of cultural production, starting with articles, stories, and poems and proceeding through movies and radio and television serials, became widespread. Radio and television actors and producers proceeded to go about the studios of Cairo, the Arab world, and Europe, acting and filming many works which were for the most part entertaining and created no cultural uproar or resurgence in the countries where they were presented or shown.

That, on the other hand, was a normal reaction to the dwindling of the channels and agencies of culture in the seventies. In 1970 alone, beginning with al-Sadat's assumption of power, the magazines which the Ministry of Culture put out were suspended, and only the three cultural magazines which the press establishments had previously issued (AL-HILAL, AL-KATIB and AL-TALI'AH) remained. AL-KATIB then soon was converted into a literary magazine, in the mid-seventies, and AL-TALI'AH was soon shut down. The reason in both instances was that the two magazines had criticized al-Sadat's regime and had started to express opposition views. The Ministry of Culture, after the suspension of its six magazines, issued two other journals (AL-JADID and AL-THIQAFAH), which tried, to no avail, to win the approval of the intellectuals. The former, toward the end of al-Sadat's era, devoted itself to publishing his book "The Search for Identity" in serial form, even after it was published in Arabic as a book. The latter was turned into a record of the memoirs of some old men of letters of middling value.

Similarly, the numerous theatrical groups which the sixties had seen diminished and the theaters became empty most times of the year. The old public no longer frequented these theaters, once the transportation crisis became aggravated, on the one hand, and serious writing stopped on the other. Conversely, private sector groups which specialized in cheap comedy were active; their ticket prices rose in the face of the large number of Arab tourists and the rise of the new class of craftsmen and merchants who went to the theater as pure entertainment, to digest their dinner.

'Adawiyah and Katkut

The movie industry also shrank, and the private sector gradually took it over until it started to resemble the private theater sector in terms of the proclivity for cheap comedy and entertainment. Nonetheless, in that period a substantial number of actors shone, headed by Mahmud Yasin, Nur al-Sharif, Husayn Fahmi, 'Adil Imam and Sa'id Salih. An additional number of new singers who had been given broader scope after the death of 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz shone within the class of craftsmen and merchants, among them Ahmad 'Adawiyah and Katkut al-Amir, who had come up through the night clubs and wedding ceremonies. Their fame then spread,

even though their songs were prohibited on radio and television until the late seventies, until it became rare to find a butcher, taxi-driver or craftsman who was not running tapes of their songs during work. It is difficult to compare their cheap songs (for example "al-Sahh al-Dahh Umbu" or "To Her Health Umm Hasan") with the songs of 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz or the popular songs which talented singers like Muhammad Rushdi in particular had developed, not to speak of their artless voices and their raucous, monotonous delivery!

Wake up, Gentlemen!

One cannot talk about culture in the era of al-Sadat without talking about a bold movie which came out in 1980 titled "Wake up, Gentlemen!" This film, whose leading actors were Mahmud Yasin and Husayn Fahmi, succeeded in portraying an important feature of the social and cultural transformation that had resulted from the liberalization policy; it was a success which surpassed that of any other literary or artistic work on that subject.

The story of the movie, in brief, revolved about a garbageman who became a millionaire, or something close to it, in the twinkling of an eye, as they say. However, when he was just a garbageman he became attached one day to a girl who brought out the garbage to him in the morning, and when he ventured to ask for her in marriage, her petty bourgeois family rejected him. The girl had a brother, an intellectual who worked as a philosophy instructor in the university. One day he thought of getting married, and his marriage project led him to face the quandary which faced young people in the seventies, and still does face them--that of finding an apartment. The search for an apartment led him to the garbageman, who had become owner of a large building, who remembered him, asked him for "key money," as usual, and indeed pursued his beautiful fiancée. After great effort finding the "key money," the intellectual managed to get half of it and took it to the garbageman. The latter invited him, with his fiancée and her family, to dinner in a club, where he threw the key money about in a moment of "delight," after he had succeeded in winning the heart of the fiancée and the affections of her family. The matter ended with the intellectual delirious in the streets: "Truth is 'Antar!'" ('Antar was the garbageman!')

The film, whose story and script were written by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, tried to portray many peripheral ideas inside this story, such as the emptiness of the life of the new parasitic class, the serious state of intellectuals in a society which transformed itself rapidly around them and rejected them because it could do without them, and the dominance of the notion "money is everything" and "apres moi le deluge," not to speak of the numerous political fiascos.

The Religious Current

However, the talk about culture in al-Sadat's era will not be complete, either, without a discussion of its religious side. Al-Sadat, as is well known, encouraged the religious current in the country when he came to power, in the effort, it seemed, to kill two birds with one stone, the first being what he called the Nasirist current, intermixed with the marxist current, and the second being the filling of the political vacuum which grew before the October 1973 war and preparing for

war with Islamic faith. However, the religious current grew quickly, especially after the crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian forces and their destruction of the myth of "the Israeli army that cannot be defeated" and "the staunch Bar-Lev Line." In addition, the crossing was quickly attributed to a return to faith. That was another justification for the increase in strength and spread of the Islamic current, in addition to certain historic circumstances with which al-Sadat was involved, and this current acquired strong motives for persevering, among them the triumph of the religious current in Iran.

This current was reflected in culture throughout the seventies and after, and the books that were in circulation the most were religious. Writers who were not known for such interests, most prominently Mustafa Mahmud and Ahmad Bahjat, turned to religious writing. However, none of these, or others, could show people the truth of things, as regarded the news that reached them at times and the rumors that reached them at other times, on the corruption on which information was subsequently revealed, or guide religious young people to a satisfactory road or to discuss the judgments they were ultimately compelled to reach regarding the holy Koran.

These were the outlines of culture in al-Sadat's era. They are outlines which can accommodate many details and much discussion, but there is nothing among these outlines, as some people imagine, connected to the peace with Israel. In spite of the Israelis' insistence on cultural cooperation between the two countries, and the fact that some Egyptian intellectuals welcomed such cooperation and others entered into a dialogue with Israeli intellectuals, none of that was reflected on culture, and it is not expected that such an effect will be in the near future.

However, the catchword on culture in al-Sadat's era remains decline in comparison with previous periods.

/No 178, 9-15 Jul 83 pp 68-70

/Text/ In this third and final instalment, /Dr 'Ali Shalash/ deals with the study of the beginning of cultural transformations in Egypt in the short period of President Husni Mubarak's rule.

Although it is easy for us to pass judgment on culture in the eras of 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat, it is difficult to do so on culture in the era of Husni Mubarak. While the eras of 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat have ended, that of Husni Mubarak has just begun. It is not easy for us to pass judgment on an era just as it is beginning, nor is it fair for us to make predictions about a fetus in its mother's womb. Culture, at the beginning of a ruler's era, is similar to a fetus whose features have not yet taken solid form. However, the most a student can do is subject the beginning to examination and thought, so that perhaps that will bring him to conclusions which will satisfy the truth more than they satisfy him.

There is no doubt that Mubarak inherited a heavy legacy in which elements of Nasirism and al-Sadatism were intertwined, nor is there any doubt that he is a man who lived close to two presidents who were different in thinking and procedures, just as he lived close to two different cultures, and that many of the

people of the generation that participated in the establishment of these two cultures continued on from these two cultures into his own, at least. His great spontaneous enthusiasm had an effect on the fact that he has continued to be generous to this day. However, the problem of this generation itself is that it is also anxious that a subsequent generation, which has actually been born, not grow up in a cultural vacuum, especially with the obvious deterioration which afflicted the channels and agencies of culture in al-Sadat's era.

After this introduction, which has been necessary, we might perhaps first be able to set our hands on the most important lines distinguishing what has been going on on the cultural stage since President Mubarak's assumption of power a year and a few months ago.

A Realistic Politician

It is clear from President Mubarak's statements and actions that he is a serious, uncomplicated man facing the facts at hand inside and outside his country, and that he wants to proceed along his own road, one which is clear and independent of that of his two successors, in a way where the goals to which the country has committed itself will not be infringed, and the gains it has realized will not be infringed either. Thus one can state from that standpoint that he is a realistic politician who bases his movements on careful, objective calculations, in a manner which leaves no room for subjective positions, fantasy or adventure.

It is also clear that intellectuals appreciate this realism in Mubarak and have greeted his era with optimism, contrary to the way they greeted the eras of 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat. 'Abd-al-Nasir, from the beginning, had many enemies whose privileges he had eliminated or whose opinions differed with his. From the beginning al-Sadat also had such enemies. However, Mubarak is different from his two predecessors in terms of the circumstances of his political training and development. Thus, he offers optimists an additional opportunity to increase their degree of optimism.

The Returnees Start To Come Back

Perhaps one of the most conspicuous items of proof of the optimism which has spread about among the people, and the intellectuals among them, is that many of the intellectuals who filtered out of Egypt in voluntary exile in al-Sadat's era have returned and have started to engage in substantial activity. Among these are Ahmad Baha'-al-Din, who spent years as an editor in chief of AL-'ARABI magazine in Kuwait, then returned to AL-AHRAM with a daily column, 'Ali al-Ra'i, who came back from teaching at the University of Kuwait to write criticism in AL-MUSAWAR magazine, and 'Abd-al-Qadir Qutt, who came back from teaching at the University of Beirut to teach and write criticism, as well as assuming the position of editor in chief of the new magazine IEDA', which is a magazine put out by the Writers' Board early this year, after the shutdown of the magazines AL-JADID and AL-THIQAFAH, which had deteriorated greatly in recent years.

Another of these returnees is Mahmud al-Sa'dani, the satirist who lived in the seventies in transition among Iraq, the Gulf and Britain, and, in London,

edited the magazine 23 JULY, which came out in the second half of the seventies as part of the opposition campaign against al-Sadat abroad. Al-Sa'dani returned to write for the magazine SABAH AL-KHAYR, of which he was the editor in chief in the latter part of 'Abd-al-Nasir's term. Finally, another returnee is Sa'd Ardash, the stage actor and producer, who contributed to the resurgence of the theater in the sixties, then went to Kuwait and remained there, teaching, producing and writing until the end of al-Sadat's era, then returned to Cairo and started to produce a play on a book of short stories by Sa'd Makkawi titled "The Dream Comes to the Village."

These, and other intellectuals in residence such as Zaki Najib Mahmud and Yusuf Idris, have started to impart a character of vitality and secularism which the cultural climate had been lacking in al-Sadat's era.

Further Vitality

In another area, the Writers' Board, after the death of Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur in 1980 and the assumption by 'Izz-al-Din Isma'il of its chairmanship at the start of Mubarak's tenure, began to impart further vitality to the cultural atmosphere. In fall 1982 it organized a great festival on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the death of the two contrasting contemporary poets Shawqi and Hafiz. It invited to this festival many literary figures of the Arab world who, during their stay, spread about an atmosphere that had been lacking, which Shawqi himself had summarized in his verse, saying,

"Though countries differ, we are joined

"By an eloquence that is not different, and an articulateness."

The Writers' Board shut down the only two magazines which had characterized al-Sadat's era, and issued a new magazine, IBDA', which we referred to a short time ago, in their place. It started issuing some important books which ought to have come out years before, including the translation of the novel "100 Years of Solitude" by the Colombian writer Garcia Marquez, who won the Nobel Prize last year, and the Bibliographic Encyclopedia of the Theater (1900-1930) which Dr Ramsis 'Awad had prepared and fought long to publish during the two previous periods, until it finally came into the light. Without this bibliography, no fruitful study of the stage of the period which it deals with can be done. One hopes that the person who prepared it, or others, will resume preparing the rest of it, for the following periods, or we will be like someone who is content to use the first two letters of the alphabet.

While the publishing apparatus of the government has been busy in this fashion for a short period of time, the special publishing house has been active, along with it, outside the area of religious books and books on cultural heritage in which it had almost become specialized. For the first time, the full translation appeared in Arabic of the extremely difficult world famous novel, the native speakers of whose language even have difficulty understanding to this day, the novel "Ulysses," by the Irish writer James Joyce, or "'Ulis," as the name has been translated in the translation here. This was translated by a university

professor who traveled to Kuwait in al-Sadat's era, Dr Taha Mahmud Taha. Whatever one's opinion about the accuracy of the translation, which took more than 10 years, might be, its Arabic text itself is in itself stirring to the reader's imagination, and is hard to put down.

In fact, the domestic Egyptian opposition has started to play a constructive role in culture. The National Grouping Party has declared that a magazine for literature and the arts will soon be issued which Dr al-Tahir Makki will be in charge of editing. This step may perhaps encourage the two other opposition parties to take part in practice in creating culture, in place of their strange participation in the word "no," which was the slogan of the entire opposition in al-Sadat's era, bringing back to mind a broadcasting head in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era who was notorious for using this dismissive "no" on all the papers that were presented to him for signature. He would always start with the word "no," then add the word "objection" if he was in agreement, or the word "agreement" if he was opposed! What is true opposition except the art of giving and taking!

While these are all signs which call for cultural optimism, if one may use the expression, much still remains to be done to restore lost vitality to the cultural entity in a country which by virtue of its position, its role and its history is in the midst of an Arab world covering a tremendous area of the planet.

Decline of the Stage and Screen

One of the most prominent observations in this regard is that two of the most important channels of culture and manifestations of cultural expression are still rooted in the context of the hangover of regression, and shallowness that dominated in the previous period. Once the generation of authors who had infused vitality into the veins of the stage in the fifties and sixties had stopped writing for the stage, the circumstances were not propitious for any other serious or talented alternative. Here is cheap, half-spontaneous comedy taking over the theaters that are in supply today, and the violation of texts and trial of a successful comic actor like Sa'id Salih are only proof of the shallowness of writing, on the one hand, and the absence of theatrical traditions on the other. Here is the cinema, also, mired in the same abyss of shallowness, as if it was bringing us back once again to the period of the forties and the movies of the war rich which were made to exploit the increasing normal human demand for enjoyment and a desire to escape from an atmosphere of oppression and despondency. It is sufficient for us to quote some titles of movies being shown now to give proof of this cheapness, triviality and fraudulent exploitation of man's need for amusement. Among these titles, which are not much different from those of the movies by the war rich, are "Poor Hasan Bey," "The Kingdom of Hallucinations," "Love in a Dungeon," "An Oddity Born of a Marvel," "The Bite of a Dog," and "Mukhaymir Is Always Ready." I am afraid to say that a decline such as the one these art forms have witnessed is proof of the decline in the society that produces and consumes them. Indeed, having tried to consume some of the plays and movies, I am afraid to say that sitting in theaters and movie houses is no longer a pleasure, as it was in the past, because of the extreme foolishness of the strange new public which has started frequenting these places, once again, in order to gossip, waste time, eat sandwiches and crack open sunflower seeds!

Parallel Publishing

Another most prominent observation is what we might call "parallel publishing," a movement which does not belong to the government publishing sector or the sector of the individual, but whose backbone, rather, are the few piasters which young people pool in order to issue small low-cost magazines and books written by hand or typed and then copied. This phenomenon has started to be widespread in the last year. However, one must say that it is not the creature of today: its early manifestations emerge in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir, when a group of young people got together, after the defeat, and issued a magazine titled GHALIRI 68. This magazine, which lasted for about 2 years, was the only competitor to vanguard youth writing. This phenomenon then started to grow rapidly all during al-Sadat's era, as a result of the suspension of cultural and literary magazines and young people's discontent with alternative magazines and channels of publication. Now the same phenomenon is increasingly growing in Mubarak's era.

If young people in Europe and America do this when the means of publication are too restrictive for their extensive bold or experimental writings, that is normal, but it is extremely limited. However, when this approach, parallel publishing, is the only means available to young writers, that is not a good omen, because with the passage of time it starts to resemble a blind alley. The producers are young people with limited material resources, and the consumers themselves are also young people with limited buying power. There is no doubt that another reason for the widespread nature of this phenomenon was, and still is, the aversion of legitimate avenues of publication to accept young people's writing, on the one hand, and the absence of criticism on the other, on top of the shrinkage or freeze in the channels and agencies of culture, and the excessive prices the state-owned publication sector puts on its publications as a result of constant policies of guidance and production aimed at realizing a profit.

Culture is a Common Property, Not a Commodity

The main reason for all this was the dominance of the notion, in the channels and agencies of culture during the previous ers, that "culture is a commodity." However, culture in a poor developing country in which illiteracy is at a disturbing level cannot be, or remain, a commodity to which the laws of supply and demand apply as they do elsewhere. Rather, culture can, or must, play a leading role in building up man with a little planning, guidance and awareness of the seriousness of the part freedom plays in culture and its prosperity. There is no doubt that the Egyptian intellectual in the era of Mubarak enjoys a substantial amount of freedom, but freedom alone, without support from channels and agencies, is not enough by itself.

Egypt, since the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir, has been without a literary magazine that would bring Arab literary figures together, as AL-RISALAH or AL-THIQAFAH did. In addition, in al-Sadat's era, the secretariat general of the conference of Arab literary figures was also absent from Egypt, just as the magazine LUTUS, which was issued in Cairo as the organ for Asia and Africa, was also absent, and the activity of the permanent office of the writers of Asia and Africa was frozen.

It is not in the interests of Egypt or in the interests of the Arabs to live culturally dispersed, after a communality of culture which was the glorious achievement of the Arabs throughout the ages. Though they were politically and economically dispersed and fragmented many times throughout history, they were not culturally dispersed and fragmented as they are today. Herein lies the role and responsibility in which Egypt has always deserved credit for initiative.

Perhaps after all this, we can state that the signs that inspire cultural optimism are present in Mubarak's era and that the intellectuals themselves are present, because there can be no culture without cultural figures. What we do wish, however, is that the intellectuals will help set forth a plan for culture which will be binding on them and on the agencies which will proceed to carry it out. If the conferences of our era have had a bad impact on our lives in past periods, because of their frequency and the fact that their resolutions have become mere ink on paper, we must only seek out an alternative, and, if it is not possible for us to create an alternative to conferences, as undoubtedly it is, we must only hold another conference, benefiting from the errors of the past, which is the least one can believe in!

The American writer Arthur Miller once said that the intellectuals are the first people to call for change, and, if it is carried out in the manner they call for, they are the first people to be discontent with it. However, I can say today that that is their fate. They are a people who have only ambition and the ability to dream and demand change. A prophet has nothing but a message; isn't that the case?

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CSO: 4504/513

AMENDED FINANCE LAW FOR 1983 ADOPTED

Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA in French 2 Aug 83 pp 4-5

[Law No 25-83 adopted by the Chamber of Representatives on 26 and 27 July 1983:
"Amended Finance Law for 1983"]

[Text] Here is the complete text of the Amended Finance
Law as adopted recently by the Chamber of Representatives.

God alone be praised.

(Great seal of His Majesty Hassan II)

Be it known by these presents--and may God elevate and strengthen the content
thereof!

That our Sherifian Majesty,

Noting the Constitution, particularly articles 26 and 39 thereof;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-72-260 dated 9 Shaban 1392 (18 September 1972) estab-
lishing the organic finance law;

Noting Royal Decree No 1-82-332 dated 15 Rabi I 1403 (31 December 1982) pro-
mulgating the finance law for 1983 (Law No 24-82);

Has decided as follows:

Article 1: Hereby promulgated is the Amended Finance Law for 1983, No 25-83,
as adopted by the Chamber of Representatives in its special session on 15 and
16 Shawwal 1403, corresponding to 26 and 27 July, and reading as follows:

Amended Finance Law for 1983, No 25-80 [as published]

Part 1

General Conditions for Financial Equilibrium

Title 1

Provisions Relative to Revenues

I. Authorized Taxes and Revenues

Contribution to National Solidarity

Article 1

Paragraphs I, II, IV, V, VII, VIII, and XII of article 1A of the Finance Law for 1980, No 38-79, promulgated by Royal Decree No 1-79-413 dated 11 Safar 1400 (31 December 1979), are amended as follows:

I. There is established for the benefit of the general state budget a contribution to national solidarity to be paid by physical and legal entities on the basis of:

1. Income subject to:

a) The levy on public and private salaries, indemnities and emoluments, wages, pensions, and life annuities, the said levy being referred to throughout this text as the "levy on salaries and wages."

b) The tax on professional income.

c) The urban tax in the case of rental income.

d) The agricultural tax, including income temporarily exempt, totally or in part, from the said tax.

2. The rental value of property or portions of property subject to the urban tax and occupied by the owner as his principal or secondary residence, including property or portions of property temporarily exempt, totally or in part, from the said tax.

3. The potential income, determined as provided in paragraph IV.B. below, from undeveloped sites located within the urban communes and their peripheral zones as the latter are defined in the provisions of the royal decree dated 7 Kaada 1371 (30 July 1952).

Provided, however, that this provision does not apply to the following undeveloped sites:

a) Those belonging to the national or local governments.

- b) Those located in zones where construction is banned.
- c) Those subject to the urban tax.

II. As regards the sites referred to in paragraph I, No 3:

(The remainder is unchanged.)

IV. A. The basis for calculating the contribution to national solidarity is the equivalent:

1. In the case of income subject to the levy on salaries and wages, of the basis adopted for calculating the said levy, increased by the amount:

a) Of expenses inherent in the job, as provided in article 3, No 2 of Royal Decree No 1-58-368 dated 26 Jumada II 1378 (7 January 1959) regulating the levy on public and private salaries, indemnities and emoluments, wages, pensions, and life annuities.

b) Of deductions for dependents, as provided in article 4 of the same royal decree.

But reduced by the levy withheld at the source or outstanding.

2. In the case of income subject to the tax on professional income, of the basis adopted for calculating that tax without regard for deductions for dependents as provided in article 38A of Royal Decree No 1-59-430 dated 1 Rajab 1379 (31 December 1959) regulating the tax on professional income.

3. In the case of income subject to the agricultural tax and the urban tax, of the basis adopted for calculating those taxes.

4. In the case of property or portions of property occupied by the owner as his principal or secondary residence, of the rental value as established in the final subparagraph under article 2, paragraph V of the Finance Law for 1978, No 1-77-372 dated 19 Muharram 1398 (30 December 1977).

Provided, that in the case of property or portions of property occupied by the owner as his principal residence, the taxable basis is equal to the said rental value less a lump sum of 30,000 dirhams.

B. In the case of undeveloped sites referred to in paragraph I, No 3 of this article, the potential income serving as the basis for calculating the contribution to national solidarity is equal to 10 percent of the market value of the said sites as established on 1 January of each year on the basis of the statement provided for in paragraph XVII below.

C. When the taxable basis, as defined in A and B above, applies to a period of less than or more than 1 year, the contribution to national solidarity will be adjusted to conform to the period in question.

V. In the case of income subject to the levy on salaries and wages, the annual amount of the contribution to national solidarity is determined by reference to daily income.

The contribution to national solidarity is not applicable when the annual taxable basis as defined in paragraph IV above is less than or equal to 9,000 dirhams. [The contribution will equal the pay for:]

- a) Four days when the annual taxable basis is more than 9,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 36,000 dirhams.
- b) Five days when the annual taxable basis is more than 36,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 60,000 dirhams.
- c) Eight days when the annual taxable basis is more than 60,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 90,000 dirhams.
- d) Ten days when the annual taxable basis is more than 90,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 120,000 dirhams.
- e) Twelve days when the annual taxable basis is more than 120,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 200,000 dirhams.
- f) Twenty days when the annual taxable basis is more than 200,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 300,000 dirhams.
- g) Thirty days when the annual taxable basis is more than 300,000 dirhams.

VII. A. 1. In the case of incomes subject to the tax on professional income or the agricultural tax and in the case of the rental value of property subject to the urban tax, except property occupied by its owner as his principal residence, the contribution to national solidarity is calculated on the amount obtained by application of the schedules specific to the above-mentioned taxes to the taxable basis as defined in paragraph IV above.

The rate of the contribution to national solidarity applicable to the amount thus obtained is as follows:

- a) On incomes subject to the tax on professional income: 10 percent.
- b) On incomes subject to the agricultural tax: 20 percent.
- c) On the rental value of property or portions of property subject to the urban tax when rented or occupied by its owner as his secondary residence: 10 percent of that portion of the said amount up to 50,000 dirhams and 15 percent of the portion above 50,000 dirhams.

2. In the case of property or portions of property subject to the urban tax and occupied by its owner as his principal residence, the contribution to national solidarity is calculated by applying a rate of 4 percent to the taxable basis as defined in the final subparagraph of paragraph IV,A. above.

B. In the case of taxpayers subject to the tax on professional income and taxed according to actual net income, the contribution to national solidarity cannot be less than the following amounts, regardless of the particular enterprise's taxable income:

1. For taxpayers whose annual or annualized turnover does not exceed 1 million dirhams: 1,500 dirhams.
2. For taxpayers whose annual or annualized turnover exceeds 1 million dirhams: 3,000 dirhams.

VIII. In the case of potential income from undeveloped sites, as defined in paragraph IV.B. of this article, the rate of contribution is as follows:

1. When the potential income does not exceed 20,000 dirhams: 2 percent.
2. When the potential income is over 20,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 50,000 dirhams: 2.5 percent.
3. When the potential income is more than 50,000 dirhams and less than or equal to 100,000 dirhams: 3 percent.
4. When the potential income is more than 100,000 dirhams: 4 percent.

XII. In the case of taxpayers subject to the urban tax, the contribution to national solidarity is established by reference to:

1. The rental value as of 1 January each year in the case of property or portions of property occupied by the owner as his principal or secondary residence.
2. The income for the current year in the case of other property.

The tax is collected as provided in paragraph XIV.

(The remainder is unchanged.)

Customs Duties

Tax System Applicable to the Importation of Equipment and Material Destined for Irrigation and the Construction of Greenhouses

Article 2

I. Equipment and material destined for irrigation and the construction of greenhouses and included on the list issued by the authorities are admitted free of import duties and taxes.

This exemption is subject to authorization by the authorities prior to importation and to proof, under the conditions established by the authorities, that the equipment and material in question will be used for the above-mentioned purposes.

II. Article 8A of the Finance Law for 1982, No 26-81, as promulgated by Royal Decree No 1-81-425 dated 5 Rabi I 1402 (1 January 1982), is repealed.

Tax on Products and Tax on Services

Article 3

I. The provisions of articles 1, 4, 11, and 77 of Royal Decree No 1-61-444 dated 22 Rajab 1381 (30 December 1961), which replaced the transaction tax with a tax on products and a tax on services, are amended or supplemented as follows:

The said article 1: For the transactions defined in articles 4 through 12 below, there is hereby established the following:

1. A tax on products at the normal rate of 19 percent, to be applied within Morocco and on imports.

However, that rate...

2. (The remainder is unchanged.)

The said article 4: Subject to the provisions of articles 7A, 8, 9, and 11, the following are subject to the tax on products at the rate of 19 percent:

1. Sales by fiscal producers.

2. Deliveries to themselves by the entities referred to in paragraph 1 above.

(The remainder is unchanged.)

The said article 11: For those owing taxes and whose total taxable turnover does not exceed 200,000 dirhams during the preceding year, business subject to the tax on products at the rate of 19 percent, as provided in article 4, is subject...

(The remainder is unchanged.)

The said article 77: The event giving rise to tax liability in the case of imports is constituted by clearance of the goods through customs.

The tax rate is set at 19 percent ad valorem.

However, that rate is reduced...

(The remainder is unchanged.)

II. The above-mentioned Royal Decree No 1-61-444 dated 22 Rajab 1381 (30 December 1961) is supplemented by article 87.V. as follows:

Article 87.V. Temporarily, and notwithstanding the provisions of article 15, sums collected by taxpayers on or after 1 August 1983 in payment of sales,

labor, or services fully completed and invoiced before that date are subject to the rates of the tax on products or the tax on services in effect as of the date on which the said transactions were actually carried out.

In cases where, as of 1 August 1983, those liable for tax are bound by contracts calling for supplies, labor, or services to be delivered or performed in successive stages, transactions carried out before the said date are regarded as being distinct from such transactions carried out after the said date and will be subject, as the case may be, to the rates in effect on 31 July 1983 or those taking effect on 1 August 1983.

Taxpayers affected by the provisions in the two preceding paragraphs and for whom the event giving rise to tax is constituted by receipt of payment must, before 30 September 1983, send or present to the tax office a statement of their turnover, including a list showing the names of customers owing them money as of 31 July 1983 and the amounts due by customer for business subject to the tax on products at the normal rate.

The tax due as a result of business with those debtors will be paid as the sums due are collected.

Registration Taxes

Article 4

Book 1, article 94 of Decree No 2-53-11g1 [as published] dated 12 Jumada II 1378 (24 December 1918 [as published; presumably 1958 intended]) codifying the legal texts concerning registration and stamp taxes is repealed and replaced by the following provisions:

Article 94: Property title deeds (mulkia).

A. Deeds conferring title to real property are subject to the taxes provided in article 96, paragraph 1 below.

Those taxes are based on the value of the property covered by the title deeds.

Each parcel or portion thereof, whose value must be appraised separately, is to be described specifically in terms of its boundaries, area, and location.

B. However, and until 31 December 1996, deeds conferring title to real property located outside urban peripheries are subject to a reduced tax as follows:

1. Twenty-five dirhams per hectare or fraction thereof up to a maximum equal to or less than 5 hectares, provided, however, that the minimum tax shall be 100 dirhams.

2. Fifty dirhams per hectare or fraction thereof for that portion of the total area exceeding 5 hectares, provided, however, that the minimum tax shall be 200 dirhams.

In order for this tax to be applied, the instrument conferring title must include a statement by the beneficiary to the effect that:

- a) The drawing up of the instrument is required as part of a registration procedure.
- b) Registration of the property in question is expressly required.
- c) The property in question has not been the object of:
 - 1. Any instrument of conveyance inter vivos as a donation or for a valuable consideration in his favor.
 - 2. Any real action for recovery of property as of the date of the instrument.

The title deed covering property located in a commune where property has been surveyed and recorded in the land survey register must also be accompanied by a cadastral extract.

The instrument duly recorded and approved by the cadi is transmitted by the collector of registration taxes to the registrar of property ownership.

In cases where surveying operations reveal that the area exceeds the area specified in the instrument by more than one-twentieth, the registration procedure is suspended until the parties involved provide proof that they have paid the required additional tax as calculated at the above-mentioned rate.

In case of false statements or dissimulation, the beneficiary will be sued for payment of the additional tax calculated on the basis of the tax schedule set forth in A above, to which shall be added a penalty equal to 100 percent of the amount of tax due.

The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to title deeds covering property located in a rural regrouping zone or in a zone where rural property is registered in common under the terms respectively of Royal Decree No 1-62-105 dated 27 Muharram 1382 (30 June 1962) and Royal Decree No 1-69-174 dated 10 Jumada I 1389 (25 July 1969).

Stamp Taxes

Article 5

The provisions of articles 2, 8 (sections VIII, X, XII, XIV, XVI, XX, XXI, and XXII), and 18 in Book II of Decree No 2-58-1151 dated 12 Jumada II 1378 (24 December 1958), codifying texts on registration and stamp taxes as amended or supplemented, are again amended as follows:

"Chapter 1

"Stamps Based on Paper Size

"Article 2: The price of stamped paper supplied by the authorities and the stamp tax on paper to which taxpayers themselves are authorized to affix stamps

or which they cause to be stamped by the authorities are based on the size of the paper in question, as follows:

"1. Folio of standard paper measuring 0.21 by 0.27 meters: 10 dirhams.

"2. Standard paper measuring 0.27 by 0.42 meters: 20 dirhams.

"3. Ledger paper measuring 0.42 by 0.54 meters: 32 dirhams.

"(....)

"Chapter III

"Special Stamp Taxes

"Article 8: The following are subject to special stamp taxes, the coefficient of which is established as follows:

"(....)

"Section VIII

"Criminal Files

"Issuance of an extract of a criminal file is subject to the collection of a stamp tax of 10 dirhams.

"(....)

"Section X

"Identification Cards

"Identification cards valid for 10 years are subject to a stamp tax of 10 dirhams when they are issued and when they are renewed.

"(....)

"Section XII

"Automobile Transportation

"The stamp taxes provided in connection with the policing of traffic and haulage are established as follows:

"(....)

"A.

"B.

"(....)

"C. Special taxes, the payment of which is provided for in the order dated 29 Jumada II 1372 (16 March 1953) establishing special regulations for the registration of automobiles in series WW and W18:

"1. Series WW

"a) Application for a receipt authorizing temporary operation of a vehicle: 150 dirhams.

"b) Supplementary tax for reporting the operation of a vehicle after expiration of the receipt authorizing the temporary operation of a vehicle: 250 dirhams.

"2. Series W18

"a) Application for a W18 card: 500 dirhams.

"It is stipulated that this card is valid only for the current year; as a consequence, the tax is due at the time of each renewal.

"D. Taxes whose payment is provided for in article 5 of the royal decree dated 3 Jumada I 1372 (19 January 1953):

"1. Application for a categorized certificate of competence to operate an automobile or for a categorized extension of such certificate when the extension is subsequent to issuance of the certificate of competence, valid for operating vehicles whose gross weight does not exceed 3,500 kilograms: 300 dirhams.

"2. Application for a certificate of competence to operate motorcycles (model M): 250 dirhams.

"3. Application for a certificate of competence to operate motorcycles or motorized bicycles (model J): 100 dirhams.

"4. Application for a duplicate to replace a lost or damaged certificate of competence:

"a) Covering automobiles: 200 dirhams.

"b) Covering motorcycles and motorized bicycles (models M and J): the fees are the same as those provided in Nos 2 and 3 under this paragraph D.

"5. Application for an international drivers license: 100 dirhams.

"E. The taxes... (remainder unchanged).

"Section XIV

"Hunting Licenses

"Hunting licenses valid for 1 year are issued on stamped forms costing 200 dirhams and are also subject to a supplementary stamp tax of 22 dirhams, the proceeds of which are paid into the Hunting Fund.

"Section XV

"Permits To Carry and Possess Firearms

"A.1. Permits to carry displayed firearms for 1 year are subject to a stamp tax of 200 dirhams.

"2. Permits to carry concealed firearms are subject, under the same conditions, to a stamp tax of 200 dirhams annually.

"B. Permits to possess firearms are subject to a stamp tax of 200 dirhams annually.

"C. Renewal of the said permits is subject to the same taxes.

"Section XVI

"Registration Certificates

"Registration certificates issued in pursuance of the royal decree of 1 Kaada 1366 (17 September 1947) are subject to a fee of 60 dirhams for each year of validity.

"Collection of this fee is evidenced by affixing to the registration certificates, at the time of their issuance, adhesive stamps with a value corresponding to the entire period that the registration will remain valid.

"(....)

"Section XX

"Explosives Control Cards

"A tax of 20 dirhams is paid by the employer, who affixes one or more adhesive stamps to his application for an explosives control card.

"Section XXI

"Individual Seaman's Record Book

"The fee for issuing an individual seaman's record book is set at 10 dirhams, payment of which is evidenced by affixing to the record book, both when issued and when replaced, adhesive stamps that have been canceled by the maritime district chiefs or assistant chiefs.

"(....)

"Section XXIII

"Health Fees for Vaccination on Departure With Issuance of a Certificate

"Vaccinations against cholera, plague, typhus, smallpox, or yellow fever that are administered to travelers leaving Morocco and documented by a certificate are subject to a fee of 20 dirhams, payment of which is evidenced by affixing adhesive stamps.

"Chapter VIII: Penalties

"Article 18: Any infraction...

"(....)

"(The first three subparagraphs remain unchanged.)

"Any infraction of the provisions of article 8, sections XVI and XVII (sub-paragraphs 3 and 4) above is punishable by a penalty set at 100 percent of the amount of the original taxes."

Article 6: The provisions of article 8 in Book II of Decree No 2-58-1151 dated 12 Jumada II 1378 (24 December 1958) codifying texts on registration and stamp taxes, as amended or supplemented, are supplemented by section XXV, reading as follows:

"Chapter III

"Special Stamp Taxes

"Article 8: The following are subject to special stamp taxes whose coefficients are established as follows:

"(....)

"Section XXV

"Tax on Travel Outside the Country

"I. Subject to the exemptions provided below, every person of Moroccan nationality is liable for a tax of 500 dirhams at the time of his departure through any frontier post.

"This tax is collected in exchange for tax stamps with a value of 500 dirhams that are affixed to the traveler's passport and canceled with the departure seal by National Security agents stationed at the frontier posts.

"II. The following are exempt from this tax:

"1. Pilgrims to the holy places of Islam who carry a passport entitled 'Special Pass,' as provided by article 8, section IV of the Stamp Tax Code, or a passport with a visa for fulfillment of the rites of the Hadj.

"2. Any person carrying an order to carry out a mission as issued by the authorities in accordance with the regulations in effect.

"3. Students pursuing higher studies abroad, upon presentation of their student card or a certificate of enrollment in an institution of higher learning.

"4. Moroccan workers abroad, as well as their spouses and dependent children, whether leaving for the first time or returning to their place of work, upon presentation of a labor contract or a residence permit issued by the proper authority at their place of work.

"5. Personnel traveling while on duty in the employ of air or sea navigation companies, drivers and their assistants of vehicles belonging to registered companies for the overland transportation of passengers or freight, and railway transportation personnel.

"6. Persons holding border cards.

"7. Persons participating in congresses, meetings, or events of a political, trade union, artistic, or cultural nature or in sporting events, under the conditions established by the authorities.

"8. Patients for whom treatment is not available in Morocco and who have a doctor's certificate under the conditions established by the authorities.

"III. Any infraction of the provisions of this section is punishable by a penalty set at 100 percent of the amount of the tax. The penalty is not subject to remission.

"Those responsible for monitoring and noting infractions are the agents of the Registration and Stamp Tax Division, the Customs and Indirect Tax Administration, agents of the Directorate General of National Security, and the authorities in charge of issuing passports.

"Any infraction noted must be the object of a report indicating in particular all necessary information shown on the passport and, necessarily, the number of the national identification card.

"The said report will be sent to the Ministry of Finance (Registration and Stamp Tax Division)."

II. Earmarked Funds

Special Tax on Animals Slaughtered in Controlled Slaughterhouses

Article 7

I. With a view to procuring the necessary funds for carrying out the programs for safeguarding and protecting livestock, there is hereby established a special tax on animals slaughtered in controlled slaughterhouses, excluding those slaughtered for export.

II. The special tax referred to in paragraph I is established as follows per head of livestock:

Tax per Head of Livestock

<u>Species</u>	<u>Tax (in dirhams)</u>	<u>Species</u>	<u>Tax (in dirhams)</u>
Cattle	35	Equidae:	
Sheep	5	Horses and mules	25
Goats	5	Donkeys	10
Swine	25	Camels	35

III. The above-mentioned tax is collected by the communal agent, who withholds a sum equal to 3 percent of the revenues collected to cover his collection costs. The balance is paid to the treasurer general monthly.

IV. The following are repealed:

1. The royal decree dated 5 Shaban 1356 (11 October 1937) establishing a surtax on animals slaughtered in municipal cities as a means of securing funds for the prevention of bovine tuberculosis, as amended or supplemented.
2. The royal decree dated 26 Rabi I 1367 (7 February 1948) repealing the royal decree dated 14 Ramadan 1362 (15 September 1943) revising the tax on cattle slaughtered in municipal cities with a view to securing the necessary funds for combating bovine hypodermosis and establishing a tax with a view to combating external parasites of sheep and goats.
3. The orders issued to implement those decrees.

Article 8

The provisions of articles 1 through 7 take effect on 21 Shawwal 1403 (1 August 1983).

Title II

Provisions Relative to the Balancing of Resources and Expenditures

Article 9

The overall balancing of resources and expenditures for 1983 is as follows (in dirhams):

<u>Item</u>	<u>Resources</u>	<u>Ceiling on expenditures</u>
I. General state budget:		
Resources	33,078,455,902	
Operating expenditures		18,859,089,589
Investment expenditures		13,569,979,040
Amortizable debt and floating debt expenditures		5,700,000,000
Total general state budget	33,078,455,902	38,129,068,629

Item	Resources	Ceiling on expenditures
II. Supplementary budgets:		
Government Printing Office:		
Resources	6,053,177	
Operating expenditures		5,153,177
Investment expenditures		900,000
Port of Casablanca:		
Resources	71,180,000	
Operating expenditures		43,580,000
Investment expenditures		27,600,000
Ports:		
Resources	245,818,348	
Operating expenditures		118,518,348
Investment expenditures		127,300,000
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications:		
Resources	1,258,672,000	
Operating expenditures		858,000,000
Investment expenditures		400,672,000
Moroccan Radio and Television:		
Resources	192,531,647	
Operating expenditures		111,411,647
Investment expenditures		81,120,000
Property Registry and Land Surveys:		
Resources	122,900,000	
Operating expenditures		100,900,000
Investment expenditures		22,000,000
Total supplementary budgets	1,897,155,172	1,897,155,172
III. Special Treasury accounts:		
Earmarked funds	1,234,918,000	1,307,210,000
Banking and commercial operations	27,225,400	27,057,500
Settlements with foreign governments	memo	memo
Membership in international organizations	memo	569,008,000
Monetary operations	memo	memo
Investment	730,000,000	730,000,000
Loans	125,912,000	626,305,000
Advances	36,430,000	65,000,000
Appropriated expenditures	2,704,000,000	2,704,000,000
Total special Treasury accounts	4,858,485,400	6,028,580,500
Totals	39,834,096,474	46,054,804,301
Excess of government expenditure over resources	6,220,707,827	

Part 2

Funds for Government Operations and Special Provisions

Title 1

Provisions Applicable to 1983

I. General State Budget

Article 10

I. The amount of additional funds allocated to the general state budget for 1983 is set at the sum of 449,901,618 dirhams.

II. The amount of funds allocated to the general state budget for 1983 is reduced by the sum of 5.2 billion dirhams.

III. These increases and reductions in funds are distributed by item and line as shown in table A appended to this law [not included].

Article 11

I. The amount of credits made available to the ministers for 1983 under the heading of operating expenditures in the general state budget is reduced by the sum of 1,280,519,208 dirhams.

II. These reductions are distributed by item as shown in table B appended to this law [not included].

Article 12

I. The amount of program authorizations and committed credits made available to the ministers under the heading of investment expenditures in the general state budget is set at 72,955,250,201 dirhams, including 13,569,979,040 dirhams in the form of payment credits for 1983.

II. These program authorizations, committed credits and payment credits are distributed by ministry and item as shown in table C appended to this law [not included].

II. Supplementary Budgets

Article 13

I. The amount of funds allocated to the supplementary budgets for 1983 is increased by the amount of 28,358,000 dirhams.

II. The amount of funds allocated to the supplementary budgets for 1983 is reduced by the amount of 211,171,888 dirhams.

III. These increases and reductions are distributed as shown in table A appended to this law [not included].

Article 14

I. The amount of increases in credits granted for 1983 under the heading of operating expenditures in the supplementary budgets is set at 20,805,500 dirhams.

II. The amount of reductions in credits for 1983 under the heading of operating expenditures in the supplementary budgets is set at 3,165,270 dirhams.

III. These increases and reductions are distributed as shown in table D appended to this law [not included].

Article 15

I. The amount of program authorizations and committed credits made available to the ministers under the heading of investment expenditures in the supplementary budgets is set at 4,172,458,000 dirhams, including 665,592,000 dirhams in payment credits for 1983.

II. These program authorizations, committed credits and payment credits are distributed as shown in table E appended to this law [not included].

III. Special Treasury Accounts

Article 16

I. The amount of supplementary funds allocated to special Treasury accounts for 1983 is set at 25 million dirhams, the detail of which is shown in table A appended to this law [not included].

II. The amount of credits made available to the ministers for 1983 under the heading of earmarked funds is increased by the sum of 25 million dirhams for the benefit of the account entitled "Special Fund for the Safeguarding and Protection of Livestock."

Title II

Permanent Provisions

Elimination of Jobs Rendered Vacant by Retirement

Article 17

Jobs becoming vacant on or after 1 July 1983 due to the retirement of the employees occupying those jobs are eliminated.

Earmarked Funds Account

Establishment of an Account Entitled "Fund for the Safeguarding and Protection of Livestock."

Article 18

I. In order to permit proper accounting for operations related to the safeguarding and protection of livestock, a special Treasury account entitled "Special Fund for the Safeguarding and Protection of Livestock" is established effective 21 Shawwal 1403 (1 August 1983). The official with power to authorize expenditure is the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform.

II. This account will constitute the record of the following:

1. On the debit side:

Expenditures necessary for:

- a) The prevention of bovine tuberculosis.
- b) Compensation for the slaughter of contagious animals.
- c) Combating bovine hypodermosis and the external parasites of sheep and goats.
- d) Combating the effects of natural disasters (drought, floods, and so on).

And, generally:

- e) Operations to safeguard and protect livestock.

2. On the credit side:

- a) The yield from the special tax on animals slaughtered in controlled slaughterhouses.
- b) Government subsidies.
- c) Gifts, bequests, and miscellaneous revenues.

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CSO: 4519/310

CRISIS STATE OF HOUSING IN NATION'S CAPITAL DEPLORED

Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI in Arabic 16, 18 Jun 83

[Article by Maria Ben Bouchouaib: "Housing Crisis in Rabat -- or Failure of the Government Program?"]

[16 Jun 83 p 5]

[Text] The government's housing program in the city of Rabat is basically embodied in the programs of the Regional Contracting Office for Construction and Infrastructure for the Northwest, the social program, and the expansion of the urban area in the city.

The government's contribution covers at the same time the applications of those who are able to meet debts and the applications of lower income persons belonging to economically lower classes.

A. The government's participation and the applications of people who are able to meet debts:

1. The Regional [Contracting Office] for Construction and Infrastructure in the Northwest, and their limits.

The Regional Contracting Office for the Northwest (IRAK) has sustained an obvious defeat. In spite of that, the benefits that it has been able to enjoy in the public context have been very important.

1. IRAK Northwest (1) was the first contracting office of its kind to come into being. It was later followed by the Contracting Office of the Center, the South Center, and the South.

2. Considering that IRAK Northwest is close to the central administration, it is able to enjoy an important number of facilities (2).

3. In addition, IRAK Northwest is the best equipped in terms of technical and managerial staffs.

On the basis of the report by the National Commission on Housing and Land Management, the accomplishments realized by IRAK Northwest in the 5-year

plan for 1973-77 are to be tabulated at 3,614 housing units, of which just 780 were in Rabat, distributed among various sections in accordance with the following table:

Distribution of IRAK Housing in Rabat

Section	Number of Dwellings
Youssofia	50
Zenguet El Soudan	50
Massira	350
Amal 4	120
Amal 14	210

From this table, it is apparent that:

1. More than 90 percent of the IRAK Northwest housing was constructed in the form of collective dwellings.
2. Use of the figures shown in the table above requires care, since they are exaggerated. We can mention the example of the Massira program, which is situated on the Casablanca Highway, in which the state of construction still is as it was in 1979.
3. IRAK has undergone important delays in the construction area. In fact, among all the programs which had been set out for the 1973-77 period, only one was completed (210 dwellings in Yacoub Mansour, Amal 14). Work was not been completed on the others except after great delay, in 1979 (Zenguet El Soudan, Youssofia).
4. In the end, one can state that IRAK Northwest was not able to perform its task as a pioneer in housing the largest possible number of people; the numerical results have been very mediocre.
5. The 1973-77 5-year plan expected 72,595 housing units of IRAK Northwest in the area (about 25 percent of the total requirements in the plan); therefore the total accomplishments IRAK realized, 3,614 units, are to be considered very mediocre in comparison with what had been planned for, accounting for less than 5 percent, if we consider the housing which was under construction during the plan, which was less than 0.5 percent, if we base ourselves on the housing which was delivered. While the 1973-77 plan, through this housing, intended to meet the needs of people who were able to cover debts whose salaries were less than 1,000 dirhams, the people in charge of this department do not attribute any importance to the goals of the plan.

It is to be noted that the Yacoub Mansour 1 housing alone was based on the notion of housing at appropriate prices, on grounds that the total real estate price of the housing did not exceed 60,000 dirhams. This explains the trend away from the intended goals.

According to an investigation made in 1978 by the Development Department of IRAK Northwest, just 19 percent of its program was directed to incomes of

less than 1,000 dirhams, and thus the table below shows that this organization is basically oriented toward persons who are able to build their own housing by relying on the private sector.

Income Groups Involved with IRAK Northwest Housing

Income Groups	Percent
Incomes below 1,000 dirhams a month	19
Incomes of from 1,000 to 2,000 dirhams a month	60
Incomes of from 2,000 to 3,000 dirhams a month	14
Incomes of more than 3,000 dirhams a month	7

IRAK Northwest is now constructing 590 housing units in Yacoub Mansour.

The following table will enable us to ascertain the status of the IRAK Northwest programs in the Rabat-Sale area, which constitutes 57.3 percent of IRAK Northwest's program.

The Status of IRAK Northwest's Programs in Rabat-Sale (4)

City	Number of Dwellings		Number of Rooms		Area	
	Collective	Individual	Collective	Individual	Collective	Individual
Rabat-Sale	1,968	56	1 to 5	3 to 7	from 55 to 159 square meters	from 110 to 272 square meters

Regarding the construction periods, these on most occasions have not been respected. The example of the Massira section in Rabat is the best proof of that, since work on the program started in 1976 on the basis that work on it would be completed in 16 months, although, at the beginning of 1979, the progress of the work had not exceeded 60 percent, that is, the equivalent of 4 months of delay. In fact, the Ministry of National Housing and Land Management was supposed to provide utilities for the land directly, after handing it over to IRAK (5); it did not do that, in view of the absence of debts in the budget, which prompted IRAK to negotiate with a private contractor on the possibility of completing the Massira project (including providing utilities for the land). This also led to a rise in the cost of the program and consequently to a linkup between the prices of the IRAK Northwest housing and that in the private sector.

Source: The survey which the Development Department of IRAK Northwest carried out in 1978.

1. The Regional Contracting Office for Construction and Infrastructure in the Northeast and its border areas.
2. IRAK's task lies in constructing housing at suitable prices, where its total real property value will not exceed 60,000 dirhams, which is oriented toward people with incomes below 1,500 dirhams.

3. The matter is related to the facilities it enjoys in its relations with the central administration and the ease of controlling the level of decisions on transactions and obtaining plots of land.
4. The above table did not take the progress of the work into account.
5. The program was carried out on land which lay within government property and does not include infrastructure.

[18 Jun 83 p 5]

[Text] In the issue which came out last Thursday, we presented the first part of the study prepared by the social researcher Maria Ben Bouchouaib on "The Housing Crisis in Rabat or the Failure of the Government Program," in which she addressed herself to the government housing program in Rabat through the participation of the government and the Regional Contracting Office for Construction and Infrastructure.

In this issue, we will publish the second and final part, which deals with the limits of the government's social program and the deficiency in the urban development project.

2. The Social Program and Its Limits

The social program for construction depends on loans authorized by the budget for dwellings of reduced size containing all maintenance and collective infrastructure. The price of the dwellings is related to the incomes of the groups with whom the program is concerned. The beneficiary's share comes to 10 percent of the total value of the real property; the rest is paid over a period of 20 years.

One can say that the social program of the Ministry of National Housing and Land Management in the Rabat-Sale context is inadequate in comparison with the related requirements of the inhabitants (40 percent).

The Social Program for Construction in Rabat-Sale

Program Carried out in 1975		Maximum Expectations for 1976	Total Number of Dwellings
Section or District	Number of Dwellings Built	Number of Dwellings under Construction	
Sale	1,098	2,196	3,294
Yaqoub Mansour (6)			
Fath Area	1,709	3,412	5,121
South Taqaddom			
(Nahda) (7)	1,050	2,100	3,150
Total	3,857	7,708	11,565

Source: The Ministry of Housing, Tourism and the Environment, Rabat
 Department: "Accomplishments of the Ministry of Housing, Tourism and the Environment in Rabat-Sale, 1972-75, page 21.

In another area, a total of 3,857 low-cost dwellings were built in three stages:

Provision of infrastructure for units.(8)

Construction. (9)

Public financing (53,484,700,000 dirhams).

Considering that the Fath section is located in western Rabat, its importance went beyond the realm of low-cost dwellings into the housing area, since the number of dwellings stipulated for this section came to 24,000 (120,000 inhabitants).

According to official statistics, 15,000 dwellings are under construction, while more than 500 have been assigned to IRAK (Northwest).

In the Nahda section, which is east of Souessi and south of Taqadom, the program is concerned with a number of types of residences. It stipulates 10,000 dwellings (about 50,000 inhabitants) of which 3,000 are low-cost residences under construction, permitting the elimination of a portion of the huts that are present in the area. The final area of the units is estimated at 150 hectares. Each residential unit is built on an area of 100 square meters, since each dwelling consists of a room, a sanitary area, and a surrounding wall.

Here one should note that the work done is not adequate, relative to needs (3,857 dwellings for 40 percent of the inhabitants), and that after the government had been expecting to be able to reduce the housing shortage and renovate well organized housing centers by means of the unit, and after it had allowed landowners to build one or two floors (indeed three or four), it found that it had opened the door wide open to speculation.

As far as most of the beneficiaries went, the plot of land does not just represent direct assistance from the government; rather, it is basically a means for raising their income, since by using the additions, which are devoted to rentals, it becomes possible for them to realize a great profit, and consequently the government's work is thereby paid for. In view of the landowners' low ability to pay their debts, on the one hand, and the large number of applications on the other, these factors, which help determine a low price per square meter with utilities, have resulted in increased density at the expense of the infrastructure.

In actuality, these units are only mere dormitory towns and include an important source of manpower. In addition, they are incapable of generating any dynamism because they are deficient in all formative infrastructures, in spite of their relatively large area. The government's productivity is oriented toward the pursuit of private production, in the context of prices or the context of performance, and this constitutes an attempt to modify the mechanism of transactions, and raises questions on the reasons which lead to constant acts of aberrance in the government programs. One should bear in mind that the citizens' buying power, for 10 years, has been experiencing a

continuous decline, while their incomes have been increasing only slightly, and this has led to the emergence of an imbalance between incomes on the one hand and the system of loans on the other. One can illustrate this through an actual example.

Let us consider a family with a monthly income estimated at 600 dirhams, which wants to obtain housing whose total cost comes to 60,000 dirhams. This family will have the right to a maximum amount of 34,381 dirhams in loans set aside for moderate-cost housing over a period of 15 years.

Consequently, the total it must obtain by itself is 25,619 dirhams, which means that this family must save 40 percent of its monthly income for 10 years.

3. The Deficiency in the Urban Development Program

The program to change the structure of the Doum, Maadid and Haja communities "has the objective of creating a fully equipped complex with all the needs that stable life requires, as long as it creates work, increases incomes and improves the quality of life of the inhabitants of the area concerned." (14)

The inhabitants of the three communities constitute an important segment of the inhabitants of the shanties of Rabat, and this allows one to say that this is to be considered a "pioneering program, especially since it is seeking to convert the inhabitants of the shantytowns into landowners, and has the goal of creating social, economic and cultural infrastructures, provided that these sections gradually be annexed to the urban area of Rabat" (15).

While the three communities comprise 60,000 persons (16), or 11,900 huts, the change in their structure will require that the necessary facilities be provided (infrastructure and superstructure) for the inhabitants concerned, in order to prompt the inhabitants of the three communities to improve their housing with the aid of the public authorities.

In another area, the Rabat urban development project is basically aimed at creating work, since the number of unemployed persons in these three communities is now estimated at 4,550, and this project will entail reducing this rate by creating 2,500 new jobs. There are two ways to create work:

Developing commercial and industrial activity, which requires substantial manpower.

Training (or educating) the unemployed.

On the cost of the housing, that absorbs 25 percent of the income of the sections of the three communities (36 dirhams in Doum, 70 dirhams in Maadid, and 100 dirhams in Haja).

The shacks are acceptable in Morocco, on grounds that they are a fact of life. Thus, we will have made a major step toward understanding the phenomenon of the shanties. However, extirpating the shanties will require

strong desire and reasonable behavior. Experience has shown, more than once, that "police operations result only in increasing the belt of shanties," because they do not extirpate the damage, since these shacks are prone to reappearing over a broader area everytime they are exposed to destruction.

The Doum, Haja and Maadid project, which has been prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which supposes that it is to be an experiment that can be applied to Asian countries, is no doubt a project for renewal on a number of levels. It bypasses higher technology and relies on independent means of production and work organization which are concentrated on self-construction. However, the project ultimately will end up missing its objective, since it evolved to serve the interests of social groups which were not the object of the program.

The government, through its current 5-year plans, has the intention of stopping the flow of movement of rural inhabitants toward the city, and it also has the intention of combatting the overflow in the large cities by building small urban centers throughout the nation. On this basis, the 1968-72 plan had previously adopted the policy of working to settle inhabitants in the villages, but without fruitful outcome, since the schizophrenic picture of the city inherited from colonialism, since independence, has merely been exaggerated, and the accumulation, mixing and regression of living conditions in the shantytowns are growing greater and greater.

On this subject, Franz Fanon wrote,

"The area inhabited by the colonized does not complement the city inhabited by the colonialists. The city of the colonialists is characterized by rigidity, since everything is made of rock or iron; it is a brilliant city with paved roads in which garbage cans are constantly overflowing with unknown refuse, which had never been seen before, or even dreamed of. The city of the colonized, however, or at least the native city, and the black village, the town, and the barracks, are all areas of bad repute filled with people of bad repute. It is a world without borders, and the people in it are packed close on top of one another."

In that paragraph, it is sufficient to replace the colonialist by the bourgeois, and the colonized by the shantytowns.

[Notes, a number of which are missing]

14. Ministry of National Housing and Land Management, urban development project for Rabat.

15. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is closely watching over the pilot program. In principle, it is to be applied to all the self-constructing communities (urban) in Morocco.

16. The official figure of 60,000 is much less than the actual one, since the inhabitants of these communities without a doubt exceed 100,000.

17. Franz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth," Maspero, Paris, 1976.

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CRITIC FLAYS GOVERNMENT OIL POLICY, CRITICIZES AMERICAN COMPANIES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 20, 27 Jun 83

/Article by Muhammad 'Ali Babakr: "What Is the Sudanese Regime's Position on the Struggle with the Oil Companies?"/

/No 291, 20 Jun 83 pp 30-32/

/Text/ Oil and mineral exploration and drilling on Sudanese territory did not receive adequate attention from the British occupation government (1898-1956) or the national governments which came after independence in 1956. That was the result not of the concentration of attention on areas of agriculture and processing industries but of other circumstances which one can place in the framework of the basic reasons which kept the Sudanese national movement from completely carrying out all the achievements of the post-independence stage. Therefore, this continues to represent a virgin area which is awaiting the efforts of the muscle and the brains of the sons and daughters of the people of the Sudan and its democratic mass movement, as an integral part of the tasks of the progressive national revolution, in its Arab nationalist and socialist perspectives.

The first serious attempt was made in 1959, when the AGIP company started drilling activities on the Red Sea coast. The result of these activities was the discovery of a little natural gas; the company then suspended its operations, in order to shift to the field of imported petroleum products distribution inside the country. After that came the 10-year economic and social development plan (1960-61 to 1969-70), which was devoid of interest and serious emphasis on this area. That was also the case with the development budgets in the period from the October 1964 revolution to the May 1969 revolution, and the amended 5-year plan (1970-71 to 1976-77). In the second half of the decade of the seventies, numerous companies entered the domain of oil exploration, in particular Shell, American Pacific, Chevron, and Ocean Oil in the Red Sea areas. The result was the Chevron Company's success in discovering small amounts of natural gas. In 1977, this company shifted its operations to its concession areas in southwestern Sudan, broad areas covering more than 516,000 square kilometers or the equivalent of more than 20 percent of the total area of the Sudan. In this field, specifically, Chevron's efforts led to the discovery of amounts of oil in the al-Muglad and Baninu areas, which as circumstances would have it was linked to the great event in the history of the Sudan and was concurrent with the circumstances of the emergence of the

energy crisis in the world, with all its concomitant developments and the circumstances of the aggravated economic crisis that the Sudan has been going through since the beginning of the seventies. Naturally, that could not be just coincidence of history, especially since a limited group of companies, namely what is known as the cartel of the seven sisters, dominates the field of oil in a critical fashion. In addition to that, the fact that Chevron's discoveries were simultaneous with the circumstances of aggravated economic crisis in the country made the regime concentrate broad, great attention on these discoveries, on grounds that they were the liferaft that it had been waiting for to solve its increasing economic and political crisis and were an effective means for anesthetizing the upsurging democratic mass movement and keeping it in "waiting rooms" until the panacea for treating the crisis and the structural disturbances the domestic economy was suffering from could flow in.

As circumstances would also have it, jubilation and great broad attention was accompanied by the stifling economic crisis Nigeria was going through and the fall of the Shah of Iran.

There is no doubt that Chevron's discoveries represent a turning point in the history of the development of the Sudanese economy. These discoveries underlined the fact that Sudanese territory has massive precious wealth stored up within it, in addition to its agricultural (plant and animal) and industrial resources. In another area, Chevron's entry into this field also came about in accordance with a new development in Sudanese industry, which began and developed in the period of the seventies and is embodied in the appropriation by the dominant companies with international activities (or as they are called in some books, the multinational companies) of important positions in Sudanese processing industries (Kinanah sugar, the tire factory and so forth) and extractive industries (oil). At the same time, one result of Chevron's discoveries was the entry of numerous multinational companies into the area of oil exploration in the Sudan. In accordance with the information which the minister of energy presented in the magazine SUDANOW (issue of March 1983), there are the following companies:

The Chevron Company. Since 1974, this has operated continuously in the Red Sea coast, first of all, then in the southwest of the country, over an area covering 20 percent of the total area of the country.

The Total Company (French). This started in 1979; its concession areas cover a region on the Red Sea coast (6,400 square kilometers) and the south (145,000 square kilometers).

The Texas Eastern Company (American), whose concession area on the Red Sea coast covers 27,500 square kilometers.

The Sunmark Oil Company (American). This started in 1981 and its concession area is in the Northern Province.

There also is Canadian Transpacific, and negotiations to explore for oil are underway with four multinational corporations whose names he did not mention.

Among the companies the minister did not mention is the Union Texas Company, whose concession area is on the Red Sea, and the Phillips Company, whose concession area is in the Northern Province. These concessions were granted in the period 1979-81. In 1982, the Sun Oil Company, the Transpacific Company and Sunmark applied for the grant of concessions in exploration areas.

Does this mean a struggle among international oil companies over the oil of the Sudan, and consequently the transformation of the Sudan into a stage of international struggle (within the colonialist camp)? Can one isolate all this from the financial and economic policies the government has continued to follow since 1972, especially since 1978? What is the position of the centers of the regime on this struggle? These important questions need decisive answers based on the information available.

The important fact here is that the Chevron discovery, up to this moment, still is the only tangible result, since the other companies have not yet obtained any positive results. This gives Chevron and its efforts a special, distinctive status. However, in spite of that, there is no accurate information on the magnitude of the reserves discovered. There is a little contradictory information, ranging from 200 to 300 million barrels. As for the anticipated production, it was stated at the beginning that that would be around 25,000 barrels a day, then it rose to 50,000 barrels a day. One of the results of this discrepancy is that thinking at the beginning was oriented toward the construction of a refinery in the town of Kusti whose output would total 25,000 barrels a day, which after a while rose to 50,000 barrels a day, to meet local consumption, especially in the south and west of the country. This tendency then shifted at the end of 1982, to the construction of a pipeline from the production areas in the southwest of the country to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, to export crude oil to the international market.

The question is, why isn't accurate information available on what is going on? Why this shift from production to meet local oil requirements to production for export to the world market?

These questions place the issue of the relationship that actually exists between the government and the Chevron company on the discussion table. To describe that, it is necessary to present some information on this company and the development which has occurred in the agreements between the oil producing companies and the companies operating in the oil exploration and development field in recent years.

The International Petroleum Cartel

Seven companies dominate the oil industry, constituting what is known as the international petroleum cartel, or the basic multinational corporations in the realm of oil. This cartel dominates (and until recently owned) 80 percent of the production in the third world, 70 percent of total refining capacity, and 50 percent of the oil transportation fleet. It is more than just an expression of solidarity and cooperation among these companies, since it includes participation, coordination, and commitment to specific agreements on production and prices. The companies which make up this cartel are:

1. Standard Oil of New Jersey /Exxon/.
2. Standard Oil of California (Socal, which operates in the Sudan under the name of Chevron).
3. Standard Oil of New York [Sic]
4. Gulf Oil.
5. Texaco.
6. British Petroleum.
7. Shell.

The first five of these companies are American by nationality, the sixth is British, and the seventh is British and Dutch.

Of course there are other companies, American and European, that engage in oil activity independently of this cartel, but the cartel companies are the ones which largely control the world oil industry by virtue of their resources and their influence, which is spread over all areas of the world.

The activity of these giant companies includes various areas of the world, and as a result some writers call them companies with international activities, while others call them multinational corporations. The fact is that the former description is more expressive of the actual nature of these companies, since their activities and branches, which are spread out over most of the area of the world, constitute an integral part of the parent companies' activity in their own countries. Therefore, the material and nonmaterial assets which these companies possess in the various areas of the world constitute wealth not only for themselves, but also for their own countries and governments, which means that they are essentially national companies whose activities extend to the international context. Therefore, there has been a close bond between the activity of these companies, with their various branches, and the policies of the governments of their home countries, which is represented by these governments' attention to and concentration on protecting these companies' investments and profits from the dangers which might threaten them (nationalization and expropriation). Examples to confirm this are numerous and many, and of these we will mention only the following: the United States of America planned and carried out the coup that brought down the government of Mosaddeq, when he nationalized the oil companies operating in Iran in 1953; Britain, France and Israel invaded the Egypt of 'Abd-al-Nasir after the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956; Iraq faced economic and political pressure from America, Britain and other Western countries after it nationalized Iraqi oil in 1972; the socialist government of Allende in Chile fell by arrangement and planning of the United States; and so forth. Therefore, the companies with international activities, or the multinational companies, constitute the basic manifestation of the phenomenon of neocolonialism. Indeed, one could say that neocolonialism, in essence, is oil colonialism, in which the companies of the international petroleum cartel play the main, leading role by virtue of their resources and influence.

They have a monopoly of oil exploration expertise and possess the specialized technology needed for the process of extracting it from the ground and under the ocean, transporting it and marketing it. Dominance of the oil industry is the key to political and cultural dominance in the world today, since oil constitutes the keystone of modern civilization. Therefore the fact that the United States of America leads the neocolonialist camp is a natural result of its leadership status in the oil industry and its possession of advanced technology in this area. The foreign assets of the American oil companies come to more than \$5 billion, that is, more than a third of American investments abroad, and these companies' revenues from their foreign investments come to more than \$3.5 billion a year, that is, much more than the United States' expenditures on oil imports and the expansion of its investments abroad. These facts alone are enough to explain the connection between American policy and the protection and service of the American oil companies that we have referred to. As a result of this great economic and political protection and influence, these companies carry out their well known practices of bribery, tax evasion, political subversion, manipulation of accounts, inflation of costs, military coups and all other forms of manipulation and corruption.

Until World War Two, the United States of America constituted the largest producer and exporter of oil outside the Soviet bloc. In later years, it lost this status, as a result of its pursuit of a new policy which was aimed at preserving its limited reserves of high-cost oil and relying on expanding production in the areas in which American companies dominated oil production, such as the Middle East and Latin America. Consequently, it made the transition to an oil importing country starting in 1948, while the list of the major oil producing countries included Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Iraq. In this period, the companies had a free hand in exploring for, producing and marketing oil, in exchange for some levies, on the basis of concessions granted to them by the host countries. The concessions granted covered large areas and long periods of time. At the beginning of the fifties, this situation changed because of the appearance of American and European companies which were independent of the international petroleum cartel. The host companies reopened the file of old concession rights, and some of them attained better conditions--indeed, the government of Mosaddeq dared to nationalize the oil companies operating in Iran. This transformation, on top of the abovementioned causes, came about as a result of the upsurge of the domestic companies in the third world countries and their success in expelling the forces of colonial occupation and realizing national independence. Therefore, the most important features of the new agreements with the oil companies were the grant of further powers to the producing countries to control their oil resources, the reduction of the size of the concession areas granted to the companies and the period of validity of the concession, the rise in these countries' share of production revenues, and so forth. At the end of the fifties, the producing countries started to demand control of the concession companies' activity. The beginning occurred with the European (specifically French) independent companies. In 1959, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was formed with the objective of organizing these countries' efforts to protect their national interests vis-a-vis the giant oil companies. In 1961, Iraq carried out a unilateral act by which it took over 99.5 percent of the Iraq Petroleum Company concession areas, and undertook new agreements on better terms with French companies. At the same time, Iran, in 1966,

introduced the system of contracts with producing companies. The companies' reaction toward these developments was to accelerate exploration and production activities in new areas, with the objective of creating a production surplus which would push oil prices down, and to procrastinate in reaching better terms with the OPEC countries. In confronting this situation, the OPEC countries, in 1970, reached agreement on organizing production with the goal of thwarting the companies' schemes to lower prices. In 1972 Iraq nationalized its oil resources and was able to succeed, in spite of the enormous political pressures imposed on it by the companies and their governments. This event had an obvious effect on the low price of oil, and in revealing the companies' manipulation of the resources of the countries of the third world. This gave the OPEC countries greater negotiating power and greater courage to face the dominant companies and their efforts to complete their total dominance of their oil resources. The companies could find no recourse but to accept the principle of participation through negotiations, as happened with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and so forth, out of fear of the nationalization measures that Iraq, Algeria and Libya had started.

The Western countries, in particular the United States, did not like this new situation in the oil industry, and in 1974 they established what is known as the International Energy Agency. This consists of a grouping comprising the oil consuming countries (the Western countries and Japan), and was aimed at confronting the OPEC organization. In order to prevent the Arab countries from using oil as a political weapon in their struggle with Israel, the United States threatened to occupy the oil wells in the event any danger arose which might threaten their interests. Nixon, and after him Carter, then declared an energy program which was primarily aimed at smashing OPEC, because the United States was dependent on imported oil for the equivalent of 45 percent of its domestic consumption (the proportion had been just 18 percent in 1966). The fact is that the goal of smashing OPEC was aimed basically at the Arab countries, because they produce the equivalent of 60 percent of OPEC's output, and the Arab area has the greatest oil reserves and constitutes the world's main balance, a strategic location, and a great market for American products; therefore, America tried without letup to dominate it by supporting Israel and its expansionist and aggressive tendencies. The American energy program was concentrated on reducing dependence on oil in general and on imported oil in particular, encouraging the use of other sources of energy, prompting companies to explore for oil in America and outside the OPEC countries, principally in the fields of Alaska, the North Sea and Mexico, and prompting the World Bank and international organizations to encourage oil exploration activities in new areas in order to weaken the OPEC countries and increase oil supplies.

In this summary review of relations between the companies (and behind them the governments, specifically the United States) and the oil producing countries, it is clear to us that the struggle is still going on and that the developments that have occurred (participation, for the most part, and nationalization in some countries) represent only a stage, whose development will depend on numerous circumstances. However, what concerns us here is to ask about the extent to which the Sudan has benefitted from these developments, in its relations with the companies operating in the field of oil exploration in our country.

The Sudan's Oil in Chevron's Plan

The American program to guide energy has led to positive results, primarily as a result of the recession the Western world is going through. Standard Oil Company of California (Chevron) has had an important role in drawing up and executing this program, which means among other things that it has a strong link with the center of decisionmaking in America. SoCal (the abbreviation of the company's name) is the fourth largest American oil company, and the sixth in the international context. In 1981 the values of its assets came to \$24 billion. It is active in the field of oil production, refining and marketing alike, the activities of its operations extend to 46 countries of the world aside from the United States, and it employs more than 43,000 workers. In 1981 its sales totalled \$45 billion. Its activity is concentrated basically in the countries of the Middle East (two-thirds of Saudi production in 1979, /sic/ while its production inside America does not exceed 500,000 barrels. It started work in Saudi Arabia in 1933, and had the bulk of the Saudi Aramco concession. It has operations in Iran, Bahrain and Libya. In 1959 it was forced to split its profits with the Saudi government; in 1974, 70 percent of Aramco came into the possession of the Saudi government, and in 1973 Libya nationalized 51 percent of the SoCal-Texaco company /Amoseas/, and took over the rest in 1974. Though this meager information, it is clear to us that SoCal (Chevron) is one of the most extensively deployed companies with international activities in the world, and one of those most closely linked to American policy.

In the seventies, its activities became concentrated essentially in marketing Middle East oil, and in recent years it was turned to devote attention to searching for new sources of energy and to exploration in North America, stable areas and areas that are politically clients of America's. However, it is directing most of its attention to its activity inside America. One result of its activities has been important discoveries in America and Canada, and its expressed policy now is founded on concentrating on areas in which important discoveries have been made, while continuing with exploration activities in other areas.

What, finally, is the status of the Sudan's oil in Chevron's plans? That we cannot answer categorically, but the slow progress of its operations, its concealment of information, and its insistence on producing for export, not for local consumption, reflect a tendency which is not in the Sudan's interests, as will subsequently become apparent.

/No 292, 27 Jun 83 pp 36, 37/

/Text/ The oil industry involves the oldest companies with international activity in the world. These companies, at the beginning, dealt with countries that were colonized or semi-colonized by European and American colonial powers, and lacked the necessary expertise and knowledge to enter into the field of oil production and distribution. Therefore, it was natural that the agreements concluded by the two parties would be biased against the weaker party (the host countries) and in favor of the stronger party (the companies), supported by colonial armies of occupation. With the entry of companies (American and European) that were independent of the international petroleum cartel into this area in a later period, the growing national and domestic awareness in the countries of the third world, and the domestic companies' success in expelling the foreign occupation forces

and bringing about political independence, these biased relations developed into their current status, in the course of a long complex struggle between the companies with international activities and the oil producing countries. This situation all in all is distinguished by the retention of these companies' services, on modified terms, in a direction which enables the oil-producing countries to participate effectively in dominating their resources and obtaining a just share of profits. This valuable experience is now available to countries which have recently entered the area of oil production. To what extent has the Sudan, in its relations with the Chevron company and others, benefitted from this experience? Although the information necessary to answer this sort of question is not available, we can set down the following observations:

1. The entry of the Chevron company and other companies into the oil exploration and production field constitutes an important phenomenon in the development of Sudanese industry (processing and extracting). It is the phenomenon of the takeover by companies with international activities of important centers of industrial activity in general and the oil industry as a whole in particular, at a time when these companies have lost many of their previous concessions in most countries of the third world, including fraternal Arab countries. The government has opened the door wide to the multinational companies to explore for oil and valuable minerals (uranium, gold and so forth), and to produce them in all areas and parts of the country. If these companies represent the vanguard of the forces of neocolonialism, that means that the way is being paved for them to dominate the country and its oil and mineral resources, and that they are being empowered to reformulate the domestic economy and national life in a manner which will strengthen their influence and dominance. It is true that there is an agreement which governs the relationship between these companies and the government, and there is a Ministry of Power and some laws bearing on oil production, but none of that prevents these companies from concentrating their weight and their hegemony on the oil industry in our country. The fact is that the concessions granted to these companies give them the right to explore, produce and market, and not just offer services. In the absence of a national organization which is able to participate seriously and conduct effective oversight over the activity of these companies, the dominance by the latter of the oil industry as a whole, and consequently over the country's destiny, becomes inevitable. These concessions which Chevron and the other oil companies enjoy, as will become clear, represent a regression to the period before the fifties and constitute an example of the conditions that predated the new developments in the relationship between the giant companies and the oil producing countries. We do not want to state here that there is the possibility of bypassing the multinational companies by direct exploitation through a national organization, as was the case in Iraq after 1968, but there also is a possibility of following an intermediate formula which will enable the country to use the services of the giant companies, control its own domestic resources, and obtain a just share of the profits, as is happening in most OPEC countries, in spite of their different political and social systems.

2. The information which is available on the terms of the concessions held by Chevron and the other companies is very slight, and the Ministry of Energy and Mining does not divulge the details of the agreement: the National People's Assembly, the highest legislative power in the country, has itself failed to obtain

the details of these terms. This shortcoming makes it impossible to know the truth and evaluate the existing relationship between the company and the government in an objective manner. Nonetheless, the concession acreage given to Chevron and the other companies is to be considered so great and broad that the experience the third world countries have had with these same companies has been ignored. The Chevron concession covers an area greater than 20 percent of the total area of the Sudan (516,000 square kilometers). In this regard, Sudanese engineers consider that it would have been better to break this great area up among 12 companies rather than concentrating it in the grip of a single one. This is affirmed by the experience of the third world countries, and the experience of Iraq in particular, which in 1961 was compelled to take over 99.5 percent of the concession area of the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had been exploiting only a minor portion of its concession area of more than 160,000 square kilometers. In recent years, the oil producing countries have been tending to assert their rights to take over any acreage which is not being exploited by the concession companies after the period agreed upon by the two parties ends. There is no doubt that an extensive concession area turns the company, the holder of the concession, into a strong center of influence with its own effect on the political and economic development in the country, as was the case for example with Iraq Petroleum Company before the Iraqi government took over the entire oil industry. It is not clear whether such conditions exist in the government's agreement with Chevron and other companies, or if it does not exist at all.

3. What is happening now, in agreements with companies, is that they are being compelled to commit themselves to a specific level of spending and exploration effort. We now hear that the daily spending of the Chevron company comes to \$650,000 (that is, close to two thirds of a million dollars a day)! We are told that Chevron's total spending in the Sudan has now come to more than \$600 million! There is no doubt that the figure and the volume of daily and overall spending is immense, but, since the company will recoup its expenditures after producing and marketing the oil, it is in its interests to inflate its expenditures, especially if there is no oversight and control over its activity and its accounts. So far, there has been no practical proof that the government has provided oversight and review of the company's spending and accounts, which gives Chevron, and other companies, a broad chance to manipulate accounts by inflating their expenditures, which they will recoup after the start of production. That is the same method the same companies followed with the OPEC countries in previous stages. Not only that--the other previous methods of manipulation are being repeated here, in the Sudan, in a stranger fashion. The best example of that is the dispute between the Ministry of Energy and Mining and Chevron on estimates of the volume of oil discovered. While the government estimates that at 400 million to 1 billion barrels, Chevron estimates it at just 200 to 300 million! The second example is in the struggle between the two parties and their dispute over the destination of the crude produced. Is it to be exported, as the company considers it should be, or is it to be refined to meet local consumption needs, as the government considers? This struggle is well known, and the government's retreat, and the fact that it was forced to yield to Chevron's conditions by constructing a pipeline to export the crude oil to foreign markets, is also well known. This event reflects the company's strength and the weakness of the government, in the exploration stage, before the start of production!

4. The formulation of the agreements with companies on production and production marketing has gone through numerous stages and developments. At the beginning, the companies had a free hand, in exchange for the payment of some levies to the governments of the host countries. Then the relationship developed until the government national companies managed to control all operations, while benefitting fully from the services and resources of the foreign companies, as is the situation in most OPEC countries, in particular the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others (aside from countries which have tightened their control of production and the distribution of their oil resources in full, like Iraq, and, in part, Algeria and Libya). As for the countries which have recently entered the field of oil production, they emulate the model of the 1957 agreement between the National Iranian Oil Company and the Italian firm AGIP. This agreement stipulates that the AGIP company will commit itself to defraying exploration expenses of no less than \$200 million, provided that it be permitted to recoup half of these expenses in the event oil is discovered. It also stipulates that the Iranian National Oil Company's share is to equal 50 percent of production, and that the AGIP company is to pay the equivalent of 50 percent of its revenues (that is, half of the remaining 50 percent of total production). Thus Iran's actual share will come to 75 percent of total production. In later years, this agreement was improved upon in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. These countries managed to impose minimum guarantees of expenditures on exploration, facilities and investments and wrested the right to review the company's terms after the discovery of oil. In 1966, Iran introduced the system of contracts and the use of the services of foreign companies, while the national company controlled production and distribution operations. These developments, in their totality, largely conflict with the Sudan's agreement with Chevron and the other firms. Chevron, for instance, defrays the expenses of exploration and installations and will recover these in full after production, at the rate of 30 percent of annual production, or 20 percent of total expenditures each year. The remaining revenues from production will be distributed at a rate of 49 percent to the government and 51 percent to the company. We can estimate the Sudan's share of the oil revenues at about \$180 million in 1985, assuming the pipeline's capacity is exploited in full (50,000 barrels a day), and that the prices are kept at their current level (\$29 per barrel) (that is, 50,000 times 29 times 365 times 34 cents). Naturally, doubling production will not of necessity mean doubling the Sudan's share, because Chevron's payments will be doubled with the rise in total costs in addition to the pipeline capacity. This means that the Sudan's actual share will not exceed 34.3 percent of total oil revenues (compared with 75 percent of total production revenues in the case of the 1957 agreement between Iran and the AGIP company)! Can this scanty revenue justify the immense magnitude of Chevron's investments? Or would it have been better had these investments been directed into other areas?

5. In an interview which the magazine SUDANOW held with him in July 1980, the minister of energy and mining said that there was no possibility of building a pipeline to export the Sudan's oil, for technical and financial reasons, and above all else because the amount of the oil reserves discovered were not yet known!

Although the volume of production, so far as it is now known, is in the area of 50,000 barrels a day, and although the volume of the oil discovered has not yet been determined, the approach shifted at the end of 1982, through the doing of

those in power, from constructing a refinery in Kusti to meet local consumption requirements to freezing the refinery and constructing a pipeline from the production sites to the Red Sea, in order to export oil to the world market. It seems strange that a country which is going through a severe energy shortage should orient itself toward exporting its oil production before responding to its local needs, through a long pipeline which will cost more than \$2 billion (SUDANOW, March 1983)--at a time when the cost of the domestic refinery would not exceed \$900 million!

Doesn't that indicate that the government yielded to the company's conditions, early on, after having declared the start of work on constructing the refinery?

What are the motives for this sudden change? In his interview with SUDANOW (March 1983), the minister of energy stated the following reasons:

First, the ease in financing the pipeline through international financial organizations which were hesitant about financing the refinery, because oil exports, contrary to the refinery, would guarantee that their debts would be repaid. Consequently, it would be easy to build the pipeline quickly.

Second, oil refineries throughout the world are not operating at full capacity now, and consequently the cost of refining oil abroad is now considered lower than that of refining the oil in new refineries, because of the recession in the world in general.

We can say that the minister did not mention the most important reason, which is Chevron's interest in recouping its expenditures on exploration, production, the pipeline and so forth and its fear of not receiving its rights in the event the oil is refined to respond to local consumption needs. The fact is that the volume of daily production will not justify the construction of a pipeline of that length and massive cost and that the construction of the refinery will have great benefits in stimulating agriculture and industry and economic activity in the country in general. In whose interests was the freezing of the refinery?

On top of all that, the orientation toward exports means replacing the commodity of cotton with the commodity of oil, and consequently preserving the "colonial" composition of the Sudanese economy--indeed expanding the base of the economic sector connected to the world capitalist market. That is something we can see now in all oil producing countries, since the task of the domestic economy is to produce to answer the needs of the world capitalist market and dispose of its manufactured products, with concomitant distortions and disruptions which will deepen the conditions of backwardness and subordination.

6. Starting now, Chevron's influence, arrogant conduct and violation of the laws in effect in the country have started to be apparent. In addition to the foregoing, the company is not subject to the Labor Law governing the employment of foreigners, who constitute a large proportion of its workers, and it does not use the River Transport Authority's tugs to transport its materials from Kusti to its locations in the south. Rather, it has established its own fleet. This indicates the growth of a cancerous body alien to the country, its laws, its nature, its

history, and the course of its own development, an alien body which is sucking up all the country's bounties but is adding only further structural distortions and disruptions to them. That is the same role that cotton played in the past, in spite of the great difference between cotton and oil.

Conclusion

The foregoing is only an attempt to unearth the truth of developments in the oil sector in the Sudan. The information and publications available will permit no more than the presentation of some observations. The important thing is to record what is available and to exert efforts to learn more, and follow up on what is going on through all possible channels. The entry of Chevron and the other multinational firms, and their dominance of the oil sector, represent an important development in the political and economic history of the Sudan. Here one does not mean the production of oil but the fact that these companies have started to dominate the country's assets and control its political, economic and cultural destiny. In other words, the dominance by the most important instruments of neo-colonialism of our new wealth and consequently the direction of their development: this is the basic issue which must occupy the center of the attention of the sons and daughters of the Sudan, and their popular movement.

Observation: this study has benefited greatly from a study issued by the Center of Development Studies at Khartoum University under the title, "Economics and Geopolitics of the Sudan's Petroleum," by Dr Muhammad Hashim 'Awad, March 1983, in addition to writings and information in SUDANOW.

11887

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BRIEFS

INFORMATION MINISTER REAPPOINTED--AL-DUSTUR has learned that there is a story, which is not lacking in strange aspects, behind the appointment of Muhammad Mahjub Sulayman as minister of culture and information for 3 days, then his return to his former position as press advisor to the president in the Sudan, at the rank of minister. People who know the story behind events say that the decree appointing Mr Mahjub as minister of information, as successor to Dr Muhammad 'Uthman Abu Saq, who took his place as press advisor to the president, was sudden and did not please Mr Mahjub, who realized, by virtue of his knowledge of the conspiracies going on and being hatched in the wings, that this appointment was arranged by his archadversary, Dr Baha'-al-Din Idris, the minister of private affairs, who is now in London, to remove him from the president, preparatory to eliminating him for good. Therefore Mr Mahjub declared his rejection of the new position, so that he would not be removed from his close position to the president, threatening to commit suicide if he was not returned to his former position. AL-DUSTUR's sources assert that numerous departments with connections and decisionmaking influence in Khartoum, including American and Egyptian bodies, intervened. The mediation was a success and Minister Mahjub was returned to his previous position. /Text/
/London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 292, 27 Jun 83 p 13/ 11887

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SHAMIR'S POSITIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES EXAMINED

TA021640 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 Sep 83 p 7 supplement

[Report by Refa'el Bashan]

[Text] Herut veterans recount--though the story is unconfirmed by other sources--that when Eytan Livni and Yitzhaq Shamir vied for chairmanship of Herut, Menahem Begin confessed in a closed meeting: "Gentlemen, I am looking for a successor. I have aged. I want it to be Yitzhaq, although I have nothing against Livni." And Begin explained: If anything broke the heart of the head of BETAR [Hebrew acronym for Yosef Trumpeldor Alliance, the Likud youth movement], Ze'ev Jabotinsky, it was the split between the Irgun and the LEHI [a.k.a. the Stern Gang, a pre-state underground organization]. Choosing Yitzhaq provides an opportunity to come full circle and redress a historic injustice.

What are Shamir's views on various subjects?

The premiership: "I detest the personal struggle with all its grave manifestations. Selecting a man for the post must be based on his political positions and principles. The raging of a personal struggle has taken on very dangerous dimensions. It diverts attention from the main issues and pushes them into a corner. Our cooperational structures are being destroyed; only yesterday we struggled together out of identification with a common path. The result finds expression in the utterance: "In his government, I will not serve!" Because of the overly intense personal struggle, tempers rise and we lose more and more fine powers and fill our public with unnecessary hostility."

Israeli-U.S. relations: "Never has the prime minister or anyone else in the government claimed that the relations between Israel and the United States are ideal. We have always emphasized that even between the friendliest countries differences can develop, and that there is never total concurrence."

The government's functioning: European politicians feel the need to make gestures to the Arab states. They believe that the meetings with the PLO are the cheapest way of doing so, and think that their meetings with the terrorist leaders moderate their views. The PLO is interested in the meetings themselves since they legitimize their activity as the sole representatives

of the Palestinian people and their true 'dream', the destruction of the Jewish state!"

Yitzhaq Shamir, who is especially concerned by this subject, once expressed sharply: "I contend that we must explain to the world, and particularly to the European countries, that 90 percent of the Israeli populace is united around the consensus that we will never agree to the PLO's approach, which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state, which sooner or later will turn into a major Soviet base in the Middle East, or to the demand that we withdraw in every sector to the pre-1967 borders. It must also be absolutely clear that the Arabs should not even dream about repartitioning Jerusalem."

Peace Now: The foreign minister totally rejects this movement's way and ideas. "The members of Peace Now are in error and they mislead the public. They are fully within their rights to express their opinion--but within Israel. I firmly oppose transferring our domestic ideological battles to the international arena. When the Likud was in the opposition, none of its leaders criticized the Israeli Government abroad. There were fierce debates at home, yes, but weakening the country's position by spreading various harmful and defeatist ideas abroad is like: Tell it not in Gath [II Sam. i, 20]."

"When you get right down to it, Israel is not a totalitarian state, and every Israeli can and is entitled to express his opinion. If an Israeli citizen wants to criticize the country, let him voice it publicly--out here, and not abroad!"

The settlements: When Shamir was asked about this subject, he responded definitively: "The settlements are Zionism." And when he was asked what policy should be adopted regarding settling Eretz Yisra'el, he answered: "I am not an adherent of definitions that are made to order. There is an ideology with which we went to the polls, and there should be no deviation from it. It is true that sometimes, in certain situations, a decision must be made that is not in line with the platform. Generally, however, our policy must be based on certain principles, and, of course, this applies to settling the territories."

The Camp David accords: "I was not a great adherent of the agreement. Some of its clauses are unacceptable to me; even today, I am not enthusiastic about it; and it is a fact that I did not vote for it. Objectively speaking, however, one must say that the letter of the accord is being carried out especially disappointed from what is happening in this sphere." [sentence as published; apparent line drop in original form]

The press and "leaks": In this regard we have surpassed every nation. We have set the record of records. There is not a country in the world--and I am saying this with full responsibility--in which so many state secrets are revealed uncontrollably and without restrictions. And the chief culprits are the media people. Many government leaders are afraid to talk with us

lest their names appear in tomorrow's newspaper. Israel's activities in many fields are held in high esteem and many countries want to cooperate with us. Understandably, however, they want to do so secretly for now, and their leaders openly acknowledge: We are sorry, but we cannot carry things out because of leaks that you are unable to overcome.

Religion and tradition: In December 1979, when Shamir returned from a visit to the United States and South America, a meeting was planned for him with the pope on a Friday afternoon. Because of a snowstorm, his plane was delayed and the meeting was put off till 2000. Minister Shamir, however, apologized and canceled the meeting because of the sacredness of the Sabbath.

One of Shamir's dreams is to set up a House of Lords in Israel. The idea, as he pictures it, is as follows: "Of course, in Israel the institution will not be called the House of Lords. I mean the establishment of 'an upper house,' to be comprised of politicians and statesmen who, with respect to seniority or age, no longer find their place in daily political life. These activists have garnered experience and knowledge, which an intelligent country cannot give up easily. Here, those people must retire. Sometimes their leaving seems to be as a result of being dismissed, and more than once, they have become bitter and frustrated. Then they begin to criticize the government and the parliamentary establishment as an expression of personal disappointment.

When Shamir left the position of Knesset speaker and took up the post of foreign minister, there were those who said that he lacks one vital qualification for appearing in international forums: He does not speak foreign languages. As soon as Shamir entered office, he reacted: "I can allay everyone's fears in this regard. When I was the Knesset speaker, I represented Israel in several very honorable parliaments in the world. I spoke in English and French there, and no one told me that I need to attend an ulpan [intensive language course] for foreign languages."

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

POPULATION COUNT--As of the beginning of the new year [7 September] the population has been estimated at 4.11 million people. The Jews among them account for about 83 percent, or a little more than 3.4 million people. The number on non-Jews is 700,000. The Central Bureau of Statistics spokesman reported that the population of Israel grew in the last 12 months by 78,000 people, which is 1.8 percent, as compared to 1.6 percent in the previous 12 months. However, the Jewish population grew by 1.6 percent while the non-Jewish population grew by 2.8 percent. About 96,000 babies were born in the last 12 months, among them 73,000 Jewish babies, and the number of immigrants reached 15,000, an increase of 15 percent compared to last year. [Text] [TA061824 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 6 Sep 83 TA]

CSO: 4400/508

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES NEW POLITICAL REFORMS, POLICIES

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 5 Jul 83 p 3

[Interview Fahd Al Sa'id, deputy prime minister for legal affairs, by al-Qusaybi 'Ibadah; "The Government's Consultative Council Is a Living Embodiment of His Majesty's Zeal To Expand the Base of Consultation in the Country"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Out of belief in the importance of direct dialogue between the press and the senior officials in the government, and the importance of following up on this dialogue on issues and areas that are the object of the citizen's concern, the newspaper 'UMAN is pleased to hold a conversation today with His Highness Mr Fahd Al Sa'id, the deputy prime minister for legal affairs.

It is also pleased to begin the conversation with his highness with a question on his evaluation of the progress of Gulf cooperation, on the occasion of the passage of 2 years since the Council of Cooperation of Arab Gulf Countries was established.

A Realistic Platform for Realizing Noble Objectives

[Answer] The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council came about as the culmination of cooperation that had already existed among the member countries and as an expression of these countries' profound realization of the need to develop cooperation among themselves on all levels to an extent that was in keeping with their ambitions and would give their common efforts concrete form.

Now that 2 years have passed since the establishment of the council, we can only praise God for his aid and success and mention with the utmost satisfaction, by way of evaluation, the successful steps toward cooperation which the council has achieved through this cooperation. Perhaps the council's greatest accomplishment is embodied in the fact that through it the member countries have been able to offer a good example of sincere fraternal cooperation founded on carefully studied bases and relying on a realistic platform in the steps it is taking toward attaining the noble goals for whose sake the council was established.

On the basis of this platform, the first summit of leaders of the member countries, which was held in Abu Dhabi, implanted the general foundations and principles, the second summit in Riyadh then paved the way for joint studies

and efforts, and the third summit, held in Manamah, then approved the start of the adoption of practical steps which would highlight the essence of cooperation and expand its scope.

Today the people in the area themselves can sense the diverse activity and urgent efforts which are being made in various fields. They can perceive the dimensions of the steps that have been taken toward coordination and cooperation in the security, military, economic, social and other fields. These are steps that are assuming a serious character and promise the utmost benefit for the peoples in the area.

In this regard, we can only point out, also, that the council, through the tangible steps it has realized on all levels, has generated a positive deep response in the Arab and international contexts as a clear reflection of the constructive role it is playing, expressing the member countries' concern to coordinate among themselves and assume their responsibilities vis-a-vis their Arab motherland and its just causes, and vis-a-vis the international community.

The Economic Agreement Is a Starting Point

[Question] Your highness talked about the achievements the Gulf Cooperation Council has made overall. Considering that your highness is the chairman of the higher committee of Cooperation Council conferences, would you be so kind as to give some details on the consolidated economic agreement, since that it is one of the council's noteworthy achievements?

[Answer] The consolidated economic agreement contains the general principles and the essential premises of economic cooperation, and therefore the agreement, in itself, does not represent the last word in this area — rather, it is the starting point in moving toward our economic cooperation founded on carefully studied bases aimed at prosperity for all the countries and peoples of the area.

Therefore, the agreement still is receiving constant effort and profound study, all with the goal of applying it in a sound manner which will consecrate cooperation and promote it with positive steps, in order to achieve the desired goals.

As I point to all member countries' concern to follow a realistic approach regarding the joint efforts they are making, taking the interests of all into consideration, I believe that that is the best method for guaranteeing that the course of the cooperation process is followed by sure steps and positive achievements that all the people of the area can be happy with.

The Fourth Summit and the Progress of Cooperation

[Question] If we can ask about expectations, what are your highness' expectations regarding the fourth summit, which is to be held in Doha next November?

[Answer] The Sultanate of Oman views the fourth conference, which is to be held on the territory of the fraternal country of Qatar, with interest, since it is a fraternal meeting among the leaders of the member countries to monitor efforts existing at cooperation. As to expectations on what this summit will produce, I would like to state that it is not a matter of expectations but of asserting that the efforts made to make the course of cooperation a success will continue.

Meetings and contacts are continuous, the signs along the road are obvious, and the council's goals have been declared. The steps that are being taken in the context of the council are being preceded by preparation, arrangement, consultation and coordination stages. Therefore arriving at carefully studied recommendations will serve the public interest and will take all the conditions of the member countries into account. They are recommendations on the steps it considers appropriate.

I can say, in general, that the three previous sessions of summit meetings implanted the foundations of mutual cooperation; proceeding from that premise, we are looking upon the fourth summit with like optimism, and hope for every benefit for it and from it. There is no doubt that with the help of God and the efforts of their majesties and highnesses the leaders of the member countries it will make new contributions in the realm of the practical application of the goals of cooperation, in a manner that will achieve benefits for all the people in these countries.

The Consolidated Laws Will Require Thorough Study

[Question] In the realm of legislation, what possibility is there that consolidated laws will be issued in the context of the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States?

[Answer] In this area, I would like to state that the legislation and laws that exist in the member countries are the product of the stages of development these countries have passed through, and, in addition to that, they address themselves to political, organizational, administrative, economic, social and other areas.

Therefore, when we speak about the possibility of issuing consolidated laws, the situation of necessity requires thorough studies of a special nature, which are performed in stages, in response to the requirements for developing the cooperation that exists among the member countries, to the extent that that will serve the goals of joint cooperation among them.

In the light of all this, since we observe that there actually is a correspondence among some of the laws in effect in the member countries, there will be no difficulty regarding these laws; however, there also are laws in existence in these countries which are special in nature and express the specific needs of each country. Therefore, as far as they are concerned, the situation will require thorough study and research in a manner which will pave the way for coordination among them. Ultimately the important thing is that there actually be efforts at coordination and cooperation in all fields.

The Consultative Council and Its Role in the Construction Process

[Question] Your highness has been assigned to chair the preparation committee to establish the country's consultative council. Now that close to 2 years have elapsed since it was established, what is your highness' evaluation of its role in the construction process which the country is witnessing under the leadership of His Majesty Sultan Qabus?

[Answer] Before I venture on an evaluation of the council's role, I would like to point out that the establishment of the council has come about, through success from God, as a living embodiment of the concern of his majesty the country's monarch to expand the consultative base in the country and to afford citizens scope for contributing opinions and counsel on the efforts, responsibilities and increasing burdens of development, to an extent which will enrich the development process and deepen cooperation between the government and the citizens in achieving development goals. This form of cooperation existed before the establishment of the council; indeed, it was the basic foundation for all the major achievements that have been made in all fields since the blessed upheaval.

The council has proceeded to organize and develop this cooperation and has prompted it to acquire new powers and greater effectiveness which is in keeping with expansion in development areas. Therefore, including the local sector, with the representatives of the regions and the private sector it contains in the framework of the council, in addition to the government sector, is a realistic affirmation of the importance of bringing people's efforts together in this stage of development, in order to meet the needs of development.

The Consultative Council Is a National Outgrowth of Our Omani Situation

[Question] In the light of the remarks your highness made, a question comes to mind regarding the character which sets the council apart from conditions in other countries. Would you be so gracious as to explain this character?

[Answer] The establishment of the council in the form it was established is in effect to be considered a step with its own character, from the standpoint that it came about as a natural outgrowth of our Omani situation, divorced from traditions and theories which are not compatible with this actual situation.

In addition, the special character of this successful step is evident in its compatibility with values and traditions which are firmly rooted in our society, and in the fact that it places the efforts of the government and the citizens in an integrative framework which will bring about interaction among various views and will concentrate all powers and efforts on what is good for our country and for the citizen and his welfare.

A Perceptible Effort by the Consultative Council

[Question] Next, let us talk about the role of the council, and an evaluation of that role from the standpoint of experience in the period which has passed.

[Answer] The council's role as defined by the lofty decree of the sultan, is to contribute views and counsel regarding the areas of the country's economic and social development. It is a role of the utmost importance when we consider that development is our basic cause and our road to exploring the horizons of development.

Therefore, it is necessary that the council make great effort in various developmental areas so that that will assist the government in its attempt to realize the best rates of economic and social growth, respond to the citizen's basic needs and face their problems with appropriate solution, so far as the resources available permit.

When we deal with the council's role in the period that has elapsed since it was established, an objective evaluation of this role will make us consider the tangible efforts the council has exerted in many areas, which have resulted in positive recommendations which the lofty ruler has approved, being so gracious as to impart directives to the competent bodies in government to take them into consideration regarding the development efforts and projects to be carried out.

Everyone has monitored the council's efforts in the sessions it has held and the efforts its committees have made in numerous fields.

Everyone has also monitored the dialogue which has taken place in this context, in which a number of their excellencies the ministers and senior officials who have described the government's policy, existing projects, and projects approved for execution in the course of the years of the second 5-year plan, in their various fields of specialization. They have also responded to the members' requests for information in a manner which has underlined the aspects of the cooperation in effect between the government and the council, in service to the public interest.

An Objective Exchange of Views

[Question] What is your highness' evaluation of the repercussions of the dialogue that has taken place in the framework of the council on the public interest?

[Answer] When I assert the importance of having positive dialogue continue in the framework of the council, I consider that this dialogue must always realize that the government's agencies are assuming their responsibilities and duties in carrying out development plans and projects, in accordance with the available resources and revenues, thereby committing themselves to existing legislation, priorities and needs which have been studied and approved in the general context embracing all areas of development in different parts of the country, and that it must also take into consideration the effects of international economic conditions on the economic situation and the development efforts in a developing country such as Oman, especially during this stage, when the developing countries are facing many difficulties as a result of the negative repercussions of the current international economic situation.

In the light of all this, when the dialogue which is going on in the context of the council addresses itself to areas of development or to responding to essential development requirements, I believe that it would be most feasible if this dialogue took the character of an objective exchange of views in a manner which will realize the citizens' general interests and will in the first place help discover the most appropriate means for overcoming the difficulties that might stand in the way of development efforts or prevent a response to essential requirements.

This, in my conception, is sound, healthy dialogue; it is most important that this dialogue contribute to the realistic evaluation of things and therefore the attainment of realistic recommendations which will help create suitable solutions which are the common goal of the government and the council both.

Amending Legislation Requires Profound Study

[Question] The lofty decree of the sultan regarding the establishment of the council states that one of the council's powers is to express opinions on the economic and social laws that are in effect and recommend improvements the council considers should be made within them to cope with the development requirements which have occurred or have been occurring since the blessed upheaval. Would your highness be so kind as to explain this?

[Answer] In that area, I consider that it is clear that amending existing legislation, that is, amendment for its own sake, when the council, therefore, deals with specific legislation in order to investigate the extent to which it is in keeping with the developments or requirements that have newly arisen, before it recommends that that legislation be amended, developed, subtracted from or added to, it must make a deep, thorough study of the area this legislation deals with and study the problems that might exist or the complications in enforcing this legislation, and consider whether these problems or complications arise from circumstances in which this legislation is not involved or from the fact that this legislation is not in keeping with new requirements which did not exist when it was issued.

In general, the council's recommendations to amend or develop some legislation must have justifications from all economic and social standpoints, and such justifications must at the same time be in keeping with the government's general goals, plans, policies and legislation.

Priority to Areas Related to Citizens' Needs

[Question] Does your excellency consider that the council's role has been positive in selecting subjects in accordance with priorities as a basis for discussion, or in its treatment of subjects in general fashion, while leaving the determination of priorities on them to the government?

[Answer] Regarding the subjects the government submits to the council, priority is given to areas that are of interest to the citizen at this stage, and this must also be the case regarding the issues the council itself deals with, so that priority can be given to areas with strong connections to citizens' needs.

If we consider that the council's role is addressed to all development areas, in spite of their great number and proliferation and indeed their many ramifications, it is essential that there be priorities. This is of extreme importance, since the council can acquire a more effective role by concentrating its efforts in one area after another, in accordance with specific priorities, taking stock of the extent to which a given area is related to a large segment of the citizens, the extent of its importance in responding to their essential needs, and the extent of its importance as far as the realization of the stipulated goals of government plans and projects in different economic and social development areas goes.

Great Appreciation

[Question] Now, at the conclusion of this conversation, would your highness like to add something specific?

[Answer] Yes, I would like to express the utmost appreciation for the efforts that are being made to make the course of cooperation among the Arab Gulf countries a success, and I would like to praise the effort the Consultative Council has exerted on behalf of the government during the period that has elapsed since it was established. I sincerely pray to God to give us utmost success in working fruitfully for the good of Oman and its beloved people in the context of the wise leadership of His Majesty Sultan Qabus -- may God preserve him and guide his steps along the road to prosperity.

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CSO: 4404/507

GOVERNMENT RELEASES VARIOUS PRIMARY, SECONDARY SCHOOL STATISTICS

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 20 Jul 83 p 3

[Article: "143,000 Male and Female Students in the Three Educational Stages in the Previous Academic Year"]

[Text] The total number of students in the sultanate as a whole in the past academic year, 1982-83, came to 142,866 in the primary, preparatory, general secondary, model preparatory, and commercial, agricultural and Islamic secondary schools, the Male and Female Teachers' Institute, the religious preparation institutes in mosques, and other types of education.

Students in the primary stage accounted for 116,467 of all the students. Of these, 72,311 were male and 44,156 were female, distributed among 204 schools, 76 of which were mixed, 72 were for boys and 56 were for girls.

The number of students in the preparatory stage was 19,985, 14,541 of whom were males, distributed among 219 schools, 67 of which were mixed, 107 were for girls and 45 were for boys.

The total number of students in the secondary stage came to 4,230, of whom 2,899 were males and 1,231 were females, distributed among 32 schools, of which 19 were for girls and 13 were for boys.

The total number of students in academic studies was 140,582, 89,751 of whom were males, distributed among 455 schools, 143 of which were mixed, 192 were for boys, and 120 were for girls.

The number of model preparatory students, out of the total number of students, came to 468, of whom 316 were females, distributed among two schools for boys and girls. The students in the commercial section totalled 160, those in the agricultural section 105, and those in Islamic secondary 171. The number of students in the Male and Female Teachers' Institute came to 813, 455 of whom were male, distributed among six institutes, four of which were for girls. The number of students in the preparatory Islamic institutes in the mosques came to 567, distributed among seven religious institutes.

The number of students in other types of education came to 2,284 of the total number, 1,610 of whom were female, distributed among 18 schools, 15 of which were for boys.

The total number of schools and institutes in the three stages throughout the sultanate came to 473, 143 of which were mixed, 207 were for boys, and 123 were for girls.

The total number of male students in various types of education in the three stages was 91,361, and the female students numbered 51,505.

The total number of teachers in faculties in schools and institutes throughout the sultanate came to 7,646, of whom 5,183 were male and 2,463 female.

In another area, more than 9,000 male and female students took examinations for preparatory and general secondary certificates in 1982-83.

The number of people sitting for general secondary examinations in their two sections, science and literature, came to 1,813, 1,225 of whom were in the literature section.

Fifty-nine sat for [examinations] from Islamic general secondary and studies, 35 of whom were in the literature sections. The number of people taking teachers' secondary examinations was 254.

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CSO: 4404/507

IMPACT OF SYRIAN CONTROL OVER PLO DISSIDENTS DISCUSSED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 16 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by Jihad al-Khazin: "Abu 'Ammar and Confrontation With Syria Over Freedom of Palestinian Will"]

[Text] I have read the important interview conducted by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT with Yasir 'Arafat in Tunis and found Abu 'Ammar saying only indirectly that his disagreement is with Syria, even though there isn't a single Arab who doesn't know that the disagreement is between 'Arafat and President Hafiz al-Asad or between the PLO and the Syrian regime.

I believe that Abu 'Ammar deserves that his friends, or the people who support what the PLO, if not its chairman personally, represents, rise to defend him or at least speak up fearlessly and call things by their true name, so that what is said is not "certain circles, factions, elements, regime or regimes" but rather "this man specifically or this state specifically."

Thus, I say that the disagreement is between the PLO and the Syrian regime in general and between 'Arafat and President al-Asad in particular.

If we want to be objective, we do not say this or that man is wrong. Perhaps both men have striven for what is good but one missed and the other hit the target. However, I want to tell the readers a story of Abu 'Ammar and the Syrian regime in which I was involved and which I had not expected to publish for a long time and then only as an historical incident.

The entire story began and ended in the first 6 months of 1975. I am now writing from memory because I want to explain what is happening today on the basis of what happened yesterday. As for writing history and the absolute accuracy it requires, that is another matter.

Now, I beg the readers to be patient while I recount my story chronologically despite the almost crime-story suspense it contains.

At the outset of 1975, there was great clamor in the west against air hijacking incidents, especially when a damaging incident was perpetrated in Europe by a mentally unbalanced individual. Fatah wanted to disclaim any connection with the hijacking incidents and any attempts to defend those who perpetrated

them. So Fatah invited a number of Arab and foreign journalists in Beirut to attend a press conference in Damascus to show them two Palestinians it had imprisoned after they had hijacked a plane in the Gulf.

At the time, I was the chief editor of an English-language newspaper published in Beirut. Ziyad 'Abd-al-Fattah, who was then and still is chief editor of the PALESTINIAN NEWS AGENCY (WAFA), explained the issue to me and asked me to accompany him in his car, or mine, to Damascus. I found out that what was wanted was propaganda for Fatah and not the coverage of a real news event. The two detainees had been in Fatah jails for many months. So I decided to send Anita Evans, a British journalist who was working with us at the time.

I explained the issue to Miss Evans and asked her to use her presence in Damascus to arrange a meeting for me with Brig Gen Misbah al-Budayri, the Palestinian Liberation Army commander, so that I could interview him on the issue of the alleged presence of units of the Liberation Army in South Lebanon, an issue that at the time received as much international attention as plane hijackings.

Miss Evans attended the press conference and then contacted Brig Gen Misbah al-Budayri's headquarters from inside WAFA's offices to request an appointment for me. Brigadier General al-Budayri immediately sent her a jeep that took her to him, and he gave her the interview on the spot.

Miss Evans returned to Ziyad 'Abd-al-Fattah's car, the same way she had gone to Damascus. But as soon as the car left Damascus, two traffic policemen stopped it because its lights were not on. The policemen found that the car did not carry any documents. 'Abd al-Fattah told the policemen that he was WAFA's chief editor but they did not believe him because he, too, did not have any documents on him. The incident ended with the car impounded and 'Abd al-Fattah taken to a police station. Miss Evans found herself on the road. But her wait did not last long. She was a pretty blonde and soon somebody came along to give her a ride to Beirut.

I have recounted these details for their importance, not for entertainment. Had Miss Evans stayed with 'Abd-al-Fattah in his car, she would have told him about the interview and he would have appreciated its importance and would have contacted me immediately upon their arrival in Beirut. But the impoundment of the car and his detention made him to miss the opportunity to discover that Miss Evans had had an important interview with the Liberation Army commander.

Miss Evans finally arrived at the newspaper offices in Beirut after 2100. I had left the offices to attend an official function. The deputy chief editor dragged me away from the dinner by telephone to explain to me what had happened in Damascus and to tell me that Miss Evans had returned not only with the details of the press conference but with an exclusive and fiery interview with Brigadier General al-Budayri.

I suggested to the deputy chief editor, who was a friend in addition to being a colleague whom I had known since childhood, that he devote the top part of

the front page to the exclusive interview and publish the press conference, in which we had participated along with tens of other publications, at the bottom of the page.

The deputy chief editor, who now holds an important job in Washington, told me that Brigadier General al-Budayri attacked the PLO and 'Arafat violently. I was surprised by this because I had not been aware of the presence of disagreement between the two men. I had also assumed that Brigadier General al-Budayri was a part of the PLO.

However, I was determined to publish the interview, which I considered a journalistic scoop because the Liberation Army commander had never given such an interview before. I suggested to the deputy chief editor that he soften the violent attack and omit any phrases that might offend 'Arafat personally. At my insistence, the deputy chief editor accepted the suggestion begrudgingly.

I was still reading the interview, both the English version and the Arabic translation in a sister paper, at the break of dawn when I realized that the attack was much more intense and violent than I had expected, and I waited for the calls to begin.

Abu 'Ammar was enraged at me and he asked a friend of mine, Abu al-Za'im, to question me. I told Abu al-Za'im exactly what had happened and Abu 'Ammar's anger was quickly allayed when he saw the passages omitted from the interview--omissions that proved the newspaper's goodwill and Brigadier General al-Budayri's ill will.

Let me pause here to point out that appointment of the Liberation Army commander used to take place through agreement between Syria and the PLO by way of proposals and nominations by both sides.

Only a few days passed when the PLO Central Committee convened in Damascus and voted on whether to expel Brigadier General al-Budayri from his post, with 6 votes for and 6 votes against the expulsion. There were 13 members present and the last was Faruq al-Qaddumi (Abu al-Lutf), who stood up to say that the Liberation Army commander had made a mistake and apologized and that Abu 'Ammar, the father of the revolution, had a great heart or something of the sort and that, therefore, he would vote for Brigadier General al-Budayri to remain in his post.

Thus, Fatah made it clear to Brigadier General al-Budayri that he was staying with its approval, even though it could not in fact dismiss him because such a decision required Syria's approval.

A few more days passed and Abu 'Ammar met with President al-Asad, complained to him about al-Budayri and told him the story of the interview. President al-Asad said in reply that 'Arafat was the commander in chief of the revolution and that he had the power to dismiss the Liberation Army commander if he wished to do so.

This was the go-ahead that Abu 'Ammar wanted. The Central Committee met again and voted 13 to 1 to dismiss Brigadier General al-Budayri. The committee also announced a number of military transfers that affected numerous commanders.

The new commander and his chiefs of staff came to take over their posts only to find the dismissed officers, their supporters and the Syrian commando force opening fire on them and defending the stay of the dismissed or transferred commanders.

Brigadier General al-Budayri and his men remained in their posts in spite of the PLO and the declared decisions of its Central Committee. Thus, numerous units, and even sectors such as supply and equipment, came to have two commanders. The Liberation Army became totally paralyzed because nobody knew who was really in charge.

A few weeks later, I met a Palestinian commander who had just returned from his service in South Lebanon. As soon as he heard my name, he told me with bitterness the catastrophe the Liberation Army had been experiencing since the interview and since the decision that was not carried out and which Abu 'Ammar had been lured to make in the belief that he had the Syrian regime's approval.

As a result, the Liberation Army remained idle and paralyzed until the start of the civil war in Lebanon. Then there was the confrontation between the Palestinian and Syrian forces in 1976. As a result of this confrontation, the PLO regained the purely Palestinian forces while Syria retained the forces considered pro-Syrian.

And now, what happened in 1975 is being repeated on a more serious and broader scale. But the principle is the same.

When the latest split erupted, a number of PLO leaders went to 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam to seek clarifications from him on the issue, considering that no split could develop without the prior approval of the Syrian regime. Khaddam told the leaders present that his suggestion was that the dissenters and the loyalists split the positions equally. This proposal is still alive and is being reiterated to this moment. If carried out, the proposal would mean the actual end of the PLO, just as duality was the end of the Liberation Army as an independent force in 1975.

The truth is that the dissenters' statements about the causes of their dissent are beautiful. But we don't believe these statements because they are mere words that mean nothing. What is more important is that we compare what we know about the position of Abu 'Ammar and of those who want to topple him, namely, the Syrian regime that is behind the dissenters, and then determine the main reason for the existing problem. Egypt is playing the card of its military, human and numerical weight and the Arab oil-producing countries are playing the economic card. As for the Syrian regime, it has nothing other than the Palestinian card to offer because nobody will play with the Syrian regime without this card.

8494

CSO: 4404/531

SAUDI ARABIA

WEST GERMAN ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 292, 27 Jun 83 pp 27-29

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali Qasim: "Kohl Announces Entering Competition; German Arms for Saudi Arabia Instead of American?"]

[Text] In an important step, considered the first of its kind in the history of the world-wide competition which has been going on for several years to win contracts to export arms to the Arab military market, West Germany officially announced its desire to enter the arena of this competition. It hopes thereby to be able to win a major share in a market which has continued for a rather long time to form one of the most important--and absolutely the most vigorous--of the arms markets in the world. The West German announcement came as a surprise, attracting attention on more than one level. Although this announcement has not been a radical and complete departure from the traditional German policy which has been followed only with regard to arms exportation abroad, nonetheless it is a significant step in that it places Germany in a position of direct competition with its foremost ally in the world, the United States. Thus, the two parties are waging a stubborn struggle at the present time, and have been remaining silent to a great extent for the sake of winning a probable Saudi tank deal which, in the event it is concluded, will form one of the biggest deals of the era, a deal with a very far-reaching effect on political and military levels.

About 2 years ago, German industrial sources leaked to the specialized news media news to the effect that Saudi Arabia was interested in purchasing military equipment of German manufacture. This was a part of efforts to build the Saudi armed forces and modernize their equipment in all areas. In spite of that fact that the Saudis refrained from commenting on the German news at that time, its corroboration increased gradually, especially in light of secret discussions which occurred at that time on various levels between the Saudi and German parties. These discussions were crowned in public during the visit to Saudi Arabia in that period by the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.

The truth of the Saudi intentions became clear later. They turned out to be concentrated on modernizing the armored forces operating in the Saudi army by providing these forces with large amounts of the advanced equipment which is currently produced in West Germany.

It was learned at a later date that the Saudis informed the German government of their desire to obtain about 800 new Leopard-2 tanks and a like number of MARDER armored infantry fighting vehicles, in addition to 200 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (i.e., mounted on a tank chassis), consisting of a twin 30 mm gun mounted on a Leopard-1 tank chassis.

In this connection it is noteworthy that three models of weapons mentioned above are considered among the most advanced and modern of their type in the world. The Leopard-2 tank belongs to the world's new generation of main battle tanks. Work on its development began in the late seventies in order to provide it to the German armored forces starting in 1982. It is considered equal, from the standpoint of level and effectiveness, to the most modern of the tanks which have been developed and produced in the world at the present time, such as the new American M-1 Abrams, the British Challenger, the French AMX-40, and the Soviet T-80. It might stir up attention to note that the Germans consider the Leopard-2 superior to and more effective than the American M-1 Abrams, for which the United States has so far spent several billions of dollars on programs that call for its development and production.

However, the two tanks were designed equal, and the situation reached a point which compelled the American army to think earnestly about the possibility of cancelling the Abrams tank program and supplying German Leopard-2 tanks in its place, to be produced in the United States on the basis of official German licensing. By its very nature, such a step tended to stir up strong negative reactions in American military manufacturing circles. This resulted in disregarding such an action and forcing the American army command, therefore, to be satisfied with the M-1 Abrams as the new model to supply its armored forces, in spite of the numerous, continuing problems faced by efforts to produce it. At the same time, the army command reached an interim solution which requires relying upon the German Rheinmetall 120mm gun, used on the Leopard-2 tank, to equip the Abrams tank, instead of the American M-68 105mm gun, which is less efficient and less effective. In fact, an agreement was made between the two parties to produce this gun jointly, a step without precedent in the history of the arms cooperation between them.

Everything that applies to the Leopard-2 tank as opposed to the Abrams tank applies to the same extent to the Marder armored vehicle and the Gepard anti-aircraft gun. Thus, it is noted in this regard that West Germany was the first among the NATO countries to achieve an improved infantry fighting vehicle design capable of facing Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, which appeared at the beginning of the seventies.

Since that time the Marder vehicle has constituted a point of pride for German military manufacturing. No one has caught up with them except for their French counterparts, who managed to produce the AMX-10 vehicle. As for the United States, all of its efforts aimed at producing an equivalent vehicle met with devastating failure until the beginning of the eighties, when a design was achieved for the M-2 Bradley vehicle. It is in the production process at the present time, after a delay which lasted about 10 years.

The situation is similar when discussing the German radar directed Gepard gun, which entered into actual service at the end of the seventies. At one stage the American military command thought about buying a quantity of these guns, which are mounted on the Leopard-1 tank chassis (this is the tank from which the design of the new tank, the Leopard-2, was derived). This was before the American company General Motors [sic-Ford], in cooperation with Westinghouse, achieved the design of the DIVAD gun, based on the M-48 Patton tank chassis. It mounts a twin 40 mm gun which is directed by radar. It should be noted that this latter gun will not enter actual service with the American army before 1984.

Schmidt's Government Refuses to Sell Arms to Arab Region

Thus, it has been possible only to describe the Saudi intention to obtain the aforementioned German weapons as being, to a considerable extent, a fortunate choice. Its importance is that it would provide the Saudi forces with some of the best types of armored equipment currently available in the world arms market. However, the Saudi aspirations have not been realized, but instead have met with a firm German refusal to agree to supply the Saudis with the arms they requested, characterized by the utmost diplomatic decorum. In fact, Chancellor Schmidt's government was intent on abiding by the traditional policy followed by West Germany throughout the past two decades, which called for not selling arms to what was known in the German political dictionary as the "hot" regions of the world. It may be worth mentioning here that this definition has become restricted to a considerable extent to the Middle East, and especially to the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ever since the step taken by West Germany in 1964 as an exception, when it sold Israel 400 American-made M-48 Patton tanks (from German army surplus), with the severe Arab reactions which resulted from it, including the well-known step of severing diplomatic relations during the period preceding the June/July 1967 war, West Germany has returned to following a policy of "neutrality," at least in the field of arms, by refusing to sell weapons to either of the rival parties in the Middle East.

It was natural for the German refusal to respond to the Saudi requests to result in forcing the latter to be concerned about alternate sources of armament in order to meet their defense requirements. It was also logical and expectable that the United States would play a leading role in this area, in view of the close relations in military cooperation and arms that tie them to the Saudis, to the extent that the United States is responsible for carrying out a program to develop the Saudi military power in exchange for deals, the total cost of which almost reached \$100 billion during the past few years alone. Thus, West Germany, unlike the other weapons-producing nations of the world, has stayed out of the competition to win the profit of the Saudi arms market, while France and Britain, and to some extent Italy, have played the traditional roles of competitors to the United States in this market.

Over the course of several months, the program to modernize the Saudi armored force remained conspicuously hidden from the interest of world news media. A contributing factor was that for the past 2 years this interest has focused on other Saudi military deals related to various fields of armament, such as the deal for the AWACs aircraft and the F-15 Eagle fighters which was made with the

United States, costing a total of about \$10 billion, and the SAWARI-1 and SAWARI-2 agreement with France. These two agreements are intended to modernize the Saudi navy as a part of a program estimated to cost about \$6 billion.

Shift Toward American Tanks

However, the problem became prominent once again at the beginning of 1983 when news kept coming out from American news sources that discussed American-Saudi negotiations going on at the present time with the aim of studying the possibility of supplying the Saudi army with vast amounts of American made armored equipment.

The likelihood of reaching an official deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia in this regard continued to be surrounded with obscurity, especially in light of the conflicting statements which have issued from both parties during the past weeks. On the one hand, American information, leaked from the Department of Defense in Washington, asserts that the Reagan administration has, for some time, been looking into the possibility of selling to the Saudis over the next 10 years about 1200 M-1 Abrams tanks and 800 M-2 Bradley armored fighting vehicles. These sources have furnished information to the effect that the aim of this huge deal, the value of which is as high as \$6 billion, is to supply the Saudi army with a new generation of armored vehicles to replace the tanks and armored vehicles which the Saudis are currently using, such as the American M-60 and French AMX-30 tanks and the French AMX-10 and Panhard AML vehicles. In addition, these sources indicated the possibility of taking advantage of the new equipment through its use by the American Rapid Deployment Forces, should the need arise to send these forces to operate in the Arab Gulf area during the next few years. The American information also asserts that Saudi military delegations are actually testing the M-1 ABRAMS tanks and the M-2 Bradley vehicles at the present time, and they are training on them in the United States in preparation for the Saudi Government to make a final decision to purchase these models within a short time.

It was certain that the dissemination of this news, especially the part related to the rapid deployment forces, would result in stirring up strong Saudi reservations, to the point of denying the truth of it in whole and in part. In fact, none of this news has been confirmed since it came out last April.

German Intention Returns

However, the important shift which occurred in this matter did not come from either the American or the Saudi parties, but from West Germany itself. The government of Chancellor Kohl, in what can be considered the first official step of its kind for Germany, declared its intention to enter into the competition for the Saudi armored vehicle deal by studying at the present time the possibility of changing the policy followed by Germany with regard to selling weapons to middle eastern nations. In spite of the fact that the German declaration came at a time when there were no apparent indications of new Saudi intentions to return to a preference for the German equipment over its American counterpart, the bulk of the evidence points to the fact that it would not have been possible for the German government to reach this conviction had it not

arisen from a Saudi pulse-taking operation aimed at ascertaining the likelihood of Bonn approving any deal anticipated in this connection. Naturally, the significance of the German approval, which became semi-certain in light of the latter government's statements, is that it grants Saudi Arabia numerous priorities. On the one hand, among the most important Saudi gains resulting from the purchase of German weapons will be the final closure of the door to the restrictions which would certainly have cropped up if the Saudis actually intended to purchase the American weapons after all of the questions about them that circulated, concerning the possibility of their use by the American rapid deployment forces. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, by its inclination toward West Germany, will have informed the United States of its clear resentment of the irresponsible leaks disseminated by Pentagon sources concerning the possible aspects of use of the weapons which were intended for purchase. At the same time, the signing of any Saudi-German deal in this area will doubtless shape an entrance for West Germany into the Arab arms market through its widest door. In any case, a development such as this will never be in the best interests of the nations which have traditionally exported arms to this region, especially the western nations, which until now have tried to monopolize this market, starting with the United States and finishing with France, Britain and Italy. Thus, in the future it will not be possible to ignore the competition which will be formed by the German equipment in the face of other western military products when speaking of any anticipated arms deal which may be discussed in the future between the Arab countries and the nations which usually supply their defense needs.

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RADICALS BEGIN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HOJJATIEH

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 pp 1, 2

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] Recent statements by Ayatollah Khomeini's heir-apparent Ayatollah Montazeri and articles appearing in the Tehran press make it clear that the mullahs of the Khomeini line have launched a campaign to try to force the Hojjatieh conservative group who oppose them to renounce their views on the clergy keeping out of day-to-day politics and to declare their acceptance of Montazeri as their spiritual leader.

If they do that, it now appears, the Hojjatieh members will be able to share in the fortunes of the Islamic republic and retain much of their influence.

While criticising the Hojjatieh members for their selfishness and inactivity in the past the Tehran daily Kayhan, in a significant series of articles which provided the first open discussion of the group by name, quoted excerpts from statements by Montazeri in which he stressed that any conservative mullah, even those who had preached in favour of the former regime, must not be judged by his record in the past but by his present contribution to the well-being of the Islamic republic.

Kayhan presented this as a generous offer by Montazeri to Hojjatieh mullahs and called on them to get in line, adhere to Montazeri's spiritual leadership and enjoy the fruits of the revolution which all Iranians were now able to enjoy.

The Kayhan articles followed the resignations of two cabinet ministers--commerce minister Asghar Owlati and labour minister Ahmad Tavakoli--who were known to be sympathetic towards the Hojjatieh. So far a third minister, Ali Akbar Parvaresh, in charge of the education portfolio, who is said to support the group, has not resigned.

The Kayhan articles traced the origins of the Hojjatieh movement back to 1962, when Khomeini raised the banner of his revolt against the Shah. They quoted incomplete sentences from un-specified Hojjatieh publications and argued that the group were self-centred and conservative "nitpickers" whose

only interest lay in maintaining their "self-elevated holier-than-thou" position in society.

At no time prior to the Islamic revolution's success had they been in open warfare with the Shah's regime or shown any interest in coming to grips with the difficult task of looking after the interests of the Muslim people. Kayhan said they had no claim to the revolution because they hadn't fought the last regime.

In one of the articles Kayhan also alleged that even the anti-Bahai policy of the Hojyatieh was a myth, perpetuated by Hojyatieh financed preachers. "We have no evidence the Hojyatieh ever opposed the former regime for giving Bahais top positions or giving the Bahai community economic favours," Kayhan said. "We have no evidence that the Hojyatieh harmed Bahai economic interests in the past. It was only when the Imam gave the signal that widespread opposition to Bahai economic interests was mounted and the Hojyatieh had nothing to do with it." The Hojyatieh have always contended they had been an anti-Bahai force since their inception.

Before these articles were published regime spokesmen were reluctant to admit there was a rift between them and any other group of mullahs. When Khomeini had made references to the Hojyatieh in a speech he had ridiculed their dogmas but did not refer to them by name or in a manner that would imply they were an organised group. He had said: "There is another bunch which claims that the world must be riddled with so much sin as to warrant the appearance of the Hidden Imam. These are deviations which must be removed. There must be do diversity (in interpretation of holy texts) and there must be no factionalism."

The Kayhan articles and statements by figures of the regime suggest that a lesson is also intended for any other independent clergymen. The Khomeiniliners, as those who support the old ayatollah are now referred to in Tehran, obviously feel that it is important to draw all the clergy into line to assure Khomeini's power and allow him to extend his spiritual leadership to all other Muslims in time.

CSO: 4600/890

HOJJATIEH STAND ON KHOMEYNI SUCCESSOR VIEWED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 pp 2, 3

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] The Hojjatieh group of mullahs maintain that spiritual leadership must be definitely separated from temporal leadership of the faithful. They argue that government leaders should be appointed from among individuals who are trusted by the clergy and they must constantly consult the clergy in their day-to-day running of the affairs. But the top theologians must make it clear to the faithful that they have no part and responsibility in executive affairs so that if anything goes wrong the people may not blame the clergy.

As long as Khomeini himself combines the status of a chief theologian (Marja-e-Taqlid) with that of the political leader of the country, the Hojjatieh argue, the two functions can be performed by a single person because of the special circumstances surrounding Khomeini's rise to political power.

However, the Hojjatieh believe that after Khomeini there must be a radical change in the system of the Islamic republic and that the clergy should withdraw to the mosques and religious schools to form a powerful, clandestine pressure group and act as real overlords but remain hidden from public view and scrutiny. In this way, they believe, the clergy will have the best of both worlds.

There are a number of independent theologians who do not agree with the Hojjatieh that a peaceful and gradual withdrawal by the ruling clerics to positions behind the scenes is possible. These clerics, among whom one can count Ayatollah Hassan Qomi, Abdullah Shirazi and Mohamad Zanjani, want to have a clean break from the present hierarchy and in fact advocate total withdrawal of the clergy to oblivion for long enough a period to allow people's hatred of clerics to subside. On one occasion Ayatollah Zanjani has said that the main strength of the Shia clergy lay in the fact that they provided a refuge to ordinary people from excesses of the rulers and that Khomeini's revolution has stolen this highly important asset from the Shia establishment. According to him, the main task of the Shia establishment now is to dissociate itself from Khomeini and his followers and gradually

build up its former position of disinterested servants of God. Zanjani is in particular wary of Hojjatieh's greed for wielding power from behind the scenes. He was also quoted as saying that the people of Iran are far too clever not to see that there is little, if any, difference between Hojjatieh and Khomeini-liners.

Against this background of total confusion and mistrust among the clerics, leading theologians--Grand Ayatollahs Marashi-Najafi and Mussavi-Golpayegani--have remained silent and so far refused to adopt any definite stand. Both the Hojjatieh and the Khomeini-liners welcome the silence of the grand ayatollahs because it leaves the scene entirely to them. But independent clerics are highly critical of such silence and say that it is at this difficult time that the grand ayatollahs must come forward and make a definite contribution to efforts to salvage what remains of the influence of Islam among the Iranian people.

Observers believe that the Khomeini-liners will speed up their offensive against the Hojjatieh in the near future. Their tactic will be one of trying to win over as many as they can from ordinary preachers and mullahs to their side. Winning over means that they would want any preacher who wants a top position to publicly announce allegiance to Ayatollah Montazeri. Even top Hojjatieh figures will be welcome if they announce that they accept Montazeri as their spiritual leader.

Once Montazeri is installed as a credible successor to Khomeini, the present clerical rulers hope that they can effectively isolate the grand ayatollahs, who are in their eighties, and then serve a decisive blow to the independent clerics such as Zanjani and Qomi. Indeed, if need be they will declare leading figures among independent clerics as apostates and possibly will have them executed or imprisoned.

What may frustrate this scheme is a negative response by the Hojjatieh. There is no firm guarantee that the Hojjatieh would go along with the Khomeini-liners to declare Montazeri as the successor to Khomeini and to isolate independent mullahs. Such a scheme may well bring about a civil war and a blood-bath. According to one independent mullah, out of some 60,000 qualified clerics in Iran no more than 4,000 are known to fully support Khomeini. When Khomeini dies the remaining 56,000 clerics are not going to remain silent.

CSO: 4600/890

YOUNG SHAH COMPLIMENTS IRANIANS ON SHOW OF SOLIDARITY DAY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 p 4

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] The scale of the silent demonstrations against the mullahs' regime all round Iran on August 5, the Constitution Day under the former regime, has brought a statement from the young Shah Reza II expressing the exiles' solidarity with those back home who made their protests on that day.

Crowds walked the streets of Iran's cities, in particular the capital Tehran, on the anniversary in the biggest expression of antipathy towards the regime since the revolution. There were no overt signs of protest, people merely walking or driving around to show their support for the steadily growing protest movement against the mullahs.

In some parts of south Tehran, eye-witnesses, said groups of men congregated, walked to certain points and then broke up before the authorities could react to what was perceptibly unusual activity.

In his message the young Shah told those who demonstrated, "Your display of solidarity, involving groups all over Iran, has already brought your voice to the ears of the world and has exploded the myth of the stability of the regime."

The protests had provided the exile leaders abroad with a better insight into the way people inside Iran wished to conduct their campaign against the mullahs' regime, he said. They were choosing peaceful protest and not violence and he appealed to people not to be lured into risking their lives and wasting their strength by provocations from the regime. They should take care not to fall for such methods.

The Shah said information had reached the exile groups that many people who had been working with the mullahs' regime had now seen the light and now wanted to join the ranks of those who were opposing it.

"Please open your hearts to them," he said. "Our country is home for all Iranians and every one of them has the right to live their whatever his beliefs." He said their compatriots understood the plight of those who had

to earn their living and work even with the tyrannical regime in Tehran, and so everyone must open their hearts to them now they wished to express their solidarity with other Iranians.

He also called upon the public to demonstrate their respect at all time for the army and other national forces. There must be an end to divisions, for every single Iranian would be needed when the present regime was toppled and all the destruction and losses had to be made up.

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KHOMEINI 'ON DEFENSIVE' OVER CONTINUATION OF WAR

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 p 4

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] In a speech this week Khomeini appeared to be reacting to public pressures to end the war with Iraq when he said that the hands of Saddam Hussain had to be cut off before the hostilities could cease.

He gave solemn undertaking that Iran had designs on not a single centimetre of Iraqi territory and its only reason for attacking on the enemy's territory was the necessity for the cause of Islam and for the world opposed to the Great Satan America that Saddam should be deposed and punished.

Listeners in Tehran said Khomeini's tone was negative and apologetic rather than aggressive; he explained why he felt Iran could not make peace rather than making a rallying call for the war.

In another speech Khomeini returned to the theme of the need for unity of the clergy, a further admission, observers in Tehran said, of the rifts that currently exist.

Meanwhile, President Ali Khamanei has just completed a trip to military installations, prudently those away from the war front. Reports of his journeys on Tehran radio reflect the effort now being made to build up the ceremonial around his position and to heighten his presidential image.

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MUSSAVI OUTLINES 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English no 130, 25 Aug 83 p 5

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] Premier Mir Hussein Mussavi has submitted a bill to the Majlis seeking authorisation to spend nearly 890 billion rials over the next five years on the development of Iran's economic and social infrastructure.

The two priorities of the Islamic republic's five-year development plan are firstly full Islamisation of all government institutions and secondly the implementation of a series of projects to enable Iran to manufacture all the required consumer goods as well as "strategic commodities."

In his report on the plan Mussavi says: "We intend to build up an Islamic society in which all the principal teachings of the faith are fully adhered to and in which everything which the nation needs for its survival can be produced. We cannot relax our guard. The entire world of East and West have put the demise of the Islamic republic at the top of their goals. If they fail to remove us from the face of the earth by force, which they know they cannot do so, they will resort to our destruction through economic blockade. Therefore, we must be able to survive within the own four walls in a fortress republic. That is why we intend to build up an infrastructure to be able to provide us with our daily food, other essential provisions and the weapons with which we must defend ourselves."

Mussavi said that by the year 2002 AD the Iranian population would rise up to 74.2 million of whom 16.1 million would be in the six to 13 years old bracket. "Our educational system must be prepared to cope with this figure of school pupils," he said. By that year Iran must build 15 million housing units for 15 million new households, he said.

He said Islamisation of the entire administration would lead to the desired degree of regimentation and unification. Islamisation would be according to teachings and the guidance of the Imam which will leave no room for deviation and revisionism and consequently will mobilise the efforts of the entire faithful into one "stream of determined and purposeful line of action aimed at achieving the declared goals."

However, he stressed, the plan will not neglect the tasks assigned to the sectors of the economy which are not covered by the government activities. According to him two non-governmental sectors could be envisaged; one would be the private sector and the other the cooperative movement. Gradually, he said, the sphere of the influence and coverage of the cooperative movement would have to be enlarged to embrace all the vital functions in distribution of goods and services. The distribution of goods was too far an operation to be left to the private sector, he said.

He envisaged an annual growth rate of eight per cent for the economy over the next five years but did not specify whether it was to be spread evenly over the period or the growth could be lower initially when the war was continuing. In fact, the war and expenditures involved in building up the country's defences did not figure in his plan as if the economic development was to be fully divorced from the war effort. Only when he referred to the need to build up a strong home-based defence industry did he make reference to the external defence and even then he ignored the current war with Iran which is consuming the lion's share of the nation's resources.

It was also interesting that in his five-year development plan Mussavi did not talk about the thousands of disabled youth who are rendered helpless and unproductive through the regime's relentless fight with Iraq and who now demand specific projects to make them employable.

Kayhan, however, carried a brief description on the plan, a description which Mussavi reportedly provided for the Majlis members. Full details of the plan are to be released soon, Kayhan said.

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OIL MINISTER IS ATTACKED IN PAMPHLETEERING CAMPAIGN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 p 6

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] A clandestine group calling itself Patriotic Employees of the Oil Industry has blasted Oil Minister Mohamad Gharazi in a series of leaflets calling him "a terrorist and hooligan bent on destruction of Iranian oil industry." In these leaflets the group claims that it is speaking for all oil industry employees of Iran.

"Gharazi was placed in charge of the oil industry for two reasons; firstly he was a well known terrorist who took part in the murderous act of burning the Abadan Rex Cinema and secondly he was a nephew of the cursed mullah Mohamad Beheshti," one of the leaflets said.

"Ever since he took over the oil industry he has systematically worked to destroy this precious asset of our nation. Despite warnings by experts he ordered a steep rise in production without allowing the engineers to make necessary provision for the optimum productivity of wells. Under his supervision many oil wells have been simply ruined, machinery has been neglected and instruments stolen.

"Worse than that, he is selling Iran's oil at a discount and has placed his own men at key positions in the marketing department to receive huge sums in kickbacks. He is now more wealthy than many international oil tycoons."

In another leaflet the group accuses the Islamic republic of wholesale squandering of Iran's wealth. "You dirty mullahs receive more money in oil exports than the previous regime ever did. Yet today misery and poverty can be seen all over the country, there is even no foreign exchange to buy medicine while under the old regime the country was prosperous and booming. Today you receive more than 20 billion dollars a year from oil money at a time when due to recession prices of commodities and other goods are very low. You can buy a lot more with your dollars today than what the Shah could in those days because today the international economy is facing slump. But what we see is different. We see misery and hunger in Iran. We wonder where these billions of dollars of money are going. We know some of our money is being paid to international terrorists and gun runners. But even then you should be able to do more for the deprived people of Iran than what is done."

Sources inside Iran told IPS that during the past month or so there has been a sudden increase in pamphleteering campaigns by clandestine organisations most of which seem to be royalist but a few are also claiming to represent professional bodies and civil servants. A reliable source inside Iran told IPS that the new groups usually operate on a small basis comprising a few trusted friends who engage in clandestine activities against the regime. These new groups maintain that they do not seek public office or any such positions. They simply organise themselves in groups to be ready to spring up to support a nationalist secular regime which they believe will eventually replace the present theocracy.

One of the oldest clandestine organisations comprising Iranian civil servants, known as the Iran Civil Service Association, is said to be ready to provide overall leadership for scattered groups when the time is ripe to give civilian back-up to the opposition to Khomeini's rule.

"However," a source close to Iran Civil Service Association said, "we have stopped our own pamphleteering campaign because others are doing it quite adequately. We now understand that the opposition to Khomeini is engaged in a political campaign and not in a military take-over as we were previously expecting. Therefore, there is no longer any need for us to remain on guard to provide civilian backup to a military take-over. We are now finding new ways to help exile opposition's political campaign against the regime."

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TWO CONDEMNED TO DEATH FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 p 7

[London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English; weekly published by an Englishman]

[Text] Kayhan reported last week that Nematollah Assadollahi, a manufacturer from Najafabad in Central Iran, and Hassan Kuchek-Ali, an employee of the Ministry of Commerce have been condemned to death by the special revolution court for economic crimes. According to Kayhan the two men were ring leaders in a gang of "economic criminals" who had been forging official documents and papers to import construction steel and sell the stock to their accomplices.

"All the gang members have been identified and arrested," Kayhan reported. "Among them the crimes of the two were so obvious that the court decided to condemn them to death." It was not known when the two men would be executed or whether they would have any right of appeal.

The report maintains that out of 4,000 tons of construction steel which was imported by the government, only 300 tons was sold at official prices to the right people. The rest were sold at the black market to the highest bidder.

"This crime network had members in various places and there was a mafia-type division of labour among them," the report said. "Government papers were forged, at times all the genuine files were destroyed and forged files were put in their place. This network must have been responsible for many other crimes."

Kuchek-Ali, one of the two condemned to death, is said to have misappropriated 40 million rials in six months. Kayhan said that at least 60 million rials must also have been misappropriated by other gang members and divided among them.

Young members of anti-corruption squad, "armed with nothing in the way of expertise but their faith in the infallible leadership of the Imam" were credited by Kayhan for the discovery of this economic crime and the crackdown on the gang.

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BRIEFS

MULLAHS TOLD TO GUIDE--Minister of Interior Nateq Nouri has asked provincial clerics to provide guidance and assistance to the governors general in the provinces. "Our brothers who are appointed as governors general to serve in the provinces are often young and inexperienced men," he said. "They have to be guided and assisted in their enormous tasks by the clerics in any province they are assigned to serve," he said. Nateq Nouri's statement, quoted in Kayhan, came in a seminar he organised to brief the newly appointed governors general. According to the report, during the past two years the average length of service for governors general has been around six months. It was not explained at the seminar why the governors general were changed so frequently. However, independent reports indicate that constant interference by the revolutionary committees and Friday prayer leaders in the provinces does not allow governors general, who are the highest authority appointed by the government to administer provinces, to carry out their duties properly. As a result, they usually resign rather than submit to pressures from extra-governmental authorities. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 130, 25 Aug 83 p 7]

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U.S. CALLED AN UNDEPENDABLE ALLY; SOVIET SYSTEM PRAISED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 5 Aug 83 pp 3 & 26

[Article by Anis Hashmi: "Another Prediction?"]

[Excerpts] Agha Shahi, the former foreign minister of Pakistan and roving professor of the University Grants Commission, has said that if Russia should attack Pakistan, the U.S. would intervene directly which might result in the outbreak of atomic war in the area. (JANG, 5 June 83).

You may remember that during the East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) crisis, we Pakistanis were told the good news that the United States 7th Fleet was coming to our aid. But the 7th Fleet never arrived and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. General Niazi (whose nickname was Tiger) turned into a pussy cat and surrendered to a senior officer of his in unpartitioned India, General Aurora. Interesting revelations have recently been made public about him [General Niazi]. These revelations, it is said, were taken from the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report.

If you recall, in 1965 the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, foreign minister at that time, informed the late president Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan that he, Bhutto, had been assured by a great power, (namely the United States), that India would not cross our international border and attack us.

Dear readers! Agha Shahi's statement of 5 June is still in the realm of conjecture. But during the incidents of 1965 and 1971, to which we have referred, the news conveyed by the foreign ministry to the president of the country (Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Agha Mohammad Yahua Khan) proved to be false; that is to say, the United States did not come to our aid and on 6 September 1965, India crossed the border at Wagah and attacked the country. A book about the 1965 war has been recently published by the command-in-chief at the time, General Musa Khan in which the 1965 report (about India not crossing the border) has been called a conspiracy. Dear readers! We have said repeatedly in these columns that anyone who has not studied Marxism as a subject in the years following 1917 (when the revolution took place in Soviet Russia) cannot carry on the business of politics because the Soviet revolution gave birth to a new kind of human beings, a new domestic and foreign policy which cannot be understood by those who have not studied this science.

Dear readers! When the Soviet revolution took place in 1917, the intellectuals of the time who were the product of the capitalist system declared that the [Soviet] system of production was unnatural and would not succeed. But behold God's miracle! This system of production is now established in 22 countries: in Cuba in Latin America; in Southern Yemen in the Arab world; in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique in Africa; in China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in Asia; in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary etc. in Europe. But in our political system there still exist fools who consider this system unnatural although Europeans changed their tune after Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb presented their serious arguments on its behalf. But other arguments are now raised such as that human rights are trampled under this system; that religion is banned, etc. etc. But these advocates of human rights cannot see unemployment in their own country; cannot see the centres of prostitution nor the gangs of youths tired of their lives. Pardon me! but these are worthless men who insist upon lying.

We will only say in conclusion that our government did not correctly judge the situation in 1947. We have suffered grievously, and by following this pro-American course we have suffered the partition of our country. There is still time to give serious consideration to affairs; to make the desired changes in the country's economic system in order to be able to establish a self-sufficient economic structure. We should abandon our old course in foreign relations and seek new ways. There is only one way to remedy the mistakes of the last 35 years, and that is to establish a non-exploitative economic system in this country of 80 or 85 million people and, in the short period of 5 to 10 years, banish ignorance and unemployment from the country. In foreign policy also, we should establish friendly relations with our neighbours.

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CSO: 4656/240

BUDGETARY POLICIES TERMED DISASTROUS, POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS EXAMINED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Aug 83 pp 51, 52

[Text]

Ⓒ Pakistan's budget for fiscal 1983-84 makes a sombre reading. There is a gap of some PR12bn between planned revenue and expenditure. The deficit is to be made up by increased foreign borrowing and by imposing taxes on commodities with low price elasticities.

Taxes have been raised on a wide range of goods including fertilisers, cement, gas, postal services, railway travel, cigarettes, drinks and fares. The decision to discontinue the rationing of sugar will mean that sugar will also skyrocket in the near future. The share of direct taxes in total revenue has continued to decline from 21.75 per cent in 1981-82 to 18.45 per cent in 1983-84. This emphasises the essentially regressive character of Pakistan's taxation system – the poorer you are, the harder you get hit on each budget day.

Expenditure on administration is expected to increase by 39 per cent, defence by 8 per cent and debt servicing by 14 per cent during the present fiscal year. On the other hand, money provided by the government for such economic and social services as health and education is to be reduced by 15.1 per cent. No allocations have been made for the provision of Qard-i-Hasna (loans for the needy), the development of the Karachi water supply or the construction of the national Islamic centre.

The government's development programme is becoming more and more dependent on foreign aid. The share of foreign funds in total development expenditure is to go up from 53 per cent in 1982-83 to over 54 per cent in 1983-84. The proportion would be considerably enhanced if expenditure on special development projects in Baluchistan and on the energy development programme is to be included in the calculations.

It is this growing dependence on foreign aid which is the key to the government's economic strategy. The Aid to Pakistan consortium and the IMF have condescended to meet Pakistan's requests at Geneva this year – but at a price. This price is evident in the increased willingness to abandon the programme of subsidisation of essential commodities. This is combined with an increased subsidisation of the private and large scale industrialists. The economic strategy of General Zia is looking very much like the economic strategy of General Pinochet!

But Pakistan is not Chile and America's commitment to General Zia is not of a long-term nature. The deliberate attempt on the part of the bureaucracy to increase economic hardship by inflating prices and cutting down real wages, can be interpreted in only one way. The bureaucrats are preparing to ditch General Zia.

One is reminded of the last days of Agub Khan when the bureaucrats set out to celebrate "a decade of development." Then, as now, claims were made about the "extraordinary high growth rates" achieved, the low rate of inflation and the lack of a "credible alternative" to Agub Khan and his system.

Nobody believed Agub Khan. Few believe the present administration. Indeed, government statistics published in the current *Pakistan Economic Survey* contradict Ghulam Ishaq Khan's claim that "during the fifth plan period economic growth of GDP averaged six per cent." Similarly, government claims that inflation is down to six per cent is nothing short of a sick joke. Cost of living indices have been shamelessly doctored to produce "statistical health."

Other features of the budget also remind us of Agub Khan. There are, for example, the massive increases in concessions and incentives given to the private sector. The 10 per cent surcharge on income of individuals with taxable income exceeding PR100,000 (Pakistan's annual per capita income is around PR5,000) has been abolished. Taxation-related concessions to companies are likely to cost at least PR500m. Tax holidays for investors in "underdeveloped areas" have been extended for another five years. Tax holidays in the government industries and the total exemption from taxation in agro-industries is also to continue. Similarly, income from poultry, fish, cattle and sheep breeding, dairy farming and poultry processing would also remain exempt from taxes for five years.

Tax exemption of capital gains on the sale of shares has been extended for a further five years. Tax exemption for earnings by the corporate sector on the issue of bonus shares already available until 1985, has been extended by three years, that is, up to the end of fiscal 1988.

Then, certain other facilities, for example in the relaxation of the foreign exchange regulations regarding parents' paying for the fares of students studying abroad freely in Pakistani rupees should also be counted in this category. Whose sons and daughters are studying abroad? It is basically the businessmen that will be benefiting from all the foreign exchange relaxation about 'P' forms, and so on.

The decision to abolish the 'P' form is part of a general package to dismantle exchange controls. The government has decided to permit most scheduled banks to remit smallish amounts abroad. Insofar as the larger amounts are concerned, the government is permitting automatic sanctions of PR30m worth of foreign exchange for new industrial investments. More lines of foreign exchange credits will now be available, with banks without reference to industrial clients.

These concessions are likely to have little or no impact on domestic saving. Pakistan enjoys the distinction of having the lowest domestic saving to GNP ratio in the world. The Pakistani businessman invests only that which he can borrow from the country's nationalised credit institutions. His own savings he sends abroad. Ghulam Ishak Khan has ensured that he can now do this with more ease and virtually no accountability.

Such an economic strategy is bound to lead to growing hardship for the common man. The bureaucracy is thus preparing the ground for a change of regimes. Economic hardship will contribute to the growth of political discontent and open the way for yet another army-sponsored coup which promises to set "things right."

There is, of course, many a slip between cup and lip but it is interesting to note that West German intelligence is currently seriously investigating the rumours of a new deal between Ahmadi sections in the bureaucracy and Sher Baz Mazzavi. Ghulam Ishaq's budget may be a curtain raiser in a new political drama in Qaid-i-Azam's Pakistan.

Growth of Taxes
(million rupees)

	1977-78	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84 (Budget estimates)
Taxes on income and wealth	2,655	8,449	8,949	9,999
Customs	7,945	15,000	19,002	20,821
Sales tax	1,614	3,250	3,400	3,747
Excise duties	6,184	12,400	13,373	11,905
Surcharge, stamps	894	835	2,647	4,723
Total	19,292	39,934	47,370	54,195
	13.76	21.15	18.89	18.45

Growth of Expenditure
(million rupees)

	1977-78	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84 (Budget estimates)
General administration	2,057	2,032	2,528	3,517
Defence services	9,400	19,593	23,224	25,219
Law and order	--	1,092	1,146	1,397
Community services	--	855	979	1,254
Social services	--	1,805	1,916	2,143
Economic services	--	949	2,396	2,029
Subsidies	1,028	1,074	1,758	1,916
Debt servicing	3,934	9,107	14,353	16,387

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BRIEFS

ANSARI COMMISSION MEMBER RESIGNS--London, 1 Sep (BBC)--Justice Gul Mohammad, a member of the Ansari Commission appointed to study the question of future form of government has resigned from the Commission. Justice Gul Mohammad had written a dissenting note on the Commission's recommendations in which he opposed holding elections on non-party basis and had expressed the view that in order to avoid complications, the 1973 constitution should be changed as little as possible. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 2 Sep 83 p 8]

BALUCH LEADER ARRESTED--Karachi, 1 Sep (Staff Reporter)--BBC correspondent Mark Tully was not able to listen to [Baluch leader] Ghaus Bux Bizenjo's speech in Karachi's Lyari area today because at the time when he and the other reporters were waiting for Bizenjo's arrival in Chakiwara Chowk, Bizenjo was addressing a gathering on another street nearby. When Mark Tully learned of this, he and other reporters as well as police authorities rushed to the place where Bizenjo was speaking. But by then Bizenjo, unable to continue his speech because of heavy use of tear gas by the police, had taken refuge in a car. The police placed Bizenjo under arrest soon afterwards. Mark Tully obtained the salient points of Bizenjo's speech from a Pakistani reporter. In order to avoid tear gas shells, Tully kept moving from street to street but kept on reporting. At one spot a young boy standing in front of a house offered him water and salt to counter the effects of tear gas. [Excerpt] [Karachi JANG in Urdu 2 Sep 83 p 1]

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